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PART A
I.

INTRODUCTION'

Since 1973, Nebraska has had a "weighing" death penalty system.
In this system, the sentencing court finds statutory aggravating and
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Nebraska Legislature,
which funded this research, and the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, which administered our research grant. Our report to the
commission is The Disposition of Nebraska Capital and Non-Capital Homicide
Cases (1973-1999): A Legal and Empirical Analysis (2001), available at http:fl
www.state.ne.us/home/crimecom/homicide/homicide.htm.
We also acknowledge the assistance of the following people during the
completion of this project:
Research Director: Gary L. Young, Shareholder, Keating, O'Gara, Davis &
Nedved, P.C., Lincoln Nebraska. While Mr. Young was actively involved in the
drafting and preparation of the report to the Crime Commission, he did not take
an active role in the drafting or preparation of this Article.
ResearchStaff: Joel Bacon, Troy Kirk, Tracy Uecker, Justin Walker, Timothy
Kraft, Abel Sisco, Jisella Veath, Tiffini Yeates, Richard Newell, Barbara Broffitt,
Jessica J. Kriebs, Michael T. Muilenburg, Nathan S. Russell, Lisa Schomberg,
Thomas A. Bednar, and Beau B. Brindley.
Members of the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice: Hon. Donald Stenberg, Nebraska Attorney General and Chairman; Hon.
Mike Johanns, Governor, State of Nebraska; Harold Clarke, Director, Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services; Col. Tom Nesbitt, Superintendent,
Nebraska State Patrol; Phyllis Anstine, At Large Member; Scott B. Arnold, Hall
County Board of Supervisors; Sheriff Ralph Black, Antelope County; Charles
Brewster, At Large Member; Sheriff William Brueggemann, Cass County Sheriff;
Chief Don Carey, Police Chief, Omaha Police Department; Stephen Exon, At
Large Member; Gail Ferris, Merrick County Board of Supervisors; Chief Scot
Ford, South Sioux City Police Chief; Prof. Susan Jacobs, University of Nebraska;
Gary Lacey, Esq., County Attorney, Lancaster County; Kathy Moore, Voices for
Children in Nebraska; Donald Overman, At Large Member; Vernon Pearson, At
Large Member; James J. Riskowski, At Large Member; Major Brian Tuma,
Nebraska State Patrol; Hon. Catherine A. Walters, Mayor, City of Cozad; and
William G. White, At Large Member.
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: Allen C.
Curtis, Executive Director and Barbara McCreight, Administrative Staff.
Criminal Homicide Study Advisory Panel Membership: Hon. John Colburn,
Former Lancaster County Deputy Attorney; Sam Cooper, Esq., Former Douglas
County Deputy Attorney; Dan Werner, Esq., Thayer County Attorney; J. Kirk
Brown, Esq., Assistant Attorney General; Scott Helvie, Esq., Lancaster County
Deputy Public Defender; Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender; Alan
Stoler, Esq.; Emil Fabian, Esq.; Gerald Soucie, Nebraska Commission on Public
Advocacy; and Dennis Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender.
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services: Ron Riethmuller, Records
Administrator; Jeannene Douglass, Records Manager; Ginger Shurter, Records
Officer; Nancy DeRyke, Records Officer; and Lorraine Douglass, Office Clerk.
Nebraska ParoleBoard Staff. Barb Wilken, Lisa Peery, Rachel Bauch, Trudy
Clark, Tanya Forney, and Christy Lyons.
Others: Senator Ernie Chambers; Three Retired District Court Judges; Julia
McQuillian, Ph.D., University of Nebraska Sociology Department; Cheryl Wiese,
Ph.D., Associate Director, Bureau of Sociological Research, University of
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mitigating circumstances and bases its sentencing decision on a
weighing of those factors. In Nebraska, judges have the exclusive sentencing authority. 2 This Article presents a legal and empirical analysis of the administration of that system through 1999. Our empirical
analysis tracks 185 prosecutions in 175 death-eligible cases that resulted in 89 penalty trials and 29 death sentences, three of which have
been executed.
The principal focus of this Article is on arbitrariness and comparative injustice in the administration of the death penalty.3 As it has
evolved since Furman v. Georgia,4 the legal concept of arbitrariness
may refer to one or more of the following features of a death penalty
system:
" discrimination based on illegitimate and suspect factors, such as the race
and socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim;
" geographic disparities in outcomes;
5
" random, inconsistent, and capricious outcomes.
Nebraska; Joe Steele, State Court Administrator; State District Court Clerks and
their staffs; State Probation Office Directors, Officers and their staffs; numerous
Nebraska prosecutors and defense counsel; DeMaris Johnson, Executive
Director, Nebraska County Attorneys Association; and Helga Kirst, Executive
Director, Nebraska Criminal Defense Attorneys Association.
2. Nebraska's system is modeled after Florida's system. See infra note 37. In Florida, however, the judicial sentencing decision is based in part on an advisory jury
verdict, which the court is free to accept or reject.
3. In this Article, we use interchangeably the terms arbitrariness, a legal concept,
and comparative injustice, a philosophical concept. Robert F. Schopp, Justifying
Capital Punishment in Principle and in Practice:Empirical Evidence of Distortions in Application, 81 NEB. L. REV. 805 (2002). Each addresses two separate

types of capital charging and sentencing behavior. The first type is discrimination which is both arbitrary and comparatively unjust because it treats defendants differently on the basis of morally irrelevant factors such as the race and
socioeconomic status of the defendant or victim or the county of prosecution. The
second type involves the inconsistent application of substantive standards of
noncomparative justice, which results in either the "dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar cases or similar treatment of dissimilar cases ....
Id. at 827.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. In terms of the "legal" issues they raise, state and federal courts view these
sources of arbitrariness and comparative injustice quite differently, although in
practice all are generally tolerated. Least acceptable are racial disparities held to
be the product of discrimination deemed intentional, purposeful, or "disparate
treatment." Random and unprincipled outcomes raise less concern even though
they constituted a major factual foundation of the Furman holding.
Charging and sentencing disparities based on geography or decisions that reflect the socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim raise the least "legal"
concern. When criminal defendants raise claims of socioeconomic and geographic
discrimination, courts often dismiss them outright or on the grounds that the
appellant provided inadequate evidence. See, e.g., Woods v. State, No. CR-951797, 1998 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *13 (May 8, 1998) ("We are aware of no
case in which a strike based on a venire member's economic status alone, which
was not found to be a pretext for the exclusion on the basis of race, has been
found to violate Batson and its progeny."); Thomas v. State, 421 So. 2d 160, 163
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The need to avoid "arbitrariness" and promote comparative justice,
therefore, shapes the following characteristics that one would expect
to see in a system that is administered in an evenhanded, non-discriminatory manner:
" decisionmaking is substantially guided by legitimate case characteristics
that are substantially related to the culpability of the offender;
" non-discriminatory decisionmaking;
" geographic uniformity in outcomes;
" death-sentencing outcomes that are consistent and limited to the most culpable offenders.

In addition, we focus on the implications of the Supreme Court's6
spring 2002 decision regarding the death penalty, Ring v. Arizona,
for the future of the Nebraska system. Ring requires the participation
of juries in all capital trials, although the scope of that participation,
beyond the jury's findings of statutory aggravating circumstances, is
currently unclear. Against this background, we consider possible reforms of the Nebraska system that will meet the requirements of Ring
while preserving the strengths of the Nebraska system that we document in this Article.
In the balance of this Part, we present a review of the literature
and a legal analysis of Nebraska law and practice, with special reference to the features of the system that are likely to enhance or to reduce the risk of arbitrariness in the administration of Nebraska's
death penalty. We also consider the extent to which the current system conflicts with the requirements of Ring and propose statutory
modifications of the current system that likely would satisfy the requirements of Ring.
Part B describes our methodology and documents the impact of legitimate case characteristics on charging and sentencing outcomes in
(Fla. 1982) (rejecting petitioner's claims of geographic and economic discrimination on the basis that "the appellant's allegations of discrimination do not constitute a sufficient preliminary factual basis upon which to state a cognizable
claim"); State v. Williams, No. 03C01-9302-CR-00050, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 211, at *23 (April 2, 1996) ("[T]he Tennessee Supreme Court has summarily dismissed claims regarding economic, gender, and geographic discrimination
in the imposition of the death penalty."). Our research has not located any case
in which a criminal defendant successfully appealed a conviction based on a claim
of socioeconomic or geographic discrimination.
It is noteworthy, however, that legislatures have specifically protected criminal defendants from socioeconomic discrimination. For example, the U.S. Congress requires that the United States Sentencing Commission "assure that the
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2001);
see, e.g., United States v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that socioeconomic factors were not valid grounds for increasing the sentence of a tax evasion
defendant).
6. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). The changes adopted by the Nebraska Legislature in
2002 to comply with Ring are described infra note 395.
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the Nebraska system. Appendix A presents additional detail on methodology. Parts C through E present empirical evidence of arbitrariness in the system. In doing so, we present both statewide data and
data from the major urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska. 7 In addition, we assess the extent to which any evidence of
arbitrariness (a) appears to be the product of prosecutorial charging
decisions, judicial sentencing decisions, or both, and (b) is concentrated in particular case categories, such as those with low, medium,
or high levels of defendant culpability. Part F, which presents a summary of our findings and policy recommendations, can be viewed as an
executive summary.
There are three main themes to this Article. The first theme is
that the Nebraska death penalty system shows no significant evidence
of purposeful "disparate treatment" discrimination based on the race
of the defendant or the victim.8 However, evidence of arbitrariness in
the system exists with respect to three of the arbitrariness issues
listed above, although, as we discuss below, several findings that bear
on these issues are open to more than one interpretation. Throughout,
we seek to explain our findings, but leave it to our readers to assess
their legal, ethical, and moral significance. 9
A second main theme of this Article is that there are three underlying legal sources of arbitrariness that we document. The first source
is the breadth of the Nebraska statute's definition of death-eligible
murder, which results in capital prosecutions in many cases in which
death sentences are rarely imposed and, to date, have never been affirmed on appeal. It is among these cases that the evidence of excessiveness is concentrated. The second legal source of arbitrariness is
the breadth of prosecutorial charging discretion under Nebraska law,
which contributes to geographic and race disparities and inconsistency in charging and sentencing outcomes. The third source of arbitrariness is ambiguity under state law concerning the right of
prosecutors to waive the death penalty in cases that result in a firstdegree murder conviction and the scope of discretion that sentencing
7. The major urban counties include Douglas (City of Omaha), Sarpy (City of Bellevue and parts of Omaha), and Lancaster (City of Lincoln). The counties of
"greater Nebraska" embrace the balance of the state.
8. Our findings document adjusted race-of-victim disparities in judicial death sentencing decisions in the major urban counties, infra section VII.C, that are consistent with a pattern and practice of disparate impact based on the race of the
victim. These disparities are also consistent with race-of-victim disparities documented in many states. Infra note 11 and accompanying text. However, because
the disparities are based on small samples and are not statistically significant,
they will not support an inference that a pattern and practice of race-of-victim
discrimination actually exists in Nebraska's major urban counties.
9. See Schopp, supra note 3, for a useful discussion of the limitations of empirical
studies of death-sentencing systems as a basis for assessing the constitutionality
and morality of individual death-sentencing systems in practice.
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judges have when the prosecution seeks to waive the death penalty in
first-degree murder cases.
A third main theme of this Article is that the effectiveness of the
system could be significantly improved through legislative ratification
of current Nebraska practices or adoption of procedures currently in
place or proposed in other jurisdictions. This theme concludes in Part
F with a series of policy recommendations that we believe can reduce
the level of arbitrariness in Nebraska's charging and sentencing system. We also present proposals that we believe would meet the requirements of Ring while maintaining the strengths of Nebraska's
judicial sentencing system that we document in this Article.
II.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

An extensive body of academic literature has developed over the
last twenty-five years addressing whether, and to what extent, the
consideration of non-legitimate factors influences the administration
of the death penalty.O The debate over this matter includes a lively
discussion on both theoretical and methodological dimensions. One
significant concern raised by this literature is the degree to which decisions of prosecutors and juries are influenced by the race or socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant or the victim. On the question of
race, most studies indicate that the race of the defendant does not affect the likelihood that the defendant will receive the death penalty.
However, a number of studies suggest that the odds of receiving
the death penalty are enhanced if the victim is white as opposed to
another race.1 1 For example, the Baldus-Woodworth-Pulaski study of
the administration of capital punishment in Georgia from 1973-1980
found that, after adjusting for the presence or absence of hundreds of
10. See David C. Baldus et al.,
Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the
Post-FurmanEra:An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent FindingsFrom
Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1792 (1998) (summarizing studies) [hereinafter PhiladelphiaStudy]; U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (GAO/GGO-90-57) (1990)
(summarizing studies through 1989).
11. See U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., supra note 10, at 5-6 ("In 82% of the studies, race of
victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder
or receiving a death sentence, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods,
and analytic techniques. The finding held for high, medium, and low quality
studies."). The empirical studies published/reported before 1990 are summarized
in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 254-67 (1990) [hereinafter EJDP]. The empirical studies
published or reported since 1990 reflect the same pattern noted in the GAO report. They are summarized in David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT app. B (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2003).
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variables for legitimate case characteristics, such as the level of violence and the defendant's prior record, defendants whose victims were
white, on average, faced odds of receiving a death sentence that were
4.3 times higher than similarly situated defendants whose victims
were black.12
Studies that have addressed race disparities in sentencing have
not consistently found racial disparities. Rather, these studies indicate that race disparities in sentencing are highly sensitive to locality
and vary significantly. For example, Professors Baldus and Woodworth's study of Colorado's capital punishment administration determined that there were no statistically significant race-of-defendant
effects, and no statistically significant race-of-victim effects in sentencing decisions. 1 3 In a Philadelphia study, however, there were
findings of both race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects in jury
1
death-sentencing decisions. 4
Where race effects are present, these studies generally report that
the principal source of these race effects is the prosecutorial decision
to seek or waive the death penalty in death-eligible cases. The literature also suggests that, in terms of offender culpability, the race effects are concentrated in the mid-range of cases where the facts
permit the greatest room for the exercise of discretion. Finally, the
literature suggests that race effects are more likely to influence death
penalty administration in suburban and rural rather than urban
areas.
Some scholars have argued that there are methodological flaws in
these studies.15 At least two Justices of the United States Supreme
Court have suggested that discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty is inevitable.16 To the extent possible, the research de12. EJDP, supra note 11, at 319-20.
13. See Scott Anderson, As Flies to Wanton Boys: Death-EligibleDefendants in Georgia and Colorado, 40 TRIAL TALK 9-16 (1991) (reporting no race-of-defendant effects and no statistically significant race-of-victim effects as found in DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., ARBITRARINESS AND DISCRIMINATION IN COLORADO'S POST-FURMAN

CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING PROCESS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1986) (on
file with authors)).
14. PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10 (finding no race-of-victim or defendant effects
in prosecutorial decisionmaking, but race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects
in jury decisionmaking).

15. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The Racial Justice Act of 1994 Undermining Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial Jus-

tice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 655, 662-63 (1995); John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1998); Stanley
Rothman & Steven Powers, Execution by Quota, 116 PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 8 (1994).
16. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-13 (1987) (citing viewpoints of Justices
Brennan and Marshall in text and footnotes); see also David C. Baldus et al.,

Reflections on the "Inevitability"of Racial Discriminationin Capital Sentencing
and the "Impossibility"of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 359, 371 n. 46 (1994) (quoting Memorandum from Antonin Scalia,
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sign we use in this research attempts to address the concerns raised
by critics of prior studies.
To date, there has been no systematic or comprehensive collection
of information and analysis of the scope provided in this study conducted in Nebraska. Studies with varying levels of detail and method18
ological sophistication have been conducted 17 in Arizona,
9
2
23
California,1 Colorado,20 Georgia, 1 Illinois,22 Kentucky,
Maryland, 24 Mississippi,25 New Jersey, 2 6 North Carolina, 27 Philadelphia,
Justice, United States Supreme Court to the Conference of the Justices, United
States Supreme Court 1 (Jan. 6, 1987) (stating that "[s]ince it is my view that the
unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial,
upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in
the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need
is more proof")) [hereinafter Inevitability].
17. PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10 (surveying studies through 1998); U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., supra note 10 (summarizing findings of studies through 1989).
18. PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, ARIZONA FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES SUMMARY OF
1995-1999 INDICTMENTS: DATA SET II RESEARCH REPORT TO ARIZONA CAPTIAL
CASE COMMISSION (2002) (reporting unadjusted race-of-victim effects in charging
and judicial sentencing decisions but no race-of-defendant effects) (available in
the University of Nebraska Law College Library).
19. Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to
Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1991) (finding no
race-of-defendant effects, but significant race-of-victim effects).
20. See Anderson, supra note 13.
21. EJDP, supra note 11 (finding no statewide race-of-defendant effects, but finding
race-of-victim effects in prosecutor and jury decisionmaking).
22. GLENN L. PIERCE & MICHAEL L. RADELET, RACE, REGION AND DEATH SENTENCING
IN ILLINOIS, 1988-1997, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT tech. app. I, Report A (April 14, 2002).
23. Thomas J. Keil & Gennardo F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky
Murder Trials: 1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17 (1995) (finding no race-ofdefendant effects, but significant race-of-victim effects).
24. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race-of-Victim and Race-of-Defendant
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System (1978-1999) (finding white-victim and black-defendant/white-victim
effects in charging and sentencing decisions after adjustment for the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances charged in the case, but no independent
black defendant effects) (unpublished manuscript available in the University of
Nebraska Law College Library).
25. RICHARD BERK & JOSEPH LOWERY, FACTORS AFFECTING DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS IN MISsISSIPPI (June 1985) (finding no overall race-of-defendant effects, but
race-of-victim effects).
26. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2000-2001 TERM
(June 1, 2001); Leigh Bienan et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in
New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTG. L. REV. 27 (1988)
(finding race-of-victim effects and no race-of-defendant effects in prosecutorial
decisionmaking, and race-of-defendant effects but no race-of-victim effects in jury
decisionmaking).
27. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
(1987) (finding statewide race-of-victim effects, no race-of-defendant effects).
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Pennsylvania,28 South Carolina, 2 9 Texas, 30 and Virginia. 3 1
In this study, we have used the most advanced analytical methodology developed in the conduct of prior similar studies. The analysis
builds on the insights of these studies and seeks to refine the measures of criminal culpability and other controls that have emerged as
these studies have become more sophisticated.
III.

LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE NEBRASKA DEATH
PENALTY SYSTEM

A Nebraska penalty-trial court stated in 1989 that "the state's policy is to impose the death penalty sparingly and uniformly."32 This
aspiration states what appears to be the goal of the Legislature, 33 the
Nebraska Supreme Court, 34 and the penalty-trial sentencing judges
who have addressed the issue. In this section, we analyze the core
features of Nebraska law and practice that are likely to enhance or
impede the realization of those goals or are otherwise relevant to the
risk of arbitrariness. In this regard, we consider the death penalty
legislation, the jurisprudence of the Nebraska Supreme Court, and the
charging and sentencing practices of Nebraska's prosecutors and
judges. At a number of points, we contrast the Nebraska system with
those of other American death-sentencing jurisdictions. In the analysis, we consider the implications of Nebraska law and policy for what
we are likely to find in our empirical study of the system. We also
identify a series of narrower questions that we address empirically in
subsequent portions of this Article.
Our survey of Nebraska law and practice has benefited greatly
35
from an interview with Nebraska State Senator Ernie Chambers
28. PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10 (finding no race-of-victim or defendant effects
in prosecutorial decisionmaking, but finding race-of-defendant and victim effects
in jury decisionmaking).

29. Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death
Penalty in South Carolina:Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV.
245 (1988) (finding no race-of-defendant effects, but race-of-victim effects).
30. Deon Brock et al., Arbitrarinessin the Imposition of Death Sentences in Texas: An
Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim, and Race of

Offender, 28 Am. J. OF CRm L. 43 (2000) [hereinafter Texas Study].
31.

JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002) [hereinafter VIRGINIA STUDY].

32. State v. Boppre, Case No. 35847, p. 8 (Scotts Bluff Co. Dist. Ct. 1987) (emphasis
added). All unreported decisions of the Nebraska District Courts cited herein are
available in the University of Nebraska Law College Library.
33. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
34. See State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 569, 250 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1977).
35. Interview with Senator Ernie Chambers, District 11, Nebraska Unicameral, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 18, 2001) [hereinafter Chambers Interview].
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and an extensive joint interview that we conducted with three retired
36
Nebraska trial court judges.
At first blush, Nebraska appears to be a typical "weighing" state.
The legislation includes nine aggravating circumstances and seven
mitigating circumstances, which are listed in Table 1.37 Upon a finding of liability for first-degree murder, 38 the statute establishes a
three stage penalty-trial process in which the sentencing authority determines whether (a) statutory aggravating circumstances are present
in the case, or (b) statutory mitigating circumstances are present, and
(c) if they are, whether "the aggravating circumstances ... outweigh
the mitigating circumstances."39 Only when aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances may a death sentence be
imposed. 4 0 On closer examination, however, one sees that the Nebraska system is far from typical and that it implicates the issue of
arbitrariness at more levels than any other death penalty system of
which we are aware.
A.

Judicial Sentencing

A significant feature of Nebraska's statute that distinguishes it
from most weighing statutes is that penalty-trial sentencing is performed exclusively by trial court judges. Only four other states have
taken this course. 4 1 The Nebraska statute is unique even when com36. Interview with three retired Nebraska judges, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 19,
2001) [hereinafter Judges Interview]. The former judges, who had participated
in a number of penalty trials, requested anonymity, a request we honor in this
Article.
37. This weighing model roughly follows the Florida legislation found constitutional
in Proffitt v. Florida,428 U.S. 242 (1976).
38. The first element of capital murder in Nebraska is liability for first-degree murder (Ml). The key elements of M1 are (a) killing another person with a mens rea
(mental state) defined as "purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice" or (b) killing "in the perpetration of or attempt to" commit one of a series of
violent felonies. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995). Deliberation and premeditation also embrace the statutory elements of "administering poison or causing the same to be done or if by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the
same, he purposely procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person." Id. The second element of a capital murder is a presence in the case of one
or more of the statutory "aggravating circumstances" listed in Table 1. § 29-2523
(Reissue 1995). All of the aggravators in Table 1, with small technical changes,
were in the original statute with the exception of § 29-2523 (1) (i), which became
effective July 15, 1998.
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519 (Reissue 1995).
40. Id.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995).
41. Among states with exclusively judicial death sentencing, Arizona, Montana, and
Idaho assign the sentencing responsibility to the guilt-trial judge. Colorado assigns it to a panel of three judges. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2000);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2000). See generally Roxane J. Perruso,
And Then There Were Three: Colorado'sNew Death Penalty Sentencing Statute,
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TABLE 1
NEBRASKA STATUTORY AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (Reissue 1995). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
as follows:
(1) Aggravating Circumstances:
(a) The offender was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial prior history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity;
(b) The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a
crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of such crime;
(c) The murder was committed for hire, or for pecuniary gain, or the defendant
hired another to commit the murder for the defendant;
(d) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence;
(e) At the time the murder was committed, the offender also committed another murder;
(f) The offender knowingly created a great risk of death to at least several
persons;
(g) The victim was a public servant having lawful custody of the offender or
another in the lawful performance of his or her official duties and the offender
knew or should have known that the victim was a public servant performing
his or her official duties;
(h) The murder was committed knowingly to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws; or

i) The victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his or her official duties as a law enforcement officer and the offender
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement
officer.
The facts upon which the applicability of an aggravating circumstance depends must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) Mitigating Circumstances:
(a) The offender has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) The offender acted under unusual pressures or influences or under the
domination of another person;
(c) The crime was committed while the offender was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(d) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(e) The offender was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person
and his or her participation was relatively minor;
(f) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act; or
(g) At the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness, mental defect,
or intoxication.
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pared to these four states, however, because it gives the guilt-trial
judge the power to conduct the penalty trial alone or to request the
Nebraska Supreme Court to appoint two other judges to share the
duty.42 On this issue, a recent decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court holds that when the trial court opts for a three-judge panel, a
43
death sentence imposed by the panel must be unanimous to stand.
This research, therefore, provides an opportunity to test the "consistency" hypothesis advanced in Proffitt v. Florida,namely that "judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in
the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a
trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury and therefore
is better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases." 44 Implicit in this expectation is the further expectation
that judicial sentencing systems carry a lower risk of discrimination
on the basis of race and suspect factors, such as geography and the
socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim, than do jury deathsentencing systems. To test these hypotheses, we compare the evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination in the outcomes of Nebraska's penalty trials with comparable evidence from New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, both of which are weighing jurisdictions that rely
45
on jury sentencing.
The literature and Nebraska law suggest that the difference between a one- and three-judge sentencing court may have implications
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189 (1997). In Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana,
judges impose a life or death sentence after receiving an advisory jury verdict.
ALA.CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4209 (1995);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001).

42.
43.

44.

45.

Of course, all of these systems have been drawn into question by Ring v. Arizona,
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Reissue 1995).
State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 328, 632 N.W. 2d. 273, 285
(2001). In 2002, the Nebraska Legislature made a three-judge panel mandatory
for all cases. Infra note 395.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 n.10 (1976) (drawing on an opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court to the effect that a "trial judge with experience in the
facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the
case against the standard criminal activity which can only be developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants"). See Robert F. Schopp, Reconciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Comparative and
Noncomparative Justice, 53 FLA. L. REV. 475, 517-24 (2001), for an elaboration of
the reasons why judicial sentencing panels are likely to enhance consistency compared to juries. However, in Ring, the Supreme Court questioned the extent to
which data supported the Proffitt hypothesis, stating that "the superiority ofjudicial fact finding in capital cases is far from evident," 122 S. Ct. at 2342, and ruled
that, in any event, the Sixth Amendment concerns underlying Ring trump concerns about "rationality, fairness, or efficiency" in death sentencing outcomes. Id.
See infra subsection XI.B.2.
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for the risk of arbitrariness in the system. 4 6 The Nebraska data indicate that three-judge panels are appointed 50% (44/88) of the time. In
those cases, the death-sentencing rate is 51% (22/43), while in the
solo-judge cases the rate is 16% (7/44).47 When this disparity is adjusted to control for offender culpability, the disparity in the rates is
much reduced, but it still suggests that the solo-judges are more selective in their sentencing than are the panels.48 How or why could this
be?
Our interviews with retired judges suggest two possible reasons
why a guilt-trial judge may prefer a panel: (1) reduced scrutiny and (2)
enhanced reliability. The reduced scrutiny theory suggests that when
a guilt-trial judge thinks a death sentence in the case is likely, he or
she may believe that a death sentence in the case will have more legitimacy and attract less legal and political scrutiny if it is imposed by a
panel. The death sentence reversal rates in the Nebraska Supreme
Court-57% (4/7) for the solo decisions versus 36% (8/22) for the panel
decisions-supports this hypothesis, although the samples are small.
Indeed, the possibility of greater deference by the Nebraska Supreme
Court for panel-imposed death sentences may partially explain why
all six of the Nebraska death sentences vacated in federal court were
9
imposed by three-judge panels.4
46. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING AND COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS 26 (February 1981) (stating that an extensive review of the literature suggests that, at least for complex decisionmaking, groups "perform better"
than individuals by making "more accurate decisions and judgments"); Anderson
& Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (holding based on assumption
that there is less risk of arbitrariness in three-judge panels). See also Schopp,
supra note 44, at 524 (arguing that judicial panels are likely to surpass both juries and solo trial judges "in providing deeper and broader understanding of the
societal standards represented by the law and in "increasing consistency in the
interpretation and application of the systemic principles and criteria of retributive justice applied across cases").
47. This 34-percentage point disparity in sentencing rates is significant at the .001
level. One penalty trial is excluded from this analysis because the court indicated
that it had no discretion under the law because of an earlier Nebraska Supreme
Court decision in the case.
48. When culpability is measured by the number of aggravating circumstances in the
case, the disparity is 16 points (.43-.27), significant at the .03 level. When culpability is measured with a regression-based measure, the disparity is 26 points,
significant at the .001 level.
49. State v. Moore (II), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), rev'd sub nom. Moore v.
Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316
N.W.2d 33 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1990);
State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980), rev'd sub
nom. Anderson v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997), Hochstein v. Hopkins,
113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d. 876
(1977), rev'd sub nom. Holtan v. Black, 838 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1988); State v.
Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Rust v. Hopkins, 984
F.2d 1486 (8th Cir. 1993).
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The retired judges whom we interviewed suggest that a more common reason a judge may prefer a panel is a desire for the enhanced
reliability that a panel is likely to afford in difficult, close cases. This
theory suggests that guilt-trial judges are more inclined to go solo if
the outcome is clear-whether it be a life or death sentence. Two subsets of cases in Footnote Table 150 provide some support for this hypothesis: (1) the data in Row 2, Column B indicate that the panel
appointment rate, .35, is lowest in the least aggravated (one-aggravator) cases and (2) the rate is higher, .60, in the mid-range of
cases (Column B) in terms of offender culpability (two aggravators).
However, in a third subset of cases (Column D), the data cut against
the enhanced reliability hypothesis and lend support for the reduced
scrutiny hypothesis. Namely, the panel appointment rate is the highest, .73, in the most aggravated cases (three or more aggravators), a
case category in which the reliability hypothesis suggests the panel
51
appointment rate should be low.
Although the enhanced reliability hypothesis only partly explains
the panel selection outcomes, the assumption that a panel is less
likely to produce an inappropriate or arbitrary outcome is quite plausible. Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court's recent ruling that a
three-judge panel may only impose a death sentence by a unanimous
vote clearly reflects that perception. 52 Another virtue of a panel is
that the augmenting judges are selected by the Chief Justice randomly from around the state. The resulting geographic diversity of
50.
FOOTNOTE TABLE

1

RATES AT WHICH THREE-JUDGE SENTENCING PANELS ARE APPOINTED,
CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
IN THE CASES: 1973-1999

A

B

C

D

E

1

Number of Aggravating
Circumstances and Number
of Penalty-Trial Cases

1
(n=48)

2
(n=25)

3-6
(n=15)

All Cases
(n=88)

2

Judicial Sentencing Panel
Appointment Rate

.35
(17/48)

.60
(15/25)

.73
(11/15)

.49
(43/88)

51. Another possible explanation may be experience. Panels are used somewhat less
frequently in the major urban counties, .46 (31/67), where penalty trials are quite
common, than they are in greater Nebraska, .57 (12/21), where penalty trials are
few in number. However, when the culpability of the offenders is taken into account, there is only a 4-percentage point difference (.48-.52) in the frequency with
which panels are used in the two areas of the state.
52. State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 324, 632 N.W.2d 273, 282-83
(2001). The decision strongly supports the recent legislative decision to mandate
three-judge panels. Infra note 395.
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the panels may reduce the risk of geographic disparity in judicial
decisionmaking.53
B. Death Eligibility, Fact Finding, and the Weighing of
Aggravation and Mitigation
Nebraska has not followed the path of several legislatures of regularly increasing the number of homicides that are death-eligible.54 In
contrast, since 1973, the Nebraska Legislature has limited death eligibility in two ways that reduce the risk of excessive sentences. First, in
1982 it excluded offenders under age 18 from the risk of a death sentence5 5 and, second, in 1999 it excluded mentally retarded offenders.56
In the absence of these limitations in other jurisdictions, either youth
or mental retardation may be important mitigators in both the charging and sentencing process. In the jurisdictions that do expose minors
and mentally retarded defendants to the risk of a death sentence,
death sentences are only occasionally imposed; however, when they
are imposed, they often carry a high risk of being comparatively excessive because of their infrequency.57
A distinctive feature of the Nebraska statute is the much broader
discretion it allows sentencing judges to impose a life sentence than it
allows them to impose a death sentence. Compared to many other
statutes, it appears to create a de facto presumption in favor of a life
sentence outcome.
To impose a death sentence, the court must find that statutory aggravating circumstances "outweigh" any statutory mitigating circumstances. 58 The first issue, therefore, is whether any statutory
aggravation is present in the case. Although the original statute was
silent on the state's burden in proving aggravation, the Nebraska Su53. Contrary to our expectations, the retired judges we interviewed reported that the
guilt-trial judge normally had no more influence in the sentencing decision than
the two judges appointed by the Chief Justice.
54. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.3, 18.2-31 (2001). The number of aggravators
in Virginia increased from 6 in 1977 to 20 in 2002. See VIRGINIA STUDY, supra
note 31, at 9-11.
55. Act of April 20, 1982, LB 787, 1982 Neb. Laws 859.
56. Act of April 18, 1998, LB 1266, 1998 Neb. Laws 760. As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), which held that the
execution of mentally retarded defendants is barred by the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment, this prohibition is now
nationwide.
57. For examples of death sentences of young and mentally retarded offenders from
Nebraska, see State v. Victor, 235 Neb. 770, 457 N.W.2d 431 (1990), State v.
Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978), and State v. Stewart, 197 Neb.
497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). An additional danger with mental retardation is
that it may have an aggravating rather than a mitigating effect. See, e.g., Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
58.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519 (Reissue 1995).
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59
preme Court required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In 1997, the
60
Legislature ratified this standard, which is a common requirement
nationwide. 6 1 In Nebraska, this standard is often invoked by the sentencing court as the basis for finding no aggravation present in the
case, even in the face of quite convincing evidence. This finding occurs
most often when the state's case rests on a single statutory
62
aggravator.
Several of the statutory aggravating circumstances in the Nebraska statute are quite broad.63 Prior to 1977, the trial courts had no
guidance on their interpretation. However, commencing in 1977, the
year its first death case was decided, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has narrowed considerably the potential reach of several aggravators
and has been quite willing to overturn lower-court findings on aggravation. 6 4 A particularly striking example appears in the Court's first
death-sentencing decisions (a quartet) issued February 2, 1977. In

59. State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 559, 250 N.W. 2d 881, 888 (1977).
60. Act of April 18, 1998, LB 422 § (h)(i), 1998 Neb. Laws 117.
61. In addition, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), which builds on Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), held that aggravating factors which expose the
defendant to the risk of a heightened penalty are elements of the offense requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
62. See, e.g., State v. Jones, Docket 114, No. 158, p. 11 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1997);
State v. Benzel, Docket 32, Page 81, pp. 5-6 (Hall Co. Dist. Ct. 1984); State v.
Lopez, Docket 114, No. 521, p. 4 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1983); State v. Lynch,
Docket 111, No. 475, p. 5 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1982).
63. The most indeterminate aggravators are: the "substantial prior criminal record"
factor (a); the "heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel" factor (d); and the "great risk of
death" to others factor (f). NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (Reissue 1995).
64. See for example, Max J. Burbach, PriorCriminalActivity and Death Penalty Sentencing: State v. Reeves, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 547 (1991); Jeanne A. Burke,
Nebraska's 'ExceptionalDepravity' Language at Death'sDoor: Moore v. Clarke, 24
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019 (1991).
Cases construing the "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity" aggravator include: State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d
766 (1995); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986); State v. Reeves,
216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316
N.W.2d 33 (1982); State v. Harper,208 Neb. 568, 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981); State v.
Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261
N.W.2d 36 (1979); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v.
Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497,
250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
Cases construing the "offender was previously convicted of another murder or
a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial
prior history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity" aggravator include: State v. Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987); State v. Jones,
213 Neb. 1, 328 N.W.2d 166 (1982); State v. Moore (1), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d
33 (1982); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977).
Cases construing the "murder was committed knowingly to disrupt or hinder
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws"
aggravator include: State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998); State v.
Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977).
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one of those cases, State v. Stewart, the trial court found six aggravators present, but the Nebraska Supreme Court struck most of
them as unsupported by the evidence. 6 5 This decision sent a strong
signal to the trial courts and the trend in trial-court findings of aggravating circumstances since then clearly indicates the extent to which
the discretion of the trial courts has been limited. As a result, trial
courts now find fewer aggravators: before 1978, the average number
of aggravators found in the penalty-trial hearing was 4.2; since 1978,

the average has been

2.3.66

Judicial comments in sentencing orders also reflect a perception
that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions have significantly reduced trial-court sentencing discretion. This perception was apparent
in the comments of a second sentencing panel following a remand from
federal court in one particular Nebraska case. The defendant had
been sentenced to death 22 years earlier. The court noted that it could
not follow the lead of the original panel and impose another death sentence because the earlier panel "had to reach its conclusions without
the benefit of the significant appellate guidance from the Nebraska
Supreme Court with which we have been favored in the intervening
years." 67 In short, on the same evidence, statutory aggravators that
the court found to exist in the early years were simply not present or
carried much less "weight" in later years.
Another distinctive feature of the Nebraska system is the discretion that it gives the sentencing court to impose a life sentence even
when it finds aggravation but no mitigation in the case. One can reasonably argue that when no mitigation is present, any level of aggravation is sufficient to outweigh the mitigation. Indeed, in at least one
Cases construing the "great risk of death to at least several persons" aggravator include: State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v.
Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497,
250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
Cases construing the "murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of such crime"
aggravator include: State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000);
State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998); State v. Joubert, 224 Neb.
411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706
(1986); State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707, 371 N.W.2d 708 (1985); State v. Holtan, 197
Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867
(1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
65. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 520-26, 250 N.W.2d 849, 863-66 (1977). In the
Stewart opinion, it is a bit unclear if the court struck four or five of the
aggravators.
66. In the cases originally death-sentenced that were retried after a judicial remand,
the following changes occurred in terms of the number of a statutory aggravating
circumstances found by the court: Anderson (2 to 1); Bird Head (3 to 2);
Drinkwalter (2 to 1); Hochstein (2 to 1); Holtan (4 to 2); Rust (4 to 2).
67. State v. Rust, Docket 91, No. 555, p. 27 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1997); see also
State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d. 876 (1977).
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state, Pennsylvania, the statute mandates a death sentence when aggravation is found but mitigation is not found.6s In Philadelphia
County, 55% (63/114) of the death sentences are imposed under this
circumstance. 6 9 If that rule had pertained in Nebraska during the period of this study, we could have seen 35 rather than the 29 death
70
sentences actually imposed.
As noted above, when both aggravation and mitigation have been
found, the Nebraska statute permits the imposition of a death sentence only when the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. Those
words do not specify explicitly the degree to which the aggravation
must outweigh the mitigation. Nevertheless, the text of the statute
also states that when both aggravation and mitigation are found, the
court must first determine whether the mitigating circumstances "approach or exceed" the aggravation in the case. 7 1 The Nebraska Supreme Court made clear early on that mitigation which merely
"approaches" the aggravation may justify a life sentence. 72 The practical effect of this rule is that the aggravation must substantially outweigh the mitigation in the case. A number of life sentences have
73
been imposed on this ground.
Another important issue concerns the minimal level of aggravation
that must be present in the case to "justify" imposition of a death sentence within the meaning of section 29-2522(1). The specific question
raised by its language is "[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify" a death sentence (emphasis added). The use of
the plural "circumstances" suggests that more than one aggravator is
required to justify a death sentence. However, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the weighing issue is qualitative with respect to both the aggravators and mitigators. 74 Sentencing panels often quote the following language from the first quartet of
1977 decisions: "In the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, we emphasize that a death penalty will not be imposed
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(b) (1998); see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
305 (1990) (sustaining the constitutionality of the provision).
69. PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10, at 1645, fig. 1.
70. All the Nebraska cases with no mitigation advanced to a penalty trial. Two nomitigation cases, State v.Palmer (I), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981), and
State v. Palmer (II), 215 Neb. 273, 338 N.W.2d 281 (1983), resulted in death
sentences. Of course, in the face of such a rule, the Nebraska trial judges may
have been more inclined to find mitigation present in the cases.
71.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (Reissue 1995).

72. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 526-27, 250 N.W.2d 849, 866 (1977).
73. See, e.g., State v. Nielson, Case 8044, Page 124, Doc. Y, p. 2 (Wash. Co. Dist. Ct.
1978); State v. Schaeffer, Case No. 28-279, p. 11 (Hall Co. Dist. Ct. 1977).
74. The reference in subsection (2) to mitigating "circumstances" supports the Court's
interpretation since a quantitative standard with respect to mitigation would require more than one mitigator to "approach" or exceed the "weight" of the aggravation in the case.
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simply because the aggravating circumstances may outnumber the
mitigating circumstances. Rather, the test is whether the aggravating
circumstances in comparison outweigh the mitigating circumstances." 7 5 Nevertheless, the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the
death sentences in the two single-aggravator death cases it has reviewed. 76 Moreover, in single-aggravator cases, penalty-trial judges
have routinely found that the aggravation failed to "justify" the imposition of a death sentence even in the absence of mitigation, and not
uncommonly they pointedly note the "lone" or "only one" aggravator in
77
the case.
In spite of this evidence, the retired judges we interviewed completely rejected the suggestion that a "rule of one" or any other quantitative standards were perceived to exist or were applied by either the
Nebraska Supreme Court or the trial courts. In stating this judgment,
the former judges relied heavily on the language of the Nebraska Supreme Court that outcomes could not be based on mere counts, as well
as their belief that the sentencing courts meticulously adhered to this
rule. Against this background, our empirical study scrutinizes the extent to which the number of aggravating and mitigating circum78
stances, in fact, explain sentencing outcomes.
Another feature of the system that, over the years, may have made
both prosecutors and trial judges less prone to seek and impose death
sentences is the significant rate at which death-sentenced offenders
have avoided execution and have had their sentences reduced to life
imprisonment or less. Of the 29 death sentences imposed (during the
period of this study) against offenders who did not die on death row of
natural causes, 77% (20/26) have been vacated in post-sentence judicial review. Thirteen of these death sentences were vacated in state
court 79 and six were vacated in federal court.8 0 Of course, the vaca75.

State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 569, 250 N.W.2d 881, 892 (1977)(emphasis

added).
76.

State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb 311, 632 N.W.2d. 273, 284 (2001)
(vacating both defendants' death sentences). In the third single-aggravator death
case, the trial court vacated the death sentence on a post-trial motion. State v.
Simpson, Docket 686, No. 192 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1996) (court file sealed).
77. See, e.g., State v. Carter, Docket 118, No. 337, p. 1 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1980);
State v. Rehbein, Docket 113, No. 475, p. 17 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1983).
78. See infra section IV.B.
79. The death sentences of Anderson and Hochstein (I), Bird Head, Drinkwalter,
Hunt, Anderson and Hochstein (II), Jones, Palmer (I), Palmer (II), Reeves,
Sheets, Simants, Stewart, and Victor were vacated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court, while Simpson's death sentence was vacated in the trial court. State v.
Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001); State v. Sheets,
260 Neb. 325, 618 N.W.2d 117 (2000); State v. Victor, 259 Neb. 894, 612 N.W.2d
573 (2000); State v. Drinkwalter, 242 Neb. 40, 493 N.W.2d 319 (1992); State v.
Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987); State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707;
371 N.W.2d 708 (1985); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984);
State v. Palmer (II), 215 Neb. 273, 338 N.W.2d 281 (1983); State v. Jones, 213

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

513

tion of a death sentence does not terminate all risk of an execution
since the state normally can seek a death sentence in a subsequent
prosecution. Nevertheless, of the 21 offenders sent to death row who
did not die there of natural causes, 67% (14/21) have left death row.
82
Three have been executed 8 l and four remain on death row.
There is evidence that the perceived difficulty of making death
sentences "stick," combined with the high costs to the counties of postconviction litigation, may also incline all of the actors in the system to
attempt to limit death sentencing to the most culpable offenders.83
Finally, a less visible, but potentially important actor in the judicial sentencing process is the family of the victim. Since 1983, Nebraska legislation requires the trial court's presentence investigation
report to include any "written statements submitted to the county attorney by a victim."8 4 It appears that victim impact statements (VIS)
in this form are almost always submitted to the county attorney and
considered by the sentencing judge or panel before passing sentence in
a penalty trial.85

80.

81.
82.

83.
84.

Neb. 1, 328 N.W.2d 166 (1982); State v. Palmer (I), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648
(1981); State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51; 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980);
State v. Simants, 202 Neb. 828, 277 N.W.2d 217 (1979); State v. Stewart, 197
Neb. 497; 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); State v. Simpson, Docket 686, No. 192 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1996) (court file sealed).
State v. Moore (II), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996); State v. Holtan, 216
Neb. 594, 344 N.W.2d 661 (1982); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33
(1982); State v. Anderson and Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980);
State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). See supra note 49 for federal
court citations. Reeves obtained judicial relief in both state and federal court.
State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); Reeves v. Hopkins, 102
F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 1996).
Otey, Joubert, and Williams.
State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982) (pending the state's decision in State v. Moore (II), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), from federal
court Moore v. Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002)); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74,
444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 450, 586 N.W.2d. 430 (1998);
State v. Palmer (I), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
The retired judges we interviewed perceive the financial cost of capital litigation
outside the major urban counties as a major constraint on prosecutorial willingness to advance cases to penalty trial.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2261. See also NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1996) (stating that
victims have the right "to be informed of, be present at, and make an oral or
written statement at sentencing ...

hearing").

85. In the experience of Jerry Soucie, an experienced Lincoln capital defense attorney, "there is at least one, and usually several VIS from various family and
friends in every homicide PSI [presentence investigation] regardless of social and
economic status." E-mail from Jerry Soucie to David Baldus, August 15, 2002 (on
file with author) [hereinafter Soucie E-mail].
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Comparative Proportionality Review

Since 1978, Nebraska law has imposed a comparative proportionality review requirement (a) on the trial court in each penalty trial and
(b) on the Nebraska Supreme Court in its mandatory review of each
death sentence imposed. The obligation to conduct such a review in
the trial court before a sentence is imposed is unique to Nebraska,
while the Nebraska Supreme Court's obligation to conduct such a review after a death sentence is imposed exists today in 18 other death86
sentencing states.
The two Nebraska proportionality review requirements adopted in
1978 were part of a legislative package drafted and sponsored by Senator Ernie Chambers, who had been concerned for a number of years
with what he perceived to be significant geographic disparities in
charging and sentencing practices. 8 7 Senator Chambers' perceptions
of the operation of the Nebraska system since its adoption in 1973
were based on a database he personally created by systematically collecting newspaper accounts of the facts and outcomes of homicides
throughout the state.8 8 Senator Chambers concluded that both charging and sentencing practices were substantially more punitive in
Omaha, his hometown, than they were in the rest of the state. He also
perceived substantial inconsistencies throughout the state in death-

86. ALA.CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c)
(Michie 1999); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9.1 § (1)(c) (West 1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035(3)(3) (West 1999);
MONT. CODE. ANN.

§ 46-18-310(1)(c) (1999);

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 29-2521.03 (Reis-

sue 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XI)(c) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:113(e) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 470.30(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(d)(2) (1999); OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Anderson 1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-

12(3) (Michie 1998);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997);

WASH. REV.

10.95.130(2)(b) (West 1990). Florida established proportionality review as a matter of state constitutional law. See Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d
1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) (stating that because it is clearly "unusual" to sentence a
person to death where others in the same situation were not sentenced to death,
proportionality review is required under Florida's constitutional prohibition
against unusual punishments). The Illinois Supreme Court also conducts limited
proportionality reviews under its statutory authority to review "any death sentence imposed." People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1128 (Ill. 1989). The 17
death penalty states currently without proportionality review are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
87. Chambers Interview, supra note 35.
88. Id.
CODE ANN. §
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sentencing outcomes among cases that were similarly situated in
89
terms of offender culpability.
Another feature of the Nebraska legislation that distinguishes it
from any other death penalty statute known to us is a series of "legislative findings" drafted by Senator Chambers and enacted as part of
the 1978 package of reforms, 90 which included:
(a) a finding that "charges resulting from the same or similar circumstances
have, in the past, not been uniform and have produced radically differing
results";
(b) an admonition that the law "should be applied uniformly throughout the
state and since the death penalty is a statewide law, an offense which would
not result in a death sentence in one portion of the state should not result in

death in a different portion";
(c) a finding of the importance of life and an admonition that the "state apply
and follow the most scrupulous standards of fairness and uniformity" in the
administration of the death penalty;
(d) an endorsement of the principle that the death penalty "should never be
imposed arbitrarily nor as a result of local prejudice or public hysteria"; and
(e) a finding that "it is necessary for the Supreme Court to review and analyze
all criminal homicides ... to insure that each case produces a result similar to
that arrived at in other cases with the same or similar circumstances." 9 1

The proportionality review provisions in Senator Chambers' legislative package appear to have been inspired by the appellate proportionality review provisions in Georgia's 1973 statute and the 1977
decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court to adopt a similar procedure
in State v. Simants.9 2 The Georgia statute had important visibility in
1978 because in Gregg v. Georgia,9 3 which upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia legislation, the United States Supreme Court spoke
glowingly of the statute as a safeguard against inconsistency. Indeed,
for the next eight years, there was speculation that the Court might
eventually require proportionality review or some similar safeguard
against inconsistent death sentences. 94
1.

ProportionalityReview in Penalty Trials

The 1978 amendments to the death penalty statute sponsored by
Senator Chambers require sentencing judges to determine whether
89. Id.; see also State v. Palmer (III), 224 Neb. 282, 352-57, 399 N.W.2d 706, 750-52
(1986) (noting legislative history of Act of April 19, 1978, LB 711, 1978 Neb. Laws
621).
90. These findings were passed on April 19, 1978 over the Governor's veto. Act of
April 19, 1978, LB 711, 1978 Neb. Laws 621.
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.01 (Reissue 1995). This latter finding is evident in the
requirement that the Supreme Court conduct a comparative proportionality review of each death sentence imposed.
92. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
93. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
94. Pulley v Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-44 (1984), eventually held that such reviews are
not required.
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the imposition of a death sentence in the case would be "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant."95 Since the 1970s, death
sentences deemed to be excessive in this meaning of the term have
come to be known as "comparatively excessive."
A review of the Nebraska penalty-trial sentencing orders before
and after 1978 suggests that this requirement had an impact on sentencing practices, although the comparative review process applied by
the courts is not what one might have expected to see.
a.

Pre-1978

In the pre-1978 sentencing orders, there is no evidence of a comparative focus. These orders and our interview with retired judges
strongly suggest that the sentencing judges considered each case on
its own merits without any formal consideration of what was done in
other cases. 96 This is a venerable common law tradition and it applies
across both civil and criminal cases. Nevertheless, it was our assumption that judges would confer informally with colleagues locally or
statewide at judicial functions about the characteristics of clear "life"
and "death" cases. The retired judges with whom we spoke said that
such practices did not exist before or after 1978. The strength of the
"each case on its own merits" tradition is reflected in one sentencing
order issued after the 1978 amendments had been adopted, but before
July 1, 1978, when they became effective. Presented with comparative evidence, the court summarily dismissed the evidence as irrelevant because the new law was not yet effective. 9 7
95. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995). This language, which is drawn directly from the Georgia statute approved by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, requires the sentencing court in Nebraska to conduct what
is known as a "comparative" proportionality review of death as a possible sentence in the case. In 1978, this form of proportionality review existed in about 20
other states, including Georgia, but only at the "appellate" level, not at the trial
court level.
Trial courts elsewhere have been resistant to the presentation of comparative
excessiveness evidence and arguments to sentencing juries. Also, defense counsel
have been concerned that any arguments to juries that death sentences are infrequently imposed in a given category of cases, which includes their client's case,
may motivate the jury to impose a death sentence in the instant case to compensate for the other comparable cases in which a death sentence was not imposed.
Nebraska has the only judicial sentencing statute of which we are aware that
imposes a proportionality review obligation on the sentencing authority.
96. Obviously a court's prior experience in capital sentencing would have an impact
on the way it views each case.
97. State v. Otey, Docket 101, No. 489 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1978). But in a similar
case with similar timing, State v. Williams, Docket 49, No. 11, (Lancaster Co.
Dist. Ct. 1978), the court considered the comparative evidence.
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Post-1978

The Georgia legislation on which the Nebraska proportionality review provision is modeled contemplates a bottom line judgment about
the comparative "culpability" and "deathworthiness" of a series of
other offenders with whom the court is comparing the defendant.98
(We refer to these offenders as the "near neighbors" of the defendant
before the court.)
Twenty-five years of experience with proportionality review in
state supreme courts around the country indicates that judges feel
very uncomfortable and ill-equipped to make such judgments.99 Nebraska trial judges appear to share this sentiment. For example, one
Nebraska trial court perceived a problem with the statute because the
language is "broad, vague and presents no definitive guidelines for the
court to follow."100 In spite of this sentiment, we found numerous
statements by judges that a death sentence in the case would be "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases."
However, in none of those cases was comparative excessiveness the
sole ground or even a significant basis for declining to impose a death
sentence. In each of those cases, the clear basis for the imposition of
the life sentence was a determination that no aggravation existed in
the case or some other rationale based on the "weight" of the aggravation or mitigation in the case-all more traditional issues of fact and
statutory interpretation on which judges would feel completely comfortable basing a decision.1O1
This does not mean, however, that the Nebraska judges altogether
ignored the consistency issue. On the contrary, in keeping with tradi98. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3)(2001).
99. The discomfort flows from a concern about making the raw life or death decision,
the high visibility associated with the appellate review of death cases, and the
political risk associated with the reversal of death sentences, especially those imposed by juries in states in which appellate judges must stand for re-election.
Concerns also flow from a lack of consensus on the appropriate measures of defendant culpability to apply and on the level of infrequency in the imposition of
death sentences among similarly situated offenders that may justify the vacation
of a death sentence on the grounds of comparative excessiveness. Finally, most
judges are unfamiliar with the type of data collection and analysis that is necessary to conduct comprehensive and thoroughgoing proportionality review. See
David Baldus, When Symbols Clash:Reflections on the Future of the Comparative
ProportionalityReview of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 1583-88
(1996).
100. State v. Williams, Docket 49, Page 11, pp. 9-10 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1978).
Another court characterized as "obvious" the problem with "color-matching the
[comparison cases] with the case at bar." State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I),
Docket 99, No. 392, p. 17 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1978).
101. Such cases typically do not reference cases on which the comparative judgment
was based. Also, in many cases in which the sentence was based on an alternative
ground, the court simply passed over the issue of comparative excessiveness as
irrelevant.
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tional common law reliance on precedent, many sentencing orders are
replete with citations to and reliance on sentencing decisions in trial
and appellate cases that bear on the evidence required to support factual findings. Examples of such findings include (a) whether a specific
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case, (b)
whether the aggravation had sufficient "weight" to justify a death sentence, (c) whether the mitigation "approached or exceeded" the aggravation in the case, and (d) whether the aggravation outweighed the
mitigation. Comparative analyses of this sort were present in a substantial number of cases, although the level of detail in the analyses
varied considerably from case to case. It is clear, therefore, that the
spirit of comparative review is evident in many cases even though
there is no evidence of the sort of bottom line comparative analysis
based on overall offender culpability that characterized the holding of
Furman v. Georgia102 and was contemplated by the Georgia propor10 3
tionality review statute.
One court, in fact, described its perception of the impact of proportionality review at the trial court level. The case involved a remand
from a federal court of a death sentence that had been imposed 13
years earlier, before the proportionality review requirement had been
adopted. In an explanation of why it was imposing a life sentence in a
case that had originally drawn a death sentence, the court noted that,
in addition to changes in the law in the interim, the original sentence
had been imposed "without the opportunity to consider sentences imposed in similar cases." 10 4 This case illustrates how the Nebraska Supreme Court's narrowing of the statutory aggravating circumstances
has interacted with the process of proportionality review to reduce the
number of death sentences imposed. With the court's decisions narrowing discretion under the statutory aggravators over time, death
sentences became less frequent among the less 'aggravated cases and
the death sentences affirmed by the court contained larger numbers of
aggravating circumstances.
102. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
103. In terms of their completeness and usefulness as precedents for other courts to
use in proportionality reviews, the orders in the death-sentenced cases vary in
terms of the facts and reasoning on which the judgments are based. However, as
precedent, these orders are less important than the orders in the life-sentenced
cases because the death cases all result in opinions from the Supreme Court
which are more detailed and authoritative. The opinions in the life-sentenced
cases vary significantly in terms of the facts of the case and the court's reasoning.
Some are merely single page orders with neither facts nor reasoning, some have
reasoning only, and others are rich in details including citations to the comparative cases examined. In general, however, the orders in life-sentenced cases lack
sufficient detail regarding the facts of the case to assess meaningfully the criminal culpability of the offender.
104. State v. Holtan, Docket 92, No. 634, p. 20 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1989).
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Proportionality review also has implications for geographic disparities in sentencing outcomes. The retired judges we interviewed indicated that sentencing judges generally have limited knowledge of the
pattern of prosecutorial charging decisions in their counties, and even
less idea of what transpires in other areas of the state. Moreover, sentencing judges are not likely to have much knowledge of judicial sentencing patterns outside their own county. A properly conducted
proportionality review, therefore, has the potential of bringing to the
court's attention evidence on the outcomes of similarly situated cases
from around the state. To the extent that a court relies on such cases,
an increase in geographic uniformity might occur; however, the orders
we have read provide an insufficient basis for assessing the extent to
which information on similar cases is systematically brought to the
court's attention. What is clear is that without the availability of such
information, the potential of proportionality review to enhance uniformity in judicial sentencing decisions will be minimal. 0 5
2. ProportionalityReview in the Nebraska Supreme Court
a.

Pre-1978

Throughout the post-Furman period, Nebraska law has mandated
an appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court in all death-sentenced
cases to review the case for possible legal error in either the guilt or
penalty trial.106 In addition, the literature suggests that in death
penalty appeals generally, offender culpability affects the likelihood
that the death sentence will be vacated or the conviction reversed for
legal error.' 0 7 This process may be usefully described as an informal
form of proportionally review. In section XI below, we consider the
extent to which this process appears to hold in Nebraska death cases.
From 1973 to 1978, the Nebraska Supreme Court heard appeals in
five death-sentenced cases and reviewed the sentence in each for evidence of "excessiveness" under two doctrines. The first is the traditional doctrine of excessiveness. Longstanding Nebraska legislation
105. As we discuss below in our consideration of proportionality review in the Nebraska Supreme Court, there is always a question in such reviews of what comparison cases the court should consider. The most basic issue on this question is
whether the court should limit its inquiry to other death cases or should also
consider similar cases in which life sentences were imposed. Since Palmer (III),
the Nebraska Court has limited its pool of comparison cases to death cases, although it has made no effort to limit the practices of the trial courts in their
proportionality reviews. As a consequence, since 1986 some sentencing courts
have limited their review cases to death cases but other courts also include lifesentenced cases in their proportionality reviews. It is clear that the limitation of
comparison cases by the sentencing courts to death cases minimizes the capacity
of trial court proportionality to maintain consistency in sentencing outcomes.
106. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2524 (Reissue 1995).
107. Supra notes 76-78.
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applicable to all criminal appeals empowers the Nebraska Supreme
Court to vacate a sentence it considers "excessive" and to reduce the
sentence to the level that it believes is "warranted by the evidence."10 8
In applying this doctrine, the court relies on its experience and judgment without explicit reference to sentences in any other cases. In a
1977 case, the facts supported such an excessiveness claim and the
court emphasized its power to vacate death sentences on that
ground.1o 9 However, it reduced the sentence to life imprisonment on
the more conventional ground that the aggravation in the case lacked
sufficient weight to support a death sentence-a course of action
likely explained by a concern about encouraging claims under the
quite subjective excessiveness standard.
The court's second doctrine to address excessiveness, which it announced in State v. Simants,11o contemplated proportionality reviews
along the lines of the Georgia statute, even in the absence of "statutory guidelines" on the subject:
While we do not have the Georgia provision for proportional review, every capital case where there can be the slightest question will be considered in comparison with other capital cases. In other words, we will compare each captial
case under review with those previous cases in which the death penalty has or
has not been imposed under the new statute. By this means review by this
court guarantees that the reasons present in one case will reach a similar
111
result to that reached in similar circumstances in another case.

In its affirmance of Simants' death sentence, the court held the
sentence to be not "excessive" or disproportionate in comparison with
the three other death sentences decided the same day. 112 In three
other pre-1978 cases, the court reached the same conclusion with re1 13
spect to both excessiveness doctrines.
b.

Post-1978

In 1978, as part of its reform package, the Legislature directed the
court to conduct a comparative proportionality review in each death
sentence case to "determine the propriety of the sentence of each case
... by comparing such case with previous cases involving the same or
similar circumstances. No sentence imposed shall be greater than
NEB. REV. SWAT. § 29-2308 (Reissue 1995).
109. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 526, 250 N.W.2d 849, 865 (1977) (involving two
mitigating circumstances and one or at "the very most two" aggravating circumstances where the Court reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment because
the mitigators "approached" the aggravators even though they did not exceed
them).
110. 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977).
111. Id. at 563-64, 250 N.W.2d at 890.
112. Id. at 571, 250 N.W.2d at 894. These cases included no comparative analysis of
the facts of the comparison cases.
113. State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb.
528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977); State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 N.W.2d 95 (1977).

108.
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those imposed in other cases with the same or similar circumstances."114 The 1978 legislation also required the Nebraska Supreme Court to collect information on all cases involving criminal
homicides committed after the effective date of the Nebraska death
penalty statute in 1973.115
The first intention of the 1978 legislation was to ratify the Simants
comparative proportionality review procedure and bring Nebraska in
line with approximately 20 other states with legislation that required
comparative proportionality review like the Georgia law. The 1978
legislation also sought to prescribe the approach and methodology the
court used in its proportionality reviews. Specifically, the 1978
amendments sought to require the Nebraska court to apply what has
come to be known as the "frequency" approach. Under this approach,
the court would (1) examine the facts of all cases with the "same or
similar circumstances" as the death case under review, not simply
those that advanced to a penalty-trial or resulted in a death sentence, 116 and (2) calculate the frequency with which death sentences
were imposed among those cases.
Since the court had already committed itself to conduct proportionality reviews along the lines of the Georgia model, it had no objection
to statutory codification of that requirement. Also, such legislation
could be perceived as having added legitimacy to Nebraska death penalty law, since it was unclear at that time whether the United States
Supreme Court might hold that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality reviews.1 1 7 A problem arose, however, from the Legislature's attempt to prescribe the court's methodology in conducting its
proportionality reviews, i.e., the "all homicides" universe of potentially
comparable cases, an analysis of the frequency of death sentencing
among similar cases, and an apparent attempt to bar completely the
imposition of a death sentence in a case if a life sentence had been
imposed earlier in a similar case.
Death-sentenced appellants continued to raise the methodological
issues suggested by the 1978 legislation and Chief Justice Krivosha,
who joined the court that year, became a strong supporter of using an
expansive universe of comparison cases and the frequency approach to
proportionality review. In addition, the Chief Justice developed a
broad-based database of homicide cases and used it to apply the fre114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (Reissue 1995). The statute actually extends the
requirement of proportionality review to all criminal homicide convictions.
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.02 (Reissue 1995).
116. Among the state supreme courts that conduct proportionality reviews, most limit
the universe of cases considered in such reviews to these two pools of cases. The
New Jersey court is the only one of which we are aware that routinely conducts a
close factual analysis of all death-eligible cases. See State v. Papasavvas, 790
A.2d 798, 806 (N.J. 2002); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
117. Pulley v.Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), held that such reviews were not required.
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quency approach in the death cases that came before the court. In the
ten death sentences that were affirmed on his watch, he dissented in
seven on the ground that the individual death sentences were both
comparatively excessive under the statute and violative of "the federal
and state constitutions" because they were imposed "in an arbitrary
and capricious manner."11s The Chief Justice believed that the principal sources of arbitrariness in the system were inconsistent charging
practices by Nebraska prosecutors. 1 19
The majority of the court, however, did not perceive the inconsistencies pointed out by the Chief Justice to be a problem. It was also
not persuaded as to the propriety of his proposed methodology. In
that regard, it first ruled that the Legislature lacked the power to define the universe of comparison cases considered by the court or to
prescribe the kind of data that the court must consider in its reviews.
In Moore (I), the majority limited the pool of potential comparison
cases to death-eligible first-degree murder cases. 120 Until 1986, however, it continued to consider life-sentenced cases in its reviews, albeit
in an unsystematic and minimally documented fashion.
There are several plausible explanations for the Chief Justice's
failure to persuade the court to accept a frequency approach to proportionality review. First, appellate courts nationwide have been extremely reluctant to exercise legislatively granted powers to overturn
death sentences as comparatively excessive. Judges are uncomfortable with (a) decisions that are this close to life/death value judgment,
(b) the fact-based methodology required for such reviews, and (c) the
absence of clear standards for assessing when a death sentence is excessive in a comparative sense. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, no
118. The seven dissents were in State v. Palmer (III), 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706
(1986); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); State v. Moore (I),
210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982); State v. Harper,208 Neb. 568, 304 N.W.2d
663 (1981); State v. Peery, 205 Neb. 271, 287 N.W.2d 71 (1980); State v. Otey, 205
Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); and State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d
18 (1979). He found the death sentences in State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399
N.W.2d 237 (1986), and State v. Anderson & Hochstein (1), 207 Neb. 51, 296
N.W.2d 440 (1980), not to be excessive. He applied the frequency approach with
varying degrees of explicitness. In his dissenting opinions, the Chief Justice relied on a series of comparison cases, while in his affirming opinions, he did not.
See Joubert, 224 Neb. at 443, 339 N.W.2d at 257 (stating there are "no other cases
with which a comparison can be made"); Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. at
74, 296 N.W. 2d at 453 (stating appellants "absolute and total disregard for the
value of human life... makes it separate and different from any other case previously considered by this court").
119. See, e.g., Harper, 208 Neb. at 583, 304 N.W.2d at 671 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting)
("One need only examine two of the cases released by this court this day to note
how the matter of prosecutorial discretion of necessity results in the death penalty being arbitrarily imposed.").
120. Moore (I), 210 Neb at 471-78, 316 N.W.2d at 42-45 (1982) (limiting the pool of
comparison cases to first-degree murder death-eligible cases).
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other state supreme court used the frequency approach, and in 1984,
the United States Supreme Court held that there was no constitu1
tional requirement to conduct any kind of proportionality review. 21
All of these considerations likely influenced the Nebraska Supreme
Court. In addition, the methodology applied by the Chief Justice in
his dissents may not have substantially alleviated concerns arising
from an unfamiliarity with comparative factual judgments and the absence of clear standards. A third consideration is that application of
the Chief Justice's approach would have invalidated a high percentage
of the death sentences appealed.
12 2
the majorShortly before Chief Justice Krivosha left the court,
ity adopted in Palmer (III) the narrowest form of proportionality review in use nationwide-a process in which the universe of potential
23
The question
comparison cases is limited to death-sentenced cases.'
in such proportionality reviews is whether the culpability of the offender before the court is equal to or higher than the culpability of the
24
least culpable offender who has already been sentenced to death.'
As noted above, the Nebraska Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
likely enhanced consistency and geographic uniformity by narrowing
the scope of the statutory aggravating circumstances and its possible
willingness to identify legal error in cases that appear to be excessive
or otherwise inappropriate. Also, the court has given maximum dis1 25
cretion to the trial courts in their conduct of proportionality review.
However, it is hard to see how the court's formal system of appellate
proportionality review could have had much, if any, impact on consistency or geographic uniformity in the state.
One lesson from Nebraska is that proportionality reviews appear
to be a much more effective tool for promoting consistency and geographic uniformity when conducted by sentencing judges than when
conducted by an appellate court. One reason for this comparative advantage is that the trial court has more discretion as a fact finder. But
most importantly, unlike an appellate court, the trial court's ruling
that a death sentence would be comparatively excessive if it were im121.
122.
123.
124.

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
He resigned July 31, 1987.
State v. Palmer (III), 224 Neb. 282, 325-31, 399 N.W.2d 706, 735-38 (1986).
In its application of this standard, the court's opinions normally give no detail on
the comparison cases on which it relies to support its judgment that the death

sentence in the case before it is not comparatively excessive.
125. For example, while the Nebraska Supreme Court limited the universe of potential comparison cases to death-sentenced cases, the court has imposed no such
requirement on the trial court judges. As a consequence, while some trial courts
continue to consult both life and death cases in their comparative reviews, other
trial courts follow the Nebraska Supreme Court's lead in limiting the review to
other death cases.
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posed does not require the judicial reversal of a death sentence that
was imposed earlier by a lower court.
In our empirical study reported below, we test empirically the validity of the Legislature's perceptions of the system prior to 1978.126
We also assess the extent to which the data suggest that (a) defendant
culpability may have influenced the outcomes of judicial review, and
(b) proportionality review at the trial court level affected the level of
selectivity, consistency, and geographic uniformity of the system. 12 7
We also replicate Chief Justice Krivosha's frequency analyses of the
death-sentenced cases that he heard while on the court.128
D.

Prosecutorial Charging Practices

Unlike sentencing decisions ofjudges, the charging decisions of Nebraska prosecutors are not normally subject to direct legal oversight
and judicial review. Nor are there charging guidelines in Nebraska
that limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or provide any form
of oversight of charging decisions.
Nebraska prosecutors also have broad discretion to reduce the
charges in cases originally charged with first-degree murder (M1).129
However, once a first-degree murder conviction is obtained, by plea or
trial, section 29-2520 states that a sentencing hearing "shall" be held,
while section 29-2521 provides that in the hearing:
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to
sentence, and shall include matters relating to... aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. (emphasis added).

This language raises two interpretive issues. The first issue under
section 29-2520 is whether the word "shall" means that the state
"must" present aggravation in the sentencing hearing of a death-eligible case or whether the word "may" that precedes the "shall" confers
on the state the discretion to waive consideration of the death penalty
by presenting no evidence of aggravation. The second issue concerns
the obligation of the court when the state seeks to waive consideration
of the death penalty by failing to present evidence of aggravating circumstances. May the court simply enter a life sentence or must it, on
its own motion, consider aggravation and mitigation and exercise its
discretion on the life or death sentencing issue?
On the first issue, some prosecutors appear to believe that the statute requires them to present evidence of aggravation in all death-eligi126. The "differing results" perceived by the Legislature in 1978 refer to the charging
and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska's death penalty system from April 1973 to
April 1978.
127. Infra sections XI.B and XI.C.
128. Infra subsection XI.B.I.c.
129. In the 174 cases charged with M1, 30% were reduced to second-degree murder
(M2) or less.
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ble cases that result in an M1 conviction, even though the statute does
not state that the prosecution "shall" present evidence of statutory ag0
gravating circumstances in every sentencing hearing.13 This "narrow" discretion approach is exemplified by the Office of the Douglas
County Attorney. During the period covered by this study, 96% (54/
56) of that county's M1 convictions advanced to a penalty trial. However, prosecutors who adhere to the narrow discretion approach often
waive the death penalty in death-eligible cases by reducing a M1
charge or charging less than M1 in the first instance as part of a plea
agreement. For example, in Douglas County 34% (25/73) of all deatheligible cases did not advance to a penalty trial.
Other Nebraska prosecutors believe they have discretion to waive
consideration of the death penalty in a M1 sentencing hearing unless
the court insists upon doing so on its own motion.131 This "broad discretion" approach is exemplified by the Office of the Lancaster County
Attorney. Prosecutors there take the view that they have the discretion to waive the death penalty unilaterally or as part of a plea bargain in death-eligible cases when they believe that a sentence less
than death is appropriate. Prosecutors base these judgments on the
perceived likelihood that the court will impose a death sentence if the
case advances to a penalty trial and on the prosecutor's considered
judgment of whether the facts justify the imposition of a death sentence. During the period covered by this study, in 59% (19/32) of the
death-eligible cases in Lancaster County, prosecutors offered to waive
of the
the death penalty or did so unilaterally. Only 41% (13/32)
1 32
county's death-eligible cases advanced to a penalty trial.
As noted above, the second issue concerns the court's obligation
when the state seeks to waive the court's consideration of the death
penalty. Some courts insist on going forward with a consideration of
the death penalty even if the state seeks to waive it. In one case, a
prosecutor negotiated a guilty plea with a stipulation that the state
would "not even acquiesce to the convening of a three-judge panel" and
that it would advise the court that there was "no need" to consider
aggravating circumstances and the death penalty option in the sentencing hearing.13 3 The court ruled that the state could not "bargain
away" its consideration of a death sentence and that it would be "exceedingly bad precedent to allow either or both parties .. .to decide
130. However, the language that the evidence which "may" be presented "shall" include aggravating circumstances can be construed to impose such a requirement.
131. When such a waiver occurs, the court foregoes consideration of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and simply enters a life sentence.
132. In such cases, the prosecution usually abstains from presenting an argument in
favor of a death sentence.
133. State v. Anissen, Case 2687, Docket 8, Page 19, p. 2 (Richardson Co. Dist. Ct.
1995).
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the scope" of the section 29-2520 hearing.134 In most counties, however, it appears that the court will defer to the state's desire to waive
the death penalty in M1 cases.
When the state abstained from presenting aggravation and the
court considered aggravation and mitigation on its own motion, the
outcome in every case was a life sentence.135 It is for this reason that
we limit our definition of a "penalty trial" to a sentencing hearing in
which the state presents evidence of aggravation,13 6 which is generally accompanied with a request that the court impose a death
37
sentence.1
In the exercise of their discretion, Nebraska prosecutors have no
duty to consider how likely it is that a penalty trial in the case will
result in a death sentence that will be affirmed on appeal. However,
interviews with Nebraska prosecutors suggests that these considerations, in fact, impact the exercise of discretion by some Nebraska prosecutors.138 Prosecutors also have no duty to consider whether the
interests of justice would be served by the imposition of a death sentence, although, as noted above, it is clear that some Nebraska prosecutors are sensitive to this issue. 13 9 Under current law prosecutors
also have no duty to look, nor do they routinely look, to charging and
sentencing practices in other jurisdictions for guidance in promoting
geographic uniformity in their decisionmaking.
134. Id. at p. 4.
135. In one case the court declined to find the multiple-victim aggravator present in a
two-victim murder case because the state had not presented that factor. State v.
Waldner, Docket 2, No. 530, p. 3 (Colfax Co. Dist. Ct. 1990).
136. Evidence of statutory aggravation presented in the sentencing hearing may take
the form of evidence beyond the guilt-trial record, such as detail on the defendant's criminal history, or it may be limited to the submission of the guilt-trial
record, which may contain a basis for finding that one or more statutory aggravators are present in the case, e.g., multiple victims.
137. We identified one death-eligible case in which the state presented evidence of
aggravation but abstained from requesting that the court impose a death sentence. There may be additional such examples of which we are not aware, however, because we typically did not have notes of testimony from the penalty trial
and could not discern the state's argument concerning the death penalty.
We also identified 14 convictions in which the facts did not support the presence of a single aggravating factor in the case (and therefore a classification of
the case as death-eligibile), but in the sentencing hearing, which is required for
all M1 convictions (whether or not the case is death-eligible), the court referred to
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We classified these cases as
not death-eligible despite the court's reference to the aggravation and/or
mitigation.
138. Telephone Interview with Gary Lacey, Lancaster County Attorney, by Gary
Young, Research Director of this project (April 17, 2001).
139. Nebraska prosecutors also have no duty to assess the risk that the imposition of a
death sentence in the case would be comparatively excessive when compared
with the sentences imposed in similar cases.
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Finally, in the exercise of their discretion, prosecutors are required
to consider the opinions of the victim's family. Since 1983, Nebraska
law has required a prosecutor in M1 cases to consult with family members if he or she is considering a possible reduction of charges or a
waiver of the death penalty if it is given in exchange for a guilty
plea.140 Although the statute does not expressly give family members
a veto power over prosecutorial decisions, in practice they exercise
considerable leverage over prosecutorial decisions and some prosecutors are reluctant to reduce charges or waive the death penalty when
faced with the opposition of family members.141
E.

The Implications of Ring v. Arizona for Capital
Sentencing in Nebraska

Ring v. Arizona 14 2 invalidated the Arizona death penalty system
on Sixth Amendment grounds because, like in the current Nebraska
system, factual findings of statutory aggravation were strictly a judicial function. Ring holds that because the presence of statutory aggravation in a capital case exposes the defendant to the risk of raising the
maximum penalty to a death sentence, the statutory aggravating circumstances are an "element of the offense" that requires jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt. It was clear, therefore, that the
Nebraska statute had to be amended to allocate that fact-finding responsibility to the jury-either as part of its guilt trial fact-finding or
in a separate penalty trial, although a Nebraska capital defendant
43
may waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to jury participation.1
140. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1201 (Reissue 1995) (stating that prior to reaching plea
agreement, the prosecutor "shall consult" with the victim "regarding the content
of and reasons for such plea agreement"). Section 29-119 defines a "plea agreement" as existing when "as a result of a discussion between the defense counsel
and the prosecuting attorney: (a) A charge is to be dismissed or reduced; or (b) A
defendant, if he or she pled guilty to a charge, may receive less than the maximum penalty permitted by law," Attorney Jerry Soucie states that prosecutorial
consultation with family members of homicide victims is a long tradition that predates this legislation. Soucie E-mail, supra note 85.
141. Attorney Jerry Soucie states: "My experience is that most county attorneys do
allow significant victim involvement and communication in homicide cases ...
[and that] victims do have a great deal of influence on plea bargains." Soucie Email, supra note 85. Statutory consultative rights arise only after charges have
been filed but family members sometimes seek to influence that decision as well.
The statute gives consultative rights to only a single member of the immediate
family, NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-119 (2) (stating that "victim shall include at least
one family representative"), but in practice many family members and friends are
permitted to participate in the process.
142. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
143. Id. at 2430 ("Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the
functional equivalent of a greater offense'. . . the Sixth Amendment requires that
they be found by a jury."). The Nebraska Legislature made exactly this type of
change in November 2002. Infra note 395.
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Ring does not specify the extent to which jury involvement in the
Nebraska system must be enlarged beyond the narrow requirement of
finding aggravating circumstances. The case clearly does not hold
that death sentencing in its entirety is exclusively a jury function, as
has been urged under the Eighth Amendment for many years without
success. 144 Furthermore, Ring does not require a jury role on the issue of statutory mitigation, 14 5 nor does it appear to require that the
conduct of comparative proportionality review by the sentencing authority, a distinctly legal determination, be considered an element of
the offense. It appears, therefore, that Nebraska's unique tradition of
trial court proportionality review would not be disturbed if the Legislature desired to keep it in place.
The more difficult issue under the Nebraska statute, therefore, is
whether the sentencing authority's finding that statutory aggravating
circumstances outweigh the statutory mitigating circumstances is an
element of the offense that must be decided by a jury.146 The pre-Ring
case law construing Apprendi14 7 in other jurisdictions suggests that
this is a close question. Although, thus far, no case has held the
weighing decision to be a factual rather than a legal decision, a strong
argument can be made that the weighing decision calls for an "ultimate finding of fact"148 that greatly enhances the defendant's risk of a
heightened penalty.
If Ring is construed to embrace the weighing decision, there are
two alternatives available to meet its requirements. One alternative
would be to allocate the weighing decision (as well as the findings of
aggravation and mitigation) to Nebraska juries. However, this would
leave little room for the exercise of judicial discretion and would argue
for allocating the entire decision to the juries, as Arizona and Colorado
have recently done. 149 However, we believe that a return to the preFurman Nebraska system of exclusively jury sentencing would have
unnecessarily abandoned the settled law, tradition, and expectations
144. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In spite of this authority, Justice Breyer, in Ring, concurred on the ground that the Eighth Amendment requires exclusively jury death sentencing. Id. at 2446-48.
145. Id. at 2437 n.4 (noting the distinction in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), between the necessity for jury findings on aggravation versus the necessity for jury findings on mitigation).
146. Ring is silent on this issue. See id.
147. See, e.g., Borchardt v. Maryland, 786 A.2d 631 (2001) (providing an exhaustive
review of the cases).
148. Id. at 671 (Raker, J., Bell, C.J., Eldridge, J., dissenting).
149. Legis. Serv. SB 1001 (West), 2002 Ariz.; Colorado HB 02S-1005 (Act Concerning
Determination of the Death Penalty by a Jury), Approved by Colorado House and
Senate, July 10-11, 2002. Unlike Nebraska, judicial sentencing in Colorado is a
recent development, existent only since 1995. Moreover, the sentencing courts in
Colorado did not conduct a proportionality review as part of the penalty trial as is
done in Nebraska.
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that have evolved over the last twenty-five years in the administration
of Nebraska's death-sentencing system (which we document in this
Article) and could introduce into the system a significant risk of uncertainty, arbitrariness, and discrimination.
Another drawback to an all-jury sentencing system would be the
obliteration of the current recess that now occurs in Nebraska between the end of the guilt trial and the commencement of the penalty
trial. The typical (median) recess is seven weeks, which gives the parties a window of time in which to focus exclusively on the penalty
trial.150 Under exclusively jury sentencing systems, the penalty trial
normally commences immediately upon the entry of a capital murder
conviction. Experience in such jurisdictions indicates that under the
pressure of an impending capital guilt trial, defense counsel is often
inadequately prepared to move immediately into a penalty trial.151
Moreover, the necessity of pre-trial preparation for a possible penalty
trial (by both the prosecution and defense counsel) in each potentially
capital trial may increase substantially the cost of capital litigation.
By limiting the jury's role to the narrow function of finding statutory
aggravating circumstances, it would be possible to preserve the current practice of declaring a substantial recess between the guilt trial
and the judicially conducted penalty trial. The recess would also limit
the necessity for prosecutors and defense counsel to prepare for a penalty trial only in cases that actually result in a M1 conviction and the
prosecution, having heard the guilt-trial evidence, continues to believe
that a death sentence is appropriate in the case.
A second alternative would be to retain judicial sentencing but delete the weighing decision from the statute and adopt the Georgia
decisionmaking model or some variant of it. Under the Georgia model,
the sentencing authority makes findings on the statutory aggravators
alleged by the State and then "consider[s]" and bases its decision on
those factors and "any mitigating or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law."15 2 This approach would appear to (a) limit
the factual elements of the offense to the statutory aggravating circumstances and (b) treat the other "considerations" beyond the statutory aggravators as "sentencing factors" that do not require jury
participation. Except for jury findings on the statutory aggravating
circumstances, this approach would leave the death penalty decision
150. In terms of duration, the recess at the 10th percentile is two weeks and at the
90th percentile it is 17 weeks.
151. With the jury standing by to hear the penalty trial, courts are naturally reluctant
to declare a recess in the proceedings and often insist that the penalty trial must
go forward with or without all of the mitigation witnesses defense counsel would
like to present.
152. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2001). The Georgia law provides for comparative
excessiveness review but only on appeal in the state supreme court. GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (2001).
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in judicial hands, much as it currently is. The drawback of this approach is that it would lose the focus, discipline, and sensitivity that
the weighing decision has brought to judicial decisionmaking in Nebraska death penalty cases, features that are clearly apparent from a
reading of the judicial sentencing orders issued since 1973. On balance, therefore, we believe that the most prudent reform of the Nebraska system would limit the jury's role to the bare minimum
requirement of Ring, i.e., the jury finding the statutory aggravating
circumstances charged in the case, with the remaining fact-finding
and sentencing responsibilities left to the court as they are under current law. In subsection XII.B.1 we consider legislation to implement
this approach and contrast it with the measures adopted by the Nebraska Legislature to comply with Ring.
F.

Conclusion

We have presented above a road map of Nebraska law and practice. What does Nebraska law and practice and our review of the literature suggest that we are likely to find in our empirical study of
charging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska?
On the question of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimination in charging and sentencing outcomes, Nebraska law and practice
give prosecutors and judges broad discretion, but the law requiring
evenhanded treatment is well-known and the issue is politically sensitive in the state.153 Some studies in other states have documented
race effects at both these levels of decision, while others have not.
The issue of discrimination on the basis of the socioeconomic status
of the defendant and victim is different because such discrimination is
the subject of no explicit legal prohibitions and the question has low
political visibility.
The issue of geographic disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes has high political visibility but no legal status. Trial-level proportionality review and three-judge sentencing panels may minimize
geographic disparities in sentencing; however, no legal mechanism
speaks directly to the issue and neither the Nebraska Supreme Court
nor any other state agency monitors geographic disparities in
outcomes.
Several features of Nebraska law and practice and the trend of decisions that we describe are likely to reduce the number and frequency
of death sentences imposed. The first is the legislation excluding minors and mentally retarded offenders from the pool of death-eligible
defendants. Second are the provisions of the 1973 legislation that create a de facto presumption in favor of a life sentence. Third are the
153. The retired judges that we interviewed indicate that sentencing judges are particularly "sensitive" about treating minority defendants fairly.
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trial court system of proportionality review, the trend of Nebraska Supreme Court decisions narrowing the scope of important statutory aggravators, and the substantial record of both the Nebraska Supreme
Court and the federal courts in vacating death sentences for legal error. To the extent that prosecutorial charging decisions bear on deathsentencing frequencies, the policies of counties like Douglas that opt
for death in a very high proportion of M1 cases would appear to cut
against the infrequency goal, while the more selective policies of many
other counties would tend to promote it.
Although this review of Nebraska law and practice suggests a
likely decline in the number of death sentences imposed over time, we
have no basis for predicting how selective the system has been in
terms of limiting death sentences to the most culpable offenders.
Another issue is consistency. Furman v. Georgia teaches that infrequent death sentencing can create a serious risk of inconsistent
outcomes. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court's policy of narrowing the breadth of the statutory aggravators should have the effect of
enhancing consistency, as should proportionality review by sentencing
judges. Prosecutorial policies in counties like Douglas that advance
nearly all M1 convictions to penalty trial may enhance consistency,
while the more selective prosecutorial policies of many other counties
may reduce it.
Our empirical study examines the Nebraska data relevant to these
broad questions. In addition, we test the Proffitt v. Floridahypothesis
that judicial sentencing produces more consistent results than jury
sentencing by comparing the Nebraska results with those from other
states.
We also closely examine five questions that are relevant to the issue of arbitrariness in the Nebraska system. First, how accurate was
the Legislature's perception in 1978 that the system was producing
"radically differing results" in different parts of the state? Second, to
what extent do the data suggest the application of de facto sentencing
policies based on specific case characteristics? Third, to what extent
does offender culpability impact the outcomes of judicial review in the
Nebraska Supreme Court and the federal courts? Fourth, how valid
were the proportionality reviews conducted by Chief Justice Krivosha
as a member of the court? Fifth, what is the comparative level of consistency of the death sentences affirmed and vacated by the Nebraska
Supreme Court?
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PART B
IV.
A.

METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND MEASURES

Introduction

The principal focus of this research is on the disposition of deatheligible defendants, regardless of how the prosecutor charged them
and whether or not their cases advanced to a penalty trial. The Data
Collection Instrument (DCI) used to code these cases is a modified version of instruments developed in other similar studies. It includes
quantifiable measures of the strength of evidence for each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These measures allow us to examine the impact of statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances on both prosecutorial and judicial decisionmaking. A
second and subsidiary part of the research embraces non-capital homicides. We coded these cases with a smaller data collection instrument
that was completed in the process of screening all the cases to identify
those that were death-eligible.
In Appendix A, we describe in detail the case-screening protocol
that we used, our data sources, and our data coding and entry procedures. In the balance of this section, we describe the measures that
we used to assess defendant culpability and geographic disparities.
Each of our measures of defendant culpability is based on a different
but legally relevant foundation, and each provides an independent basis for estimating the scope and magnitude of geographic, race, and
socioeconomic status (SES) disparities in the system after controlling
54
for defendant culpability.1
B.

Measures of Defendant Culpability

As Professor Robert Schopp properly points out, an "evaluation of
comparative justice" of the type we present in this study requires two
comparisons. The first is a comparison of the individuals involved in
the analysis of the "applicable criteria" of noncomparative justice; the
second is a comparative analysis of individuals who are similarly situated with respect to those criteria.' 55 For the purposes of the first
comparison, the criteria of noncomparative justice are the characteristics of the cases that implicate the goals of retribution (guilt, desert,
and culpability) and deterrence. 15 6 Here we draw on the widely recognized concept of "criminal culpability," which embraces the defen154. There is considerable overlap in the measures because of the important role of
the statutory aggravating circumstances in each.
155. Schopp, supra note 3, at 826. ("[Nloncomparative justice requires that each individual receive treatment appropriate to that individual's merit or desert.").
156. The second step of an evaluation of comparative justice involves comparisons of
the treatment of discrete groups of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity,
gender, and other illegitimate or suspect classifications.
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dant's moral blameworthiness and character and the degree of
victimization inherent in the offense. 157 Indicators of moral blameworthiness reflect the extent to which the murder was premeditated
and planned and the defendant's personal responsibility for and role
in the murder or any contemporaneous crimes. The defendant's character refers to his or her prior criminal record, other unrelated acts of
violence, remorse, and cooperation with the authorities. The degree of
victimization refers to the number of victims killed and injured and
the severity of their injuries, pain, and suffering. Our measures of
defendant culpability represent different and overlapping approaches
to the measurement of criminal culpability.
A study's measures of defendant culpability are important because
they provide an objective basis to define groups of similarly situated
offenders. With such groups defined, comparisons can be made to determine if similarly situated offenders are treated differently because
of their race or SES or the race or SES of their victims. These assessments provide the basis for assessing concerns about disparate treatment in the system. Disparate treatment exists when prosecutors or
sentencing judges, in the exercise of their discretion, treat similarly
situated offenders differently on the basis of illegitimate or suspect
factors. In contrast to disparate treatment, disparate impact exists
when the evenhanded application of a facially neutral policy disadvantages a particular group. 158 Geographic disparities are another common form of disparate impact. They may arise, for example, when the
prosecutors in some counties are more aggressive in advancing cases
to penalty trial than are their counterparts in other parts of the
state. 159
Our measures of defendant culpability also enable us to define
groups of similarly situated offenders as a foundation for addressing
concerns about consistency and comparative excessiveness in the system, without regard to the race and SES of defendants and victims. In
such analyses, the issues are (a) how frequently similarly situated of157. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 808-09 (N.J. 2002) (defining and
applying the criminal culpability model in a proportionality review of a death
sentence).
158. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text for detail and authority supporting
these legal theories.
159. Recently documented examples are Virginia and New Jersey, where the evidence
indicates that suburban prosecutors are more punitive in suburban counties than
are their counterparts in the major urban centers. See BAIME, supra note 26, at
53, tbl. A (finding penalty-trial rate of .21 in the three largest countries versus .42
in the balance of the state); VIRGINIA STUDY, supra note 31, at 39, fig. 15 (finding
the rates with which prosecutors seek the death penalty are .16 in high density
counties, .45 in medium density counties, and .34 in low density counties from
1995 to 1999).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

fenders are sentenced to death and (b) to what extent the system lim160
its death sentences to the most culpable death-eligible offenders.
Because of the crucial role of defendant culpability in this research,
we used the following four independent measures of defendant culpability that have been utilized with success in other similar studies.
1.

The Number of Statutory Aggravating CircumstancesFound
or Present in the Cases

The first measure of defendant culpability is the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found by the court in penalty trial
cases or present in the non-penalty trial cases. This is a particularly
useful measure in this research because of its legal relevance and its
very significant strength in explaining charging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska. 16 1
2. Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating
CircumstancesFound or Present in the Cases
The second measure is the number of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the court in penalty trial cases and present in non-penalty trial cases, e.g., two aggravators and one
mitigator. This measure is also easily understood, has strong legal
relevance, and has been used by state courts in the conduct of proportionality reviews.' 62 Its limitation is that it does not account for the
differing weights that prosecutors and sentencing authorities may
place on different aggravators and mitigators.
3.

The Salient Factors Measure

The third, "salient factors" measure of culpability classifies each
case initially in terms of its most prominent statutory aggravating circumstance and then subclassifies it on the basis of other statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case. The salient
factors measure we rely on in this research (presented in Appendix A)
is modeled on a measure developed for proportionality review in 1999
by Judge David S. Baime, Special Master to the New Jersey Supreme
Court. This measure shares the strengths of the measures based on
counts of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and is used by
some state courts in their proportionality reviews of death-sentenced
defendants.16 3 It can also reflect the different weights placed on indi160. In more popular parlance, the most culpable offenders are often referred to as the
"worst of the worst."
161. See infra Table 4, Row la (providing logistic regression results).
162. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1076-78, 1091 (N.J. 1992); Commonwealth v. Pirela, 507 A.2d 23, 32 (Pa. 1986).
163. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 805-07 (N.J. 2002).
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vidual aggravators and mitigators by prosecutors and sentencing
authorities.
4. Logistic Regression-Based Measures
This set of measures is based on the results of logistic multiple regression analyses that estimate the impact of case characteristics (legitimate, illegitimate, and suspect) on charging and sentencing
outcome decisions in capital cases. However, the culpability scales developed in this analysis reflect only the impact of the legitimate case
characteristics.
We first developed a logistic regression model of death sentences
imposed among all death-eligible cases. The regression coefficients estimated in this analysis reflect the combined impact of all decisions
taken by prosecutors and sentencing judges.
We also estimated "decision-point" logistic regression models that
focus on the successive stages at which prosecutors and judges advance the cases through the system. For example, what case characteristics best explain which cases (a) advanced to a penalty trial with
the state seeking a death sentence, and (b) resulted in a death sentence being imposed.
In each of these models, we first examined the impact of the number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances (Model 1).
Next, we conducted systematic screening procedures to determine
what other legitimate aggravating and mitigating case characteristics
included in the DCI improved the predictive power of the analyses
(Model 2).164 We then added variables for geography, race, and SES
of both the defendant and victim (Model 2RS). The regression coefficients estimated for the geographic, race, and SES variables (after
controlling for all of the other variables included in the analysis) provide a useful measure of their average impact on outcomes.
The final models for the four key decision points, which include
variables for legitimate, illegitimate, and suspect case characteristics,
are shown in Table 4.165 The number of variables for legitimate case
164. In the development of each of these regression models, we screened for possible
inclusion over 300 variables related to background and criminal record of the defendant, the victim's background, and the characteristics of the offense, including
each of the individual statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In
the first stage of the screen we examined crosstabulations between each variable
in the DCI for an association with the outcome variable of at least 10 percentage
points. For example, if a characteristic of the offense, such as the use of a bizarre
weapon showed an unadjusted 10-percentage-point higher outcome than we observed in the cases without the characteristic, we created a recoded variable that
was suitable for inclusion in the regression analysis. This process produced a
pool of over 200 candidate variables.
165. The legitimate variables in the model beyond the number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances were either statistically significant beyond the
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characteristics in these models is distinctly smaller than what we
have observed in earlier research. This is explained in part by the
small number of death-eligible cases and death sentences in the
database. 16 6 The principal explanation for the small number of additional legitimate variables in the models is the overwhelming explanatory power of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances,
especially in the judicial sentencing decisions. When that variable is
in the analysis, the many other variables that were candidates for inclusion in the analysis simply had nothing additional to add in terms
of explaining the charging and sentencing outcomes.
Logistic regression analyses also produce for each explanatory variable a coefficient and an "odds-multiplier," which estimates the extent to which, on average, the presence of a case characteristic
increases or decreases the odds that an outcome will occur. For example, in Georgia research presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, the data suggested that a defendant's odds of
receiving a death sentence were enhanced, on average, by a factor of
4.3 if the victim was white. (These statistics for the four most important decision points in this research are presented in Table 4.)
Finally, one may depict the results of the regression with scales
that reflect the level of criminal culpability estimated for each defendant in the analysis by virtue of the presence or absence in his or her
case of each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included
in the regression models. Thus, a defendant with many aggravating
and few mitigating circumstances present in his or her case will be
ranked among the most aggravated cases, while a defendant with few
aggravators and many mitigators will be placed among the least aggravated cases. 16 7 The scales we created for this research, which have
from four to seven culpability levels, enable us to estimate the magnitude of the geographic, race, and SES disparities at each culpability
level and overall. Such an analysis may document, for example, an
overall average difference in adjusted death-sentencing rates (e.g., 8percentage points) between white and minority defendants after con.05 level in one of the models or conceptually significant with a coefficient in the
expected direction, e.g., "victim bound and gagged." The variables for the race
and SES of the defendant and victim were included in each analysis. The geography variable was both included in and excluded from each model to demonstrate
the impact of geography on the variables for the race and SES of the defendant
and victim.
166. However, in a study of the New Jersey system over a nine-year period with 227
death-eligible cases and 34 death sentences, the same screening process used in
this research identified a large number of legitimate case characteristics with
explanatory power in regression analyses. See DAVID C. BALDUS, SPECIAL
MASTER, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT, FINAL REPORT TO

THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT tech. app. 10 (Sept. 24, 1991) [hereinafter NEW
JERSEY REPORT] (available in the University of Nebraska Law College Library).

167. Figure 6, p. 559-60 infra presents examples for three of the models in Table 4.
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trolling for the defendant culpability levels estimated in the regression analysis that underlies the scale. This approach also can indicate
the ratio between the death-sentencing rates for the two groups of
cases after adjustment for the levels of defendant culpability. An important advantage of this measure is that it is easier to interpret than
the odds-multipliers referred to above. 168
C.

A Measure of Geographic Disparity

Our principal measure of geographic disparity contrasts Nebraska's three largest and most urban counties (Douglas County (including the City of Omaha), Lancaster County (including the City of
Lincoln), and Sarpy County (including the City of Bellevue and parts
of Omaha)), with the rest of the state, which we describe as "greater
Nebraska." The three counties we define as major urban centers contained 49% of the state's population in 2000.169 They also account for
67% (366/548) of the state's non-capital homicides, 61% (113/185) of
the state's death-eligible murders, 75% (67/89) of the state's penalty
trials, and 69% (20/29) of the state's death sentences.
The distinction we draw here and below between the major urban
centers of the state and greater Nebraska is not an "urban" v. "rural"
distinction. Greater Nebraska, as we define it, contains a number of
smaller cities and major suburban areas. 170 We also recognize that
there are important differences, some of which we noted above, in
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices in Nebraska's
two largest urban areas-Douglas and Sarpy counties on the one
hand and Lancaster County on the other hand.171 When our substantive analysis reveals important differences between these two metropolitan areas, we note them.
D. A Note on Unadjusted and Adjusted Disparities
In the course of this report, we often refer to "unadjusted" and "adjusted" disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes as they relate
to the race and the SES of the defendant and the victim. An unadjusted disparity refers to a difference in a charging or sentencing out168. Figure 9, p. 571 infra presents an example.
169. With 836,431 people, Nebraska's 3 major urban counties (Douglas, Lancaster,
and Sarpy) accounted for 49% of the total population of 1,711,263 in 2000. Nebraska's projected 2001 population is estimated to be 1,713,235. POPULATION DiVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table CO-EST2001-07-31 Time Series of Nebraska
Population Estimates by County: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001 (Released April
29, 2000), available at http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/counties/tables/COEST2001-07-31.php.
170. There are sizeable cities in many Nebraska counties.
171. See supra section III.D for a description of differential approaches in the two
groups of counties to plea bargaining in capital murder cases.
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come that is associated with a particular characteristic of a defendant
or victim, without any controls for defendant culpability. For example, the overall rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial is .43
(56/131) in white-defendant cases and .54 (25/46) in minority-defendant cases. The 11-percentage point difference (.43-.54) in these two
rates is an unadjusted disparity.
In contrast, an adjusted disparity measures the association between case characteristics and charging and sentencing outcomes after controlling for defendant culpability. Odds-multipliers, say for the
defendant's race estimated in a logistic regression analysis that condefendant culpability, are an example of an adjusted dispartrols1 7 for
ity. 2 For example, an odds-multiplier of 1.5 for the white-defendant
variable might tell you that after controlling for defendant culpability,
on average the odds that a white defendant will receive a death sentence in a penalty trial are 1.5 times higher than the odds faced by
similarly situated minority defendants.
Experience has taught us, however, that odds-multipliers are subject to frequent misinterpretation.17 3 For that reason, we more commonly report adjusted disparities that control for defendant
culpability on a culpability scale, such as the number of aggravating
circumstances in the cases or a regression-based culpability scale. Of
course, adjustments of this type would be unnecessary if all of the
members of two groups being compared, say white and minority defendants, had the same culpability levels or the same distribution of
culpability scores when we apply our culpability measures. In that
situation, the average outcome for the members of the two groups
would give a valid picture of how similarly situated offenders are being treated.
However, we know that the distribution of culpability scores
among different groups of offenders can vary substantially, a condition that will create a risk of faulty inference concerning the treatment of similarly situated offenders if adjustments for defendant
culpability are not introduced into the analysis. For example, if all of
the white defendants in an analysis had cases with high culpability
levels and all of the minority defendants had cases of low culpability
levels, a comparison of the average death-sentencing rates for the two
groups would be quite misleading. The adjustment procedure that we
use throughout this report estimates disparities after it reconfigures
that data so that the members of the two groups being compared have
similar distributions on the culpability scale being applied. An example of such adjusted disparities would be a 10-percentage point (.40.30) difference in the adjusted rates that death-eligible cases advance
172. Odds-multipliers are also known as odds-ratios.
173. The most common error is to interpret the statistic as a multiplier of "probabilities" rather than "odds."
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to a penalty trial or a 1.3 (.40/.30) ratio of those rates. 17 4 In Appendix
E, we describe the adjustment procedure in more detail.
E.

Convergent Validity and Triangulation of Empirical
Findings

This Article addresses five issues related to arbitrariness and comparative injustice in prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing
decisions. The first four focus on (1) race-of-defendant and race-of-victim disparate treatment discrimination, (2) adverse disparate impact
on minority defendants, (3) disparate treatment discrimination based
on the SES of the defendant and victim, and (4) geographic disparities.
On each of these issues, we evaluate adjusted disparities that we
estimated with the four measures described above. In so doing, we
apply the concept of "convergent validity," which has been described
as "using a number of approaches ... to converge (or triangulate) on
an understanding or explanation" of the empirical issues.17 5 The focus is on the consistency of the adjusted disparities in terms of their
direction, magnitude, and statistical significance.
The results presented in this Article's numerous figures are principally based on the first measure described above-the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the case. Several figures are also
based on regression-based scales. We prominently feature the measure based on the number of statutory aggravators because of its legal
relevance, understandability, and substantial power in explaining
charging and sentencing decisions.' 7 6 However, on each disparity isculpability
sue, we present the results estimated with supplemental
77
measures by way of a table, figure, or footnote.'
The fifth issue concerns the selectivity and consistency of the
charging and sentencing decisions. The analysis of these questions
174. See Figure 12 for an example of charging and sentencing outcomes adjusted for
defendant culpability.
175. Jennifer K, Robbennolt, EvaluatingEmpiricalResearch Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 800 (2002).
176. Also, the measures based on the number of statutory aggravating circumstances
and the regression-based scales embrace all of the cases in each analysis. In contrast, the salient factors scale and the scale based on the number of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances have many more levels. As a result, it is not uncommon in analyses involving small samples to find, for example, a white defendant case classified at a level at which there is no comparable minority
defendant. When this occurs, the information on that case becomes non-informative and the analysis loses statistical power. This is another reason why, when
dealing with small samples, we place more weight on the disparities that are
estimated controlling for the measures of culpability based on the number of aggravating circumstances and the regression-based scales.
177. For a few examples of our presentation of the results based on supplemental measures, see infra notes 222-23, 225-26, 236-37, 238-39, 241-42, 246, 249, and 24777.
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also rests on an application of the four measures of defendant criminal
culpability described above. Specifically, for each death-sentenced
case, we used the four measures to estimate the frequency with which
death sentences were imposed among defendants with comparable
levels of culpability. We then averaged those four estimates for each
death-sentenced case to produce two overall estimates of the frequency with which death sentences were imposed among similarly sits
uated defendants.17
F.

Omitted Variables

In spite of the very large amount of information we have on each
case and the substantial effort that we devoted to the measurement of
defendant culpability, it is clear that our analyses do not account for
all of the circumstances of the cases that decisionmakers may take
into account, such as defendant demeanor. Nor can we account for
other factors that may influence the charging and sentencing outcomes, such as juror attitudes or attorney argument styles. The issue
concerning omitted variables is how probable it is that any such omissions biased our estimates concerning the presence or absence of disparities based on race, geography, and SES. The bottom line question
is not whether there is a lack of precise correspondence between all of
the facts of each case and the database, but rather whether the systemic effects that we did or did not estimate were biased by the omitted variables. For example, what plausible theory would suggest that
the introduction of controls for "judicial attitudes" or "attorney argument styles" would explain away the victim SES effects or the geography effects, which our data clearly document? Furthermore, how
plausible is it that the inclusion of those variables in the analysis
would uncover evidence of systemic race-of-defendant or race-of-victim
disparate treatment that our analysis fails to document? In making
this assessment, recall that an omitted variable can bias the analysis
only if it is correlated with both the outcome variable, such as sentence imposed, and the illegitimate or suspect variable, such as the
defendant's race. For the omitted variables of which we are aware,
with one exception,17 9 we consider it quite unlikely that both of those
conditions would be satisfied in the Nebraska data for any of our core
analyses.
178. Appendix C, Columns L and M present the overall estimates; the Column L estimate is based on an analysis of penalty-trial cases only, while the Column M
estimate is based on an analysis of all death-eligible cases.
179. Infra note 279 and accompanying text, which discusses the implications for our
findings of disparate treatment based on the SES of the victim of missing data on
victim impact statements and communications between prosecutors and family
members.
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THE DISPOSITION OF HOMICIDE CASES: 1973-99

Capital and Non-Capital Cases

Table 2 first divides the cases by decade and then sorts, on an annual basis, the number of capital and non-capital homicide convictions.1 8 0 For each year, we report the total number of convictions and
the number and proportion of them that we have classified as "deatheligible."
The data in Table 2 indicate that the number of homicide convictions has been stable over time, about 27 per year. The number of
death-eligible offenses has been about 7 a year, ranging from 3 to 15.
The proportion of death-eligible cases has declined from .27 and .30 in
the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, to .20 in the 1990s.
B. The Disposition of Capital Cases
As noted above, we identified Nebraska's 175 death-eligible cases
by screening 689 homicides prosecuted during the period of this research that were potentially death-eligible.1 s 1 These cases resulted in
180. As explained infra note 181 and accompanying text, this table excludes 203 homicide convictions that were not potentially death-eligible. The most serious form
of non-capital homicide in Nebraska is first-degree murder (Ml) in cases that do
not include a statutory aggravating circumstance that would qualify the case as
capital murder. Non-capital M1 carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment.
The next most serious category of non-capital homicide is second-degree murder (M2). The principal distinction between M1 and M2 is the defendant's mens
rea (mental state). While M1 requires a mens rea of purpose, deliberation, and
premeditation, M2 requires only that the defendant caused the victim's death
"intentionally, but without premeditation." In spite of the facial clarity of this
distinction, there was an ongoing dispute in the Nebraska Supreme Court during
the last decade about whether proof of"malice" is also required to establish a M2
conviction. Upon a M2 conviction, the sentencing judge has discretion to sentence the offender to life imprisonment or to a term of years that can range from
20 years to life imprisonment.
The third major category of non-capital murder in Nebraska is manslaughter,
which follows the classic pattern. Manslaughter may involve what would be murder but for the presence of a "sudden quarrel." Manslaughter may also exist
when the killing is caused "unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act." The punishment for manslaughter is a prison sentence up to 20 years
(which can include probation with no time served), a fine up to $25,000, or both.
181. The project initially reviewed a total of 892 homicide cases to arrive at the universe of 689 cases that we screened for death-eligibility. We excluded from the
screen 203 cases as not death-eligible as a matter of law or because we had insufficient information to conduct a screen. First, we excluded 67 homicides committed by persons under 18 after the effective date of legislation that excluded those
cases from death-eligibility. Second, we excluded 52 cases that resulted in acquittals, dismissals, or judgments of not guilty by reason of insanity. Third, we
excluded 26 motor vehicle homicides. Fourth, we excluded 44 M2 retrials for
cases in which the initial trial had been included in the study but the conviction
was reversed or vacated during the ongoing dispute in the Nebraska Supreme
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185 prosecutions in which the death penalty was a possible outcome
(10 prosecutions involved a second or third prosecution in the case).
The test we used to identify death-eligible cases has two parts. The
first part focuses on first-degree murder (Ml) convictions. We classified a M1 case as death-eligible if it (a) advanced to a sentencing hearing under section 29-2520 of the Nebraska Statutes, (b) there was
some evidence of statutory aggravation in the case, and (c) the court
8 2
addressed the issue of whether the sentence should be life or death.'
For M1 convictions that did not advance to a sentencing hearing because of a waiver of the death penalty by the state, we classified the
case as death-eligible only if the facts clearly established that one or
more statutory aggravating circumstances were present in the case.
Second, we classified cases as death-eligible when they resulted in
a conviction for a crime less than M1 only if (a) the conviction was
pursuant either to an initial charge of less than M1 or a plea bargain
that reduced an initial M1 charge to the lesser offense, and (b) the
facts clearly established the presence of the mens rea (mental state)
required for M1 and one or more statutory aggravating circumstances
in the case. 18 3 We classify as death-eligible a number of cases that did
not result in a M1 conviction when the circumstances of the case
strongly suggest that the prosecutorial decision to charge or accept a
plea to less than M1 was based on a deathworthiness judgment rather
than a factual determination that the elements of M1 were not present in the case. In contrast, when a jury or judge decision in a guilt
Court during the last decade whether proof of "malice" is also required to establish a M2 conviction. See, e.g., Richard E. Shugrue, The Second Degree Murder
Doctrine in Nebraska, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (1996). Finally, we excluded 14
cases for which we were unable to collect sufficient information to support an
informed judgment of death-eligibility. The large majority of these cases were
homicides in which the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to probation with no time served in a Department of Correctional Services
facility.
The analysis of non-capital cases embraces 548 prosecutions, 34 of which were
second prosecutions. The entire study, therefore, included 689 defendants and
733 prosecutions-185 capital and 548 non-capital.
182. If there was no evidence of statutory aggravation in the case, we did not classify
it as death-eligible even if the court made reference to statutory aggravation and/
or mitigation.
183. For this purpose, potential liability for M1 could be based on a theory of premeditated murder or felony murder. Cases tried for M1 that resulted in a guilt trial
conviction of less than M1 were not classified as death-eligible because the fact
finder determined that the mens rea or felony murder required to support a conviction for M1 was not present, regardless of how strong the evidence of deatheligibility might have been in the case. In short, for a defendant convicted of less
than M1 to be considered death-eligible, for the purpose of this study, the decision on liability had to have been made by the prosecution on an initial charge of
less than M1 or a subsequent charge reduction, typically by way of a plea
agreement.
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trial results in less than a M1 conviction, we treat that judgment as a
factual finding that the elements of M1 were not present in the case.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the disposition of Nebraska's
death-eligible cases. Part I, box 1 includes 185 prosecutions against
175 death-eligible defendants over the period 1973-1999. Box 2A includes 89 cases in which the state sought a death sentence, while box
2B includes the 96 cases in which the state waived the death penalty
either unilaterally or by way of a plea bargain. An offender who
avoided the risk of a penalty trial could do so in a number of ways.
First, in cases charged as M1, prosecutors always have the authority to reduce the charges to M2 or less, either unilaterally or as part of
a plea bargain, in which event there can be no penalty trial.18 4 Second, for the cases in which the prosecution believes that a M1 conviction (with a mandatory life sentence) is appropriate but that a death
sentence is either excessive or unlikely to be imposed by the court,
there are three options. The first option is to enter into a formal plea
bargain to M1 with a complete waiver of the death penalty, in which
event the court dispenses with a consideration of aggravation and mitigation and imposes a life sentence.1 8 5 The second option is a unilateral waiver of the death penalty after a M1 conviction is obtained by
plea or trial. The third option is for the prosecutor and defendant to
enter into a plea agreement for an M1 guilty plea with the understanding that the prosecutor will present no aggravating evidence in
the sentencing hearing or make no argument in favor of a death

sentence. 186
Of the 89 penalty trials shown in Part 1, box 2A, in which the state
sought a death sentence, 50% were heard by the guilt trial judge alone
and 50% were heard by a three-judge panel. The death-sentencing
rate among all of these penalty trials was 33% (29/89).
For the 17 penalty-trial cases in which the defendant pled guilty,
the death-sentencing rate was 12% (2/17), while in the cases that resulted in a guilt trial conviction, the rate was 37% (27/72). The overall
184. We identified six death-eligible cases that were originally charged M2 or less. It
is likely that some of these charges were filed pursuant to a pre-indictment plea
agreement.
185. We found at least two cases in which such a plea bargain was rejected by the trial
court and a penalty trial was held.
186. These pre-trial outcomes may be based on explicit agreements or implicit understandings. Our research has documented a broad array of approaches prosecutors use to waive the death penalty with varying degrees of explicitness. In this
regard, we appreciate the willingness of prosecutors and defense attorneys in
over 100 cases to describe over the telephone and/or via a questionnaire the process of negotiation and agreement when the records in the case were unclear
about what had transpired in this regard.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

545

FIGURE 1
THE OUTCOMES OF 185 PROSECUTIONS OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE
OFFENDERS: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999
Part I. Prosecution Outcomes
Prosecutions

1Death-Eligible

(n=185)
Case Advanced to a
Penalty Trial
48% (89/185)
3B Life Sentence
3A Death Sentence
Imposed
Imposed
33% (29/89)
67% (60/89)
2AJ

2B

Death Sentence Waived
by the State
52% (96/185)

Part II. Judicial Review Outcomes
(n=29)
JAI
2A

Death Sentence Vacated or
Conviction Reversed
31 Reversed by
Reversed in66% (19/29)
Federal Court

Nebraska

32% (6/19)

Supreme Court1
68% (13/19)

IBI

Death Sentence and
Conviction Sustained
34% (10/29)

Part Ill. Status of Death Sentenced Offenders as of January 30, 2002

[1

Total Death-Sentenced Offenders Initially at Risk of Execution

'One death sentence, State v. Simpson, was vacated by the trial court before an appeal was taken.

death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible prosecutions was .16
(29/185).187
Part II of Figure 1 indicates the outcomes of judicial review of the
29 death-sentenced cases. Box 1A indicates that 66% (19/29) of the
death sentences were vacated. Boxes 2A and 2B indicate that of those
orders, 68% (13/19) were decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court
either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, while 32% (6/
187. We omit from subsequent analyses of death-sentencing rates one penalty-trial
case included in Figure 1 in which the court believed it had no legal authority to
impose a death sentence and therefore exercised no discretion concerning the
deathworthiness of the defendant.
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19) of the orders issued from a federal court. In addition, one death
sentence was vacated by the trial court without an appeal.
Part III of Figure 1 reports the status of the death-sentenced offenders as of January 30, 2002. Boxes 2A-2D indicate that of the 24
offenders sentenced to death, 58% (14/24) had their death sentences
vacated and ultimately left death row alive, 12% (3/24) died on death
row of natural causes, 17% (4/24) remain on death row, and 12% (3/24)
have been executed. Overall, 29% (7/24) of the originally death-sentenced offenders have been executed or remain on death row at risk of
execution.
Table 3 presents data in five-year intervals on the three principal
charging and sentencing outcomes in the capital murder cases that we
examine in this report.1 8 8 Column B indicates the rates at which
death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial with the state seeking a
death sentence. The Column B analysis embraces all of the deatheligible cases in the study; we sometimes also refer to that outcome as
the "penalty-trial rate." This outcome is to be distinguished from the
measure reported in Column C-the rate at which "death sentences
are imposed in penalty trials." The Column C outcome excludes cases
that did not advance to a penalty trial and is sometimes referred to as
the "penalty-trial death-sentencing rate." Finally, Column D reports
the "death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases." This analysis embraces all of the death-eligible cases, i.e., the penalty-trial
cases shown in Column C as well as the cases that did not advance to
a penalty trial.
The brackets within each column in Table 3 aggregate the data for
subgroups of years to highlight the changes that have occurred since
1987. The data indicate that statewide, since 1987, fewer cases have
advanced to a penalty trial and that in these hearings, the death-sentencing rate has declined. 18 9 Specifically, Column B documents that
since 1987 the rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial with the
state seeking a death sentence declined 14% (7/51).190 There has also
been a 25% (9/36) decline from .36 to .27 in the penalty-trial deathsentencing rate. The combined effect of these two trends has been a
29% (5/17) decline in the rate that death sentences were imposed
among all death-eligible cases from .17 to .12. These data support the
expectation that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions narrowing
statutory aggravating circumstances and the introduction of proportionality review would reduce the frequency with which death
sentences were imposed.
188. In the text below, we refer to these outcomes as "our three principal outcomes."
189. These results are not adjusted for the culpability of the offender.
190. The numerator is the difference in the two rates (.51 and .44); the denominator is
the earlier .51 rate.
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EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF DEFENDANT
CULPABILITY ON PROSECUTORIAL AND
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

In this section we apply measures of defendant culpability to evaluate the extent to which culpability explains the key outcomes, i.e.,
the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial and result in the
imposition of a death sentence. The association between defendant
culpability, as determined by our core measures, and the key charging
and sentencing outcomes suggest the degree to which the system operates in a principled manner, given the statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases.
As noted above, 19 1 our measures of defendant culpability also lay
the foundation for the analyses presented below in which we evaluate
evidence of a) disparities in these outcomes based on the race (sections
VII-VIII) and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and victim
(section IX), (b) geographic disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes (section X), and (c) inconsistency and comparative excessiveness in death-sentencing outcomes (section XI). Each of these
inquiries requires the identification of sub-groups of death-eligible offenders with comparable levels of culpability as measured by our principal measures of defendant culpability.
A.

The Impact of Individual Statutory Aggravating and
Mitigating Circumstances

Figure 2 presents data on the individual impact of each aggravating and mitigating circumstance on death sentences imposed among
all death-eligible cases. Part I focuses on the impact of the individual
statutory aggravating circumstances, while Part II focuses on the impact of the individual mitigating circumstances. Each column
presents the data for a single aggravator and mitigator, i.e., the deathsentencing rate when the factor is present or found in the case (the
shaded bars) and the death-sentencing rate for other cases in which
the factor was not found in a penalty trial or not present in a nonpenalty trial case. The dotted line across each set of bars indicates the
.16 overall death-sentencing rate for all cases. The asterisks indicate
the level of statistical significance between the rates when the factor
is present and when it is not.
For example, Column A in Part I indicates that when the "1(a)"
factor (defendant record of murder, terror, or serious assault) is present in the case, the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible
cases is .33, which is 23 points above the rate when it is not present
191. Supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.

2002]

549

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

0)

Z

M -

z

5

w CdC

i.

P~~

-

SA-8t

m

U,~

ZaU

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

and 17 points above the .16 average rate among all death-eligible
92
offenders.1
Part I of Figure 2 indicates that seven of the statutory aggravators
are associated with death-sentencing rates well above both the .16 average rate and the rates in the cases in which the factor is not present.
Also, six of these aggravators, (1(a) through 1(f)), have a statistically
significant effect in explaining death-sentencing outcomes among all
results of a multiple regression analydeath-eligible defendants. The
193
results.
comparable
sis show
Part II of Figure 2 indicates that while the presence of individual
mitigating circumstances draws down the death-sentencing rates
among all death-eligible cases, the impacts are much less substantial
than the impact of the aggravating circumstances, and none of the
194
This result
mitigating factors has a statistically significant effect.
19 5
is also confirmed in a multiple regression analysis.
B.

The Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances in the Cases
1.

The Number of Aggravating Circumstances

The most significant factor explaining the pattern of capital charging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska is the number of statutory
aggravating circumstances in the cases. Figure 3 documents their impact on our three principal outcomes: the rates that death-eligible
cases advance to a penalty trial (Column A), the rates that death
sentences are imposed in penalty trials (Column B), and death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases (Column C). For each of
these outcomes, the four bars document the applicable rates in cases
with one, two, three, and four or more aggravating circumstances.
Column A documents that the rate at which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial rises from .41, for the single-aggravator cases,
to 1.0, or 100%, for the cases with four-or-more aggravating circumstances. Column B indicates that the sentencing courts are even more
192. The numbers assigned to each aggravator and mitigator, at the foot of each bar,
are drawn from the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified in Table 1, supra.
193. In explaining death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible offenders, the following statutory aggravators were significant beyond the .05 level: 1(a) - 1(e). In
explaining the rates that cases advanced to a penalty trial, only factor 1(c) was
significant beyond the .05 level. These results are not shown in Figure 2.
194. The lack of significance in several of the categories with substantial disparities,
e.g., Columns B, E, and F, is explained by the small number of cases in which the
factor is present.
195. In the model of death-sentencing outcomes among all death-eligible cases, none of
the statutory mitigators was significant at the .05 level. In the analyses of the
cases that advanced to a penalty trial, the catch-all mitigator was significant at
the .001 level.
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sensitive to the number of aggravators. In the single-aggravator
cases, death sentences are rare, in the two-aggravator cases life or
death is a close issue, while in cases with three-or-more aggravators,
there appears to be a strong presumption in favor of a death sentence.
Finally, the data in Column C, which reflects the impact of both
prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing decisions, reveals a
very strong association between the risk of a death sentence among all
death-eligible cases and the number of statutory aggravators in the
cases. Cases with three-or-more aggravators, shown in Columns B and
C, account for 48% (14/29) of the total number of death sentences imposed. Moreover, among these cases, the death-sentencing rate is 74%
(14/19).
The striking impact of the number of aggravating circumstances on
sentencing outcomes is also apparent in the logistic regression models
presented in Table 4 (Row la). No other variable comes close to it in
explaining the charging and sentencing outcomes.
The most plausible explanation for the significant role of the number of aggravating circumstances in predicting the outcomes of the
cases is that the Nebraska system allocates the death-sentencing responsibility exclusively to judges while the statute requires the sentencing judges to assure themselves that any death sentences they
impose are proportionate to the "penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant."196 The judges have
access to all of the reported death-sentenced cases and defense counsel
regularly present information on other comparable cases sentenced to
life or less in the sentencing hearings. For a rule of thumb in defining
similar cases, the measure of the number of aggravating circumstances in the case has a firm foundation in the statute and is relatively easy to apply. As noted above, the retired judges whom we
interviewed deny that trial judges consciously apply quantitative
standards based on the number of statutory aggravators in the case.
Nevertheless, the data are consistent with the application of a de facto
rule that for cases with three or more aggravators, a death sentence is
almost certain, .93 (14/15); for the two-aggravator cases, it is a close
issue, .48 (12/25); and for the single-aggravator cases, there is a substantial presumption against a death sentence, .06 (3/48).
The data in Figure 3 suggest that the number of aggravating circumstances has considerably less impact on prosecutorial decisionmaking than it does on judicial death-sentencing decisions. Indeed, in
the single-aggravator category, in which a death sentence is a rare
event, 41% of the cases advance to a penalty trial. The regression results in Table 4 tell a similar story.1 9 7
196. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(3) (Reissue 1995).
197. The regression coefficient for the number of statutory aggravators in the model
for the judicial decisions (2.9: Row la, Column F) is 5.7 times higher than the .51
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TABLE

4

LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF FOUR CHARGING AND
SENTENCING OUTCOMES
(the number in the Columns are logistic odds-multipliers and regression coefficients
(in parenthesis) estimated for the applicable explanatory variables in Column A;
there are two models for each outcome-the first with the geography variable (2.e)
omitted and the second with it included)

A

Explanatory Variables
1. Legitimate Case

B IC

F ILG

D IE

Death-Eligible
Death
Cases Advanced
Sentence
to Penalty Trial
Waived by
w/ State
Plea/Unilateral Seeking a Death
Decision
Sentence

Death
Sentences are
Imposed in a
Penalty Trial

I
Death Sentence
Imposed Among
All DeathEligible Cases

Characteristics
a. Number of Statutory
Aggravating
Circumstances
b. Number of Statutory
Mitigating
Circumstances

.53
.48
(-.64)* (-.72)*
1.26
(.23)

c. Victim Bound and
Gagged

-

d. Def. Killed Two or
1
More Victims

.41
(-.90)

f. Def. Com mitted an
Additional Crime
g. Defendant Confession

.
3.2
(1.14)*

1.75
18.1
(.56)* (2.9)*

18.1
(2.9)*

12.2
(2.5)*

12.2
(2.5)*

.83
(-.19)

.83
(-.19)

.72
(-.13)

.72
(-.13)

.58
(-.16)

.54
(-.17)

1.31
(.27)

1.72
(.54)

.

.

.

.

.35
(-1.05)*

1.97
(.68)

2.46
(.90)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

1.23
(.21)
-

.

e. Guilty Plea

1.67
(.51)*

.
3.7
(1.3)*

.
-

.12
.11
(-2.2)* (-2.1)
.

.

.

.04
.05
(-3.3)* 1(-3.1)*
4.48
(1.5)

4.95
(1.4)*

.

.

.

.

.

2. Illegitimate/Suspect
Variables
a. White Def.

1.95
(.67)

1.46
(.38)

.63
(-.45)

.73
(-.31)

1.61
(.48)

1.55
(.44)

1.40
(.33)

1.40
(.33)

b. White Victim

.97
(-.03)

.76
(-.27)

.92
(-.09)

.97
(-.03)

1.03
(.03)

1.03
(.03)

.86
(-.15)

.88
(-.12)

c. Def. SES Scale
(High, Middle, Low)

1.21
(.20)

1.08
(.08)

.72
(-.33)

.72
(-.33)

.86
(-.15)

.87
(-.14)

.55
(-.58)

.86
(-.14)

d. Victim SES Scale
(High, Middle, Low)

1.82
(.72)*

2.03
(.71)*

.55
(-.59)*

.54
.30
(-.61)* (-1.2)*

.30
(-1.2)*

.27
(-1.3)*

.30
(-1.2)*

e. Geography Variable
1=Major Urban County
0=Other County

-

.27
(-1.3)*

-

2.8
(1.03)*

-

.95
(-.05)

-

.93
(.08)

'In multiple victim cases, in terms of aggravation in the case, the model reflects the more or most
aggravated murder, as the case may be.
* = indicates a level of confidence in the estimate that, in Bayesian terms, is the analogue to
statistical significance at the .05 level or beyond in frequenist terms.
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The Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances

In contrast to the results shown in Figure 3 and Table 4 (Row la,
Columns B through I), an analysis of the impact of the number of mitigating circumstances in the cases indicates that they have much less
impact on outcomes. The regression results shown in Table 4 (Row 1b,
Columns B through I) document a weak, non-significant association
among all of the cases.
The much weaker impact of the statutory mitigating circumstances on death-sentencing outcomes is also highlighted in Figure 4,
which breaks down all of the death-eligible cases according to the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases.
The rows (Parts I-IV) group the cases according to the number of aggravating circumstances, while the Columns (B through G) group the
cases according to the number of mitigators in the cases.
The data in Figure 4 indicate, first, that death sentences are quite
rare in the cases with three or more mitigators (Columns E through
G), although these cases account for only 26% (47/184) of the total. It
is also useful to look at the interaction between the impact on mitigation and the number of aggravators in the cases. The Part I data (one
aggravating circumstance) suggest a slight effect for the mitigators
since the three death sentences imposed in that category had only one
or two mitigators. In Part II (two aggravating circumstances), there is
an apparent effect with the rates declining as the number of mitigators increases from one to five. In Parts III and IV, which contain the
highly aggravated cases, small differences in mitigation have no effect
at all.198 Thus, it is only in the few close cases in Part II that we can
perceive a meaningful effect from mitigation (a result consistent with
the expectation that individual case characteristics have their greatest impact in the mid-range of cases where the room for the exercise of
discretion is greatest).199 In the single-aggravator cases (Part I),
there is little to mitigate in the first place, while in the most aggravated cases (Parts III and IV), the aggravation overwhelms fairly significant levels of mitigation, i.e., the death-sentencing rates are very
high in the face of two or three mitigating circumstances.200

coefficient for that variable in the model for the prosecutorial decisions (.52: Row
la, Column D).
198. However, none of these cases had four or five mitigators, which might make a
difference. Figure 4 omits one penalty trial case in which the sentencing judge
did not believe he had the authority to impose a death sentence.
199. "Mid-range" refers to the mid-range in terms of defendant culpability.
200. However, the three-mitigator category in Part III contains only one case.
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FIGURE

4

DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES,
CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOUND OR PRESENT IN THE CASES:
NEBRASKA, 1973-1999
B

A
Number of Statutory
Aggravating
Circumstances

C

D

E

F

G

Number of Statutory Mitigating Circumstances
None

One

Two

T hree

Four

Five or
More

.00

.03

.05

.00

.00

.00

(3)

(1/35)

(2/41)

(23)

(11)

(3)

.17

.14

Part I. One Aggravating
Circumstance

n=
Part II. Two Aggravating
Circumstances

.00

n=

(2/6)

(5/10)

(4/24)

(4/7)

(3/5)

(2/2)

(4/4)

(1/7)

Part 1II. Three Aggravating
Circumstances

Part IV. Four or More
Aggravating Circumstances

(1/1)

.00
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Salient Factors of the Cases

We next applied the salient factors of the cases measure of culpability, which is presented in Appendix B. This measure assigns each
case to a single category identified by its most serious aggravating
circumstance.
Column B, Parts I-IV of Figure 5 documents a significant impact of
three of the statutory aggravating circumstances (1(a), 1(c), and 1(e))
when they are accompanied by another statutory aggravating circumstance and two or fewer mitigating circumstances. For example, Part
II, Column B indicates that among the "1(e)" multiple-victim cases
with low mitigation and an additional aggravating circumstance, the
death-sentencing rate was .43 (6/14). However, Column A, Parts V
and VI indicate that two of the aggravators most commonly charged
and found (1(b) and 1(d)) have average death-sentencing rates that
are lower than the overall average (.16) and have only a marginal impact on charging and sentencing outcomes, even in the presence of additional aggravation and low mitigation (Column B).
Figure 5 also demonstrates that the highest death-sentencing rate
is only .43 (Part II, Column B) among any of the five salient factors
categories (with more than 5 cases). Thus, in terms of distinguishing
the cases that result in death sentences from those that do not and
identifying the most deathworthy offender, the salient factors measure does less well than the measure based on the number of statutory
aggravating circumstances in the cases.
D.

Regression-Based Measures and Scales

We also conducted multiple regression analyses of the key charging and sentencing outcomes. The models are presented in Table 4. 20 1
With them, we also created culpability scales that reflect the impact of
the legitimate factors only in explaining charging and sentencing outcomes. We used the regression results for three outcomes to create
the scales shown in Figure 6. Each level of the scale groups together
cases that are similar in terms of the predicted probability that the
case would result in a death sentence or advance to a penalty trial, as
the case may be.
Part I presents the results for death sentences imposed among all
death-eligible cases, controlling for defendant culpability on a fourlevel culpability scale. These outcomes reflect the prosecutorial charging decisions and the judicial sentencing decisions. In contrast, Parts
II and III focus separately on the judicial decisions (Part II) and
prosecutorial decisions (Part III). The results for judicial decisionmaking shown in Part II document a strong relationship between the
201. See supra subsection IV.B.4 and accompanying text for a description of the
screening process used to create the regression models.
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5

DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES,
CONTROLLING FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF EACH CASE UNDER THE
SALIENT FACTORS MEASURE OF DEFENDANT CULPABILITY:
NEBRASKA, 1973-19991
A
All Cases
Part 1. Defendant with a Prior
Homicide/Manslaughter
Conviction (1(a))
[2]

(2n7)

B
2
Aggravated
Case with
Low 3
Mitigation

C
Other Low
Mitigation
Cases

-5

(1/2)

D
High
Mitigation
Cases

.00

(1/4)

(1)

Part II. Multiple Victims (l(e))

43H

11

.00
n=

(7/29)

(6/14)

(6)

(6/15)

(22)

(1/9)

Part III. Defendant with a
Violent Criminal Record but
Without Murder/Manslaughter
(1(a))
.15

n=

(6/41)

(4)

Part IV. Contract KillingH
(0(0))n

Continued on Next Page
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(CONTINUED)

A
All Cases
Part V. Escape Detection
(1(b))

.14

B
Aggravated
Case with
Low
Mitigation

2--

D
High
Mitigation
Cases

..

08-

.00.0

E8
(8/58)

C
Other Low
Mitigation
Cases

(7/25)

(21)

(1112)

Part VI.
Heinous/Atrocious/Cruel
or
4
Depravity (I (d))

.06

.11

.00

(2/33)

(2/18)

(15)

.00

.00

.00

(5)

(2)

(3)

.00

.00

(3)

(3)

Part VII. Grave Risk of
Death4 to Two or More Persons
( I(f))

Part VIII. Hinder
Government Function (1)(h)

n=

' The designation at the conclusion of each parts description indicates the principal statutory aggravating
circumstance in thesecases,e.g., for Part I cases, the principal aggravator is (I(a)). See Table t for a list of the
statutory aggravators.
2 An "aggravated" caseincludes one or more additional aggravating circumstances. except for Part 11,in which
"aggravated" refers to the presence of a contemporaneous felony, such asrobbery or arson.
' A low mitigation case hastwo or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found or recognized by the court in a
renalty trial case or (b) present in a non-penalty trial case.
These casesare subclassified only in terms of high and low mitigation.
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6

DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES
(PART I) AND IN PENALTY TRIALS (PART II), AND THE RATES THAT
CASES ADVANCE TO PENALTY TRIAL (PART III), CONTROLLING FOR
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY ON REGRESSION-BASED CULPABILITY SCALES 1
(the bars indicate the death-sentencing rates among each category of cases defined in
terms of defendant culpability estimated on a regression-based scale)
A

B

Part I. Death-Sentencing
Rates Among All DeathEligible Offenders

One
(Low)

.00
n=

(29/184)

(0/72)

C
D
Four-Level Culpability Scale
(from I low to 4 high)
Two
Three

E

Four
(ieh)

.05
(3/62)

(6/27)

(20/23)

Four-Level Culpability Scale
(from I low to 4 high)
Part II. Rates that Death
Sentences are Imposed
in
2
Penalty Trials

One
(Low)

Two

II

Lni

.06

n=

(29/88)

(3/48)

Three

Four
ffiegh)

.64
*3
(5/14)

(7/11)

(14/15)

Continued on Next Page
'The-regression-based scales used in this Figure are based on the models presented in Table 4 without
a control for the geography variable.
2

This Figure does not include one death-eligible case in which the sentencing court did not believe it

had discretion to impose a death sentence.
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defendant culpability and the likelihood that death sentences will be
imposed, i.e., a steady increase in the death-sentencing rate as the
cases become more aggravated. 20 2 The results for prosecutorial decisionmaking shown in Part III present a quite different picture.
Among the cases at levels one through four, which account for 78%
(144/185) of the prosecutions, there appears to be no relationship between the culpability level of the cases and likelihood that they will
advance to a penalty trial. Only among the most aggravated cases at
levels five through seven does the risk of a penalty trial become substantial. 20 3 These findings provide support for Chief Justice
Krivosha's belief'04 that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was
the principal source of inconsistency in death-sentencing outcomes
that he perceived in the system.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Powell commented that the data
before the Court concerning charging and sentencing decisions in
Georgia's capital charging and sentencing system "results in a reasonable level of proportionality among the class of murderers eligible for
the death penalty." 20 5 We think the same can be said of Nebraska's
penalty-trial death-sentencing decisions depicted in Part II of Figure
6. Indeed, the levels of defendant culpability measured appear to explain the death-sentencing outcomes of the Nebraska system even better than they did in the Georgia data. 20 6 This result is most likely
attributable to the fact that the crucial penalty-trial death-sentencing
decisions are made by experienced judges, many of whom are likely
aware of the pattern of death-sentencing rates in cases with varying
levels of culpability. Moreover, as noted above, the Nebraska statute
imposes on the sentencing judges an obligation to consider the risk of
comparative excessiveness in any death sentences they impose. However, the results for the prosecutorial decisionmaking in Nebraska

2
202. The R 2 for the judicial sentencing model was .52. R is a measure of the power of
all of the variables in a multiple regression model to explain variations in the
defendant/outcome variable on a scale from .00 (low) to 1.0 (high). In comparison
2
to other sentencing research, an R of .52 is quite respectable.
2
203. The R for the prosecutorial charging model was only .19.
204. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
205. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (stating that "the system sorts out
cases where the sentence of death is highly likely and highly unlikely, leaving a
midrange of case where the imposition of the death penalty in any particular case
is less predictable").
2
206. For the jury death-sentencing model, the R in the Georgia research was .42,
EJDP, supra note 11, at 645, while the comparable measure for the Nebraska
judicial death-sentencing model was .52. See infra subsection XI.B.2 for a comparison of the level of consistency in Nebraska's judicial sentencing system with
the New Jersey jury sentencing system, which imposes death sentences at about
the same rate as Nebraska.
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show much less proportionality than did their counterparts in
20 7
Georgia.
We note, also, the teaching of McCleskey that a death-sentencing
system which results in a reasonable level of proportionality can also
be heavily influenced by illegitimate case characteristics. Specifically,
in spite of the evidence of proportionality to which Justice Powell referred, the data in McCleskey showed substantial and statistically significant race-of-victim disparities that were consistent with a pattern
20 8
and practice of race-of-victim disparate treatment in the cases.
PART C
VII.

A.

EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN CHARGING
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES BASED ON THE
RACE OF THE DEFENDANT AND VICTIM

Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Legal
Theories

In an evaluation of race disparities in a capital sentencing system,
it is useful to consider the concepts of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." These legal theories are used in the courts in a variety of different contexts, such as employment and housing
discrimination cases 20 9 and important consequences turn on whether
207. An analysis of prosecutorial decisions to advance death-eligible cases to penalty
2
2
trial in Georgia produced an R of .45. EJDP, supra note 11, at 643. The R in the
comparable Nebraska model of prosecutorial decisionmaking is .15. A comparable 39 variable model in the Georgia research for the imposition of death
reflects the impact of both chargsentences among all death-eligible cases, which
2
2
ing and sentencing decisions, produced an R of .35. Id. at 631. The R for the
corresponding Nebraska model is .51.
208. The Court did not question the validity of those findings of the Georgia research.
It rejected the petitioner's claims on the ground that he had not shown purposeful
discrimination in his case and that the risk of race-of-victim discrimination in his
case was not strong enough to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
209. For an extensive collection of employment discrimination cases raising disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories, see Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). For a similar collection
of cases concerning fair housing and fair lending, see Peter E. Mahoney, The
End(s) of DisparateImpact: DoctrinalReconstruction,FairHousing and Lending
Law, and the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998). Another
example of cases in which these theories have been used is the public school finance litigation both in federal and state courts. See Randal S. Jeffery, Equal
Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ.
J. 239 (1999) (collecting and discussing state cases challenging public school financing schemes on the basis of disparate treatment and disparate impact);
Jonathan M. Purver, Validity of Basing PublicSchool FinancingSystem on Local
Property Taxes, 41 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1972) (collecting early constitutional challenges to public school financing schemes).
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documented race disparities are held to constitute disparate treatment or disparate impact. 2 10 The United States Supreme Court and
many state courts have raised a high bar for parties advancing claims
based on these theories. 21 1 We emphasize, however, that these legal
theories have nothing to do with the discretion of state legislatures to
shape their death penalty laws as they see fit.212 Legislatures have
210. Most importantly, in many cases, a party must be able to establish disparate
treatment in order to set forth a discrimination claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. See, for example, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), which both held that to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a
party must show a discriminatory intent or purpose. Many civil rights statutes,
however, expressly allow plaintiffs or criminal defendants to state a claim based
on disparate impact as well as disparate treatment. For example, the Americans
with Disabilities Act includes disparate impact expressly in its definition of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (1994).
211. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court established a
burden of proof for establishing disparate treatment claims in the capital sentencing context that is impossible to meet in the absence of direct admissions of
discriminatory intent by prosecutors or jurors. The Supreme Court has also
made disparate impact claims more difficult to raise by increasing the evidentiary requirements for discrimination claims. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (making a Title VII employment discrimination disparate impact claim much more difficult to establish); Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff to make a showing of
intentional discrimination to succeed on a Title VII claim).
212. In an analogous situation, on several occasions the United States Congress has
expanded a civil rights statute after the Supreme Court issued a restrictive reading. See Serena J. Hoy, InterpretingEqual Protection: Congress, the Court, and
the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & POL. 381 (2000) (discussing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the Voting Rights Act of 1982, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 as three cases in which Congress expanded civil rights acts in response to
Supreme Court decisions construing previous statutes narrowly). In a particularly pointed example, Congress codified the disparate impact claim for employment discrimination claims in the 1991 amendments to Title VII. See Donald 0.
Johnson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and DisparateImpact: The Response to
Factionalism,47 U. MIMI L. REV. 469, 493 (1992) (noting that "Congress stated
its clear intent 'to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding
the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection
to victims of discrimination" (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(4))); Michael J.
Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991
Civil Rights Act, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 473 (1999) ("Congress intended to fix
the damage to disparate impact law caused by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, [490 U.S. 642 (1989)]."). The U.S. Supreme Court has also
recognized that, pursuant to Title VII, federal agencies have the authority to promulgate regulations that support disparate impact claims. See Guardians Ass'n.
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2, 591-92, 623 n.15 (1983); see also
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 540-42 (2001) (explaining
the plaintiffs Title VII claim and its basis in Department of Education
regulations).
State courts and legislatures also have the discretion to respond to discrimination or to correct inequities working with and based on their own constitutions
and statutes. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of
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the authority to correct disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes, whether or not the data establishing them would support a disparate treatment or disparate impact legal claim in a court of law.
Nevertheless, these two ways of conceptualizing disparities in capital
charging and sentencing outcomes based on the race and SES of defendants and victims, and the place of prosecution are helpful in understanding the Nebraska system and what our data demonstrate.
By disparate treatment we refer to the differential treatment of
similarly situated defendants at discretionarypoints of decision in the
charging and sentencing system on the basis of the race or SES of
defendants or their victims. Disparate treatment is sometimes referred to as "purposeful" or "invidious" discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
disparate treatment on the part of governmental bodies when it is
based on race. In the context of capital sentencing, the Eighth
2 13
Amendment also prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of race.
It is important to note that the statistical methodology we apply in
this study, which has been employed in numerous similar studies, can
only detect systemic disparate treatment when there is a pattern and
practice of discrimination across many cases in a discretionary decisionmaking system. If disparate treatment occurs in only a few cases,
the methodology that we apply will not detect it.
In contrast to disparate treatment, disparate impact arises when a
decision rule that is facially neutral with respect to group status, such
as race or gender, is applied evenhandedly but its application produces an adverse impact on a protected group. 2 14 This can take place
in either a discretionary or non-discretionary decisionmaking sysIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (noting that state courts can interpret state constitution provisions to give more protection than similar provisions of the federal constitution). This independent discretion has been
particularly evident in nationwide cases concerning public school financing.
Even though claims based on the Federal Constitution are extremely difficult to
raise, state courts have upheld claims under equal protection provisions in state
constitutions. See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New
Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 241 (1999) (noting that state
courts had found state constitutional violations in seven out of 22 equal protection-based education financing cases).
213. But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). While the United States Supreme Court has recognized basic rights of indigent criminal defendants, such as
the right to counsel, it has never recognized wealth or poverty as suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 323 (1980) ("ITihis Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is
not a suspect classification."). As discussed above, supra note 5, claims based on
socioeconomic or geographic discrimination are difficult to bring.
214. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII,
which prohibits employment discrimination, "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation").
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tem.2 15 The focus of disparate impact theory is not on the differential
treatment of individuals. Rather, it is on the protection of groups,
such as racial minorities and women, when they are given protected
status under the law.
The concept of adverse disparate impact has emerged in several
areas of anti-discrimination law over the last 30 years. 2 16 A common
example arises in employment law when an employer adopts a job
qualification that is applied evenhandedly to all job applicants, but its
application excludes a disproportionately high proportion of minorities
or women. A good example is a minimum height and weight requirement of, say, 5 feet 8 inches and 150 pounds. Because, on average,
women are shorter than and weigh less than men, a higher proportion
of women than men are excluded by the evenhanded application of
this otherwise facially-neutral job qualification. 2 17 The adverse impact is not intentionally caused. It exists because, on average, men
and women are physically different.
Under the anti-discrimination laws that recognize the theory of
disparate impact, a facially-neutral policy that produces an adverse
impact is not per se invalid. Its continued use will be permitted if the
policy at issue meets the test of necessity. In the employment and
housing contexts, the test is whether the policy producing the adverse
2 18
impact can satisfy the test of "business necessity."
Public education provides an example of an adverse impact on minorities that is produced by state law and policy. In most states, fund215. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988). In Watson,
Justice O'Connor provides examples of discretionary and non-discretionary systems. Non-discretionary decisionmaking systems that have had a disparate impact include written aptitude tests, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), written tests of verbal skills, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
height and weight requirements, Dothardv. Rawlison, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), and a
rule against employing drug addicts, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979). Some discretionary decisionmaking systems include hiring
decisions based on personal knowledge of candidates and recommendations,
Furnco. Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), discretionary promotions,
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983),
and management decision based on perceptions of relations between co-workers,
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
216. See, e.g., supra note 209.
217. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
218. Under this test, proof of an adverse disparate impact gives rise to a burden on the
employer or landlord to justify the policy producing the adverse impact in terms
of "business necessity." Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). If such
a justification is forthcoming, such as the need for minimum height and weight
requirements for firefighters, the policy may stand. If the requirement "cannot
be shown to be related to job performance," id., it may not be used. See also
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1975). If the employer
meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that an alternative requirement exists
that substantially meets the employer's needs and has less of an adverse impact.
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ing of public schools is primarily a local responsibility, and funding
levels per student vary widely across many states. If minorities
largely reside in communities with per student appropriation for public education that are below the statewide average, they experience an
adverse disparate impact by virtue of where they reside and the state
2 19
laws that delegate discretion for school financing to local officials.
In the balance of this section, we examine evidence of disparate
treatment based on the race of the defendant and victim. In section
VIII, we consider two forms of disparate impact that adversely affect
minority defendants. The first is a statewide adverse impact on minority defendants in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial. The
second is an adverse impact on minority defendants in the rates that
death-sentenced offenders are executed. In section IX, we examine evidence of disparate treatment based on the SES of the defendant and
victim. In section X, we examine geographic disparities that produce
an adverse impact on offenders in major urban counties.
B.

Evidence of Disparate Treatment Based on the Race of
the Defendant
1.

Unadjusted Statewide Minority-DefendantDisparitiesin
Charging and Sentencing Outcomes

The issue of race-of-defendant discrimination in Nebraska's capital
charging and sentencing system is raised by straightforward
demographics. Racial minorities constitute approximately 10% of the
population of the state of Nebraska. 2 20 Yet, as indicated in Part I of
at each stage in its
Figure 7, they are dramatically overrepresented
22
capital charging and sentencing system. 1
219. See

JEAN ANYON,

GHETTO SCHOOLING:

A

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCA-

REFORM (1997); Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and Access to
Knowledge, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
465 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGhee eds., 1995).
220. The 2000 census reports 90.8% white, 4.4% African American, 1.6% Asian, 1.3%
Native American, .1% Native Islander, and 3.3% "some other race." U.S. CENSUS
TIONAL

BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 TABLE DP-1- PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARAC-

NEBRASKA 2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2000/dp1/2kh31.pdf.
221. The overrepresentation of minorities in the population of death-eligible offenders
is largely the product of the overrepresentation of minorities among individuals
arrested for homicide. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1999 354, tbl. 4.10 (2000) (reporting nationwide, blacks constituted 54% (5,868/10,850) of persons arrested for murder and non-negligent
manslaughter in 1998). We identified the death-eligible offenders by screening
all Nebraska homicide convictions. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
The only way bias could have enhanced the proportion of minorities among those
arrested for homicide would be if similarly situated white defendants had not
been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of homicide. To our knowledge there are
no data available to test that hypothesis.
TERISTICS:
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FIGURE 7

RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL CHARGING AND
SENTENCING DECISIONS: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999

Part I. Proportion of Minority Defendants at Successive Stages in the Process
A
Death-Eligible
Defendants

B
Death-Eligible Defendants
Whose Cases Advanced
to a Penalty Trial

C
Defendants
Sentenced
to Death

(50/185)

(29/89)

(7/29)

Part II. Unadjusted Minority-Defendant Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing
Outcomes
(the number in parenthesis above each set of bars is the average rate for all cases)
A
Rates at Which DeathEligible Cases Advance
to a Penalty Trial

B
Rates at Which Death
Sentences are Imposed
in Penalty Trials

C
Death-Sentencing Rates
Among All
Death-Eligible Cases

(.48)

(.33)

(.16)

+14 pts.*
-12 pts.

.58
.44

n=

(135)

Legend:

-2 pts

(50)

=

n=

(60)

n= (135)

(28)

White-Defendant Cases

=

(49)

Minority-Defendant Cases

I

Level of Significance of Disparity: *=. 10.

Continued on Next Page
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FIGURE 7 (CONTINUED)

Part III. Minority-Defendant Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing Decisions
after Adjustment for the Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases
(the number in parenthesis above each set of bars is the average rate for all cases)

A

B

C

Rates at Which

Rates at Which Death

Death-Sentencing

Death-Eligible Cases
Advance
to a Penalty Trial

Sentences are Imposed
in Penalty Trials

Rates Among All
Death-Eligible Cases

+16 pts.*
-4 ts

.60

~

.44
. ....

n= (135)

Legend:

(49)

~

o.0.

4

n= (60)

(27)

= White-Defendant Cases

+3 pts
n= (135)

(48)

= Minority-Defendant Cases

Part I indicates that minorities represent 27% of the death-eligible
offenders and account for 33% of the offenders whose cases advance to
a penalty trial, but only 24% of the offenders who were sentenced to
death. These numbers, which are not adjusted for defendant culpability, indicate that the cases of minorities are more likely to advance to
a penalty trial than are whites, but are less likely to receive death
sentences. Part II of Figure 7 presents the differential selection rates
that shape the representation rates in Part I. Specifically, Column A
documents a statistically significant 14-percentage point (.58-.44)
statewide disparity in the rates that minorities advance to a penalty
trial. However, Column B reports a 12 percentage-point (.37-.25)
lower death-sentencing rate for minority defendants. The combined
effects of these two decision points are shown in Part II, Column C,
which indicates that among all death-eligible cases, the death-sentencing rate is 2 percentage points lower for minorities. Of these disparities, the only one consistent with a pattern and practice of
disparate treatment is the 14-percentage point minority-defendant
disparity in the rates that cases advanced to penalty trial (Column A).
For this reason, we consider that decision point in more detail below
in analyses that control for the culpability of the offenders and the
geographic location of their prosecution.
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2. Statewide Minority-Defendant Disparitiesin Charging and
Sentencing Decisions Controllingfor Offender
Culpability
Part III of Figure 7 presents statewide race-of-defendant disparities adjusted for offender culpability as measured by the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Column A documents a 16-percentage point (.60-.44) minority-defendant disparity in
the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial. 222 These results are
consistent with a statewide pattern and practice of disparate treatment in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In contrast, the capiC reveal only small
tal sentencing data reported in Columns B and
2 23
disparities that could easily arise by chance.
Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the race effects in prosecutorial decisionmaking are concentrated in the low and mid-range cases in terms
of defendant culpability. Figure 8, Column B, documents significant
effects in the one-aggravator category in which 63% (116/185) of the
state's death-eligible defendants are prosecuted. Figure 9 controls for
offender culpability with a 7-level scale based on the logistic regression analyses presented in Table 4. It indicates that the race effects
are most prominent in the mid-range cases ranging from levels 2 to 5
on the two scales.

222. Estimates based on alternative measures of defendant culpability were as follows: concerning minority-defendant disparities in the rates that cases advance
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the statewide minority-defendant disparity is 4 points
(p=.10); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 7 points
(p=.0 4 ); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 10 points
(p=.06); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column D, the coefficient
for the white defendant variable is .63, which results in a minority defendant
odds multiplier of 1.6 that is not statistically significant (NS).
223. For judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant disparity is
-19 points and not significant (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure,
the disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -14 points (NS); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column F,
the coefficient for the white defendant variable is .48, which results in a minoritydefendant odds multiplier of .62 (NS).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant
disparity is -6 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, there is no
disparity; controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 1 point (NS).
In the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column H, the coefficient for the
white victim variable is .33, which results in a minority-defendant odds multiplier of .62 (NS).
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Race-of-Defendant Disparitiesin the Exercise of Prosecutorial
DiscretionAfter Adjustment for the Place of Prosecution (in
Major Urban Counties v. the Counties of GreaterNebraska)

Without more, the statewide race effects presented above suggest a
distinct possibility of a pattern and practice of the disparate treatment
of minority offenders in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. At
first blush, this interpretation appears plausible because the disparities are concentrated in the low to middle level range of defendant
culpability where there is the greatest room for the exercise of discretion.224 An alternative possibility is that these disparities are explained by something other than differential treatment of similarly
situated white and minority defendants. This alternative is exactly
what emerged as a more plausible explanation when we estimated the
race effects separately for the major urban counties and greater
Nebraska.
The results of that analysis are presented in Figure 10. Part 1
presents the minority representation rates at the three key stages in
the process, without adjustment for defendant culpability. For the
major urban counties, where 90% of the prosecutions against minorities occur, a comparison of the data in Columns A and B in Part I, Row
A suggests no disparity in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial
and a comparison of the data in Columns C and B suggests a lower
death-sentencing rate for minority defendants. The data in Part I,
Row B for greater Nebraska tell a similar story but the samples are
too small to support any inferences about the impact of race on the
exercise of discretion.
Part II of Figure 10 presents the data based on comparative charging and sentencing rates for white- and minority-defendant cases after
adjustment for offender culpability measured by the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Panel A presents the results for the major urban counties. Column A of these data reports a
slightly higher penalty-trial rate (5 percentage points) in the minoritydefendant cases and a slightly lower minority death-sentencing rate
(Column B), which combine to produce parity in the death-sentencing
rate among all death-eligible cases (Column C). The 5-point disparity
in the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial is consistent with a
pattern and practice of disparate treatment, but the low magnitude of
the disparity and its lack of statistical significance do not support that
inference.
Panel B presents the results for greater Nebraska. It shows, in
Column A, a lower penalty-trial rate in the minority defendant cases
and the number of minority-defendant cases that advanced to a pen224. See, for example, Columns B and C of Figure 8.
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alty trial (n=l), thus making meaningful analysis of the sentencing
decisions impossible.
Figure 11 presents a more detailed analysis of prosecutorial decisionmaking controlling for the place of prosecution. Column A, Part I
indicates that without adjustment for defendant culpability, in the
major urban counties, there is a 1-percentage point minority-defendant disparity. After controls for culpability are introduced, white defendants appear to enjoy a slight advantage in three subgroups of
cases (Columns B, C, and D). However, the effects are small, and in
Columns C and D, the sample sizes are also small. If there were a
significant minority-defendant effect in the major urban counties, it
almost certainly would have appeared in the one-statutory aggravator
cases with good sample size that are shown in Part I, Column B.
For greater Nebraska, Column A, Part II shows an unadjusted disparity that is consistent with disparate treatment favoring white defendants. However, when controls for defendant culpability are
introduced, the results are mixed, not significant, and the samples are
very small. Therefore, in both areas of the state, the evidence does not
support an inference of differential treatment on the basis of the race
of the defendant.
Figure 12 expands the major urban counties versus greater Nebraska analysis to embrace minority-defendant effects in the three
key outcomes after adjustment for defendant culpability using regression-based culpability scales. Part I documents the minority-defendant effects in the major urban counties. Figure 12, Part I shows no
effects in the charging and plea bargaining decisions (Column B), a
higher penalty trial death-sentencing rate for whites (Column C), and
a comparable disparity among all death-eligible cases (Column D).225
In greater Nebraska (Part II), white-defendants fared better in pen225. When we disaggregate the data for the major counties and we compare Lancaster
County with Douglas and Sarpy Counties combined, the sample sizes are small in
Lancaster County. In each place, the adjusted disparity is a higher rate for white
defendants and not statistically significant, i.e., 9 points (p=.38) in Douglas/Sarpy
47
and 5 points (p=. ) in Lancaster County.
The results of supplemental analysis in the major urban counties, using alternative measures of defendant culpability, were as follows: Concerning the impact
of the race of the defendant on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in the
major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the cases, the minority-defendant disparity is 5 points (NS);
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -7 points (NS).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minoritycontrolling for the salient factors meadefendant disparity is -15 points (NS);
9
sure, the disparity is -9 points (p=.0 ).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant disparity is -7 points (NS); controlling for the
salient factors measure, the disparity is -6 points (NS).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

~>
r

2

0'

z

z

U4

2

U

00
+

Z

0

F .0

P40

xE

<

.<

+
E,

+
U)

UP4
c

C

E1

~~n44

<IZI

C/)O>

02
40

T

0

09C

0

c

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
FIGURE

577

12

MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING
DECISIONS IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA,
CONTROLLING FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILITY USING A
REGRESSION-BASED SCALE
(the bar indicates the penalty trial and death-sentencing rates after adjustment for
culpability with a regression-based scale)
D
C
B
A
Death-Sentencing
Rates that Death
Rates at which
Rates Among All
Sentences are
Death-Eligible
Death-Eligible
Imposed in Penalty
Cases Advance to
Cases
Trials
a Penalty Trial

Part I. Major Urban Counties

-3 pts.
ts.

(
(68)

(45)

(31) (27)

(68)

(45)

2

Part II. Greater Nebraskat

+60 pts. ,

,1.0

.40

n=
Legend:

=

(53)

(5)

White-Defendant Cases

(20)

+3 pts

(1)

(59)

(

(4)

E1 Minority-Defendant Cases

The sample sizes in Columns B and D may vary because cases are omitted from the adjusted analysis if there is not
at least one case in each racial category (e.g., white v. minority defendants) for a given culpability level.
2 Because of the sparseness of the data in the adjusted analyses, the effects reported in Part 1,Column C and Part I1,
Column C are unadjusted disparities.
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alty trials (Column C), but there was only one minority defendant and
the disparity is not statistically significant. 22 6 None of the disparities
in Figure 12 is statistically significant and none suggests a pattern
and practice of more punitive treatment of minority defendants in either area of the state. The results estimated with two other measures
of defendant culpability are to the same effect.
The weak minority-defendant disparities in both areas of the state
suggest that the statewide race effects documented in prosecutorial
decisionmaking are primarily a byproduct of the greater rate that
cases advance to a penalty trial in the major urban counties. Specifically, 90% of the prosecutions against minority defendants, statewide,
are conducted in the major urban counties. 22 7 The foregoing demonstrates, therefore, the risk of error that can arise when important and
relevant variables are omitted from a quantitative analysis.
If this explanation of the statewide race effects in prosecutorial
decisionmaking documented in Figures 10, 11, and 12 is correct, it
presents a classic example of Simpson's paradox. This paradox exists
when a strong association between two variables, suggesting a causal
relationship between them, is substantially reduced or reversed when
the data are disaggregated on the basis of a third variable. 2 28 Here
we initially see strong statewide race disparities in prosecutorial
charging and plea bargaining practices, but these perceived disparities virtually evaporate when we distinguish between and control for
the differing practices of prosecutors in the major urban and other
counties. 22 9 The foregoing demonstrates, therefore, the risk of error
226. The results of supplemental analysis in greater Nebraska using alternative measures of defendant culpability were as follows: Death-eligible cases in greater Nebraska involved only 5 minority defendants (compared to 45 in the major urban
counties), and only one of these cases advanced to a penalty trial. For the rates
that cases advance to penalty trials in greater Nebraska, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the minority-defendant disparity is -18 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is -7 points (NS).
Because only one minority defendant case advanced to a penalty trial, we conducted no further analyses of that outcome.
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in greater Nebraska, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the minority-defendant disparity is -6 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -1 point (NS).
227. Figure 12 Parts I and II, Column B (dark bars) indicate a statewide total of 50
(45+5) minority defendants with 45 prosecuted in the major urban counties.
228. E.H. Simpson, The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables, B13 J.
Roy. STAT. Soc. 238 (1951).

229. A particularly striking and comparable example of Simpson's paradox is a study
in the 1970s, which documented that, overall, women applicants to graduate programs at the University of California-Berkeley were rejected at a much higher
rate than the male applicants. However, closer scrutiny revealed that the women
tended to apply to the more selective departments (such as English and history)
and the men tended to apply to the less selective departments (such as science
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that can arise when important and relevant variables are omitted
from a quantitative analysis.
C.

Evidence of Disparate Treatment Based on the Race of
the Victim

The race-of-victim issue applies only in the major urban counties.
The reason is that a minority victim was present in only 16% (30/185)
of the cases statewide and 93% (28/30) of those prosecutions took place
in the major urban counties. Moreover, the three death sentences imposed in minority-victim cases were imposed in those counties. Accordingly, we limit our race-of-victim analysis to the major urban
2 30
counties.
Even though the sample of minority-victim cases is small, an assessment of the issue is important for two reasons. First, it is the
most commonly documented form of race discrimination in U.S. capital charging and sentencing systems. When race-of-victim discrimination does exist, it typically results in more punitive charging and
sentencing outcomes in white victim cases.
Second, the presence of race-of-victim discrimination in a system
can bias downward estimates of minority-defendant disparities in
analyses that do not also control for the race of the victim. The reason
for such bias is that the vast majority of homicides in America are
intra-racial vis-.-vis the defendant and victim. This means that because defendants in most white victim cases are also white, the usual
form of race-of-victim discrimination, which treats white victim cases
more punitively, has the effect of enhancing death-sentencing rates in
the white defendant cases, not because of the defendant's race but because of the victim's race. Also, since the defendant in most minorityvictim cases is a racial minority, race-of-victim discrimination biases
downward the death-sentencing rate in the minority-defendant cases
because the system treats minority-victim cases less punitively than it
does white-victim cases. 23 1 It is important, therefore, (a) to assess any
and mathematics). When the study disaggregated the data by the department of
application, the selection rate for female applicants was higher than it was for
male applicants both in the individual departments and overall. Peter J. Bickel
et. al., Sex Bias in GraduateAdmissions: Datafrom Berkeley, reprintedin STATIsTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

113-30 (William B. Fairley & Frederick Mosteller eds.,

1977).
230. The two minority-victim cases prosecuted in greater Nebraska involved white defendants and neither advanced to a penalty trial. The race-of-victim analysis in
the report of this research that we submitted to the Nebraska Commission on
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, supra note 1, differs somewhat from the
analysis in this section because its focus is statewide rather than on the major
urban counties.
231. Research from Georgia in the 1970s clearly reflects this pattern. Those data documented substantial race-of-victim effects. As a result, the unadjusted data
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evidence of race-of-victim discrimination in Nebraska's major urban
counties and (b), if such disparities are found to exist, to estimate minority-defendant disparities after controlling for the race of the victim.
In the major urban counties of Nebraska, the distribution of deatheligible cases on the basis of the defendant/victim racial combination
differs from the usual pattern in that nearly one-half of the minoritydefendant cases involved a white victim. 2 32 However, there is evi-

dence of the usual pattern in which minority-victim cases are treated
less punitively than white-victim cases, an outcome that reduced
somewhat the overall death-sentencing rate in the black-defendant
cases. However, the adjusted white-victim disparities are based on
small samples and are not statistically significant. For that reason
they do not support an inference of disparate treatment based on the
race of the victim.
Figure 13 presents the evidence. Part I documents the key charging and sentencing outcomes controlling for the defendant/victim racial combination, while Parts II and III report the unadjusted and
adjusted white-victim disparities among all of the cases. The place to
begin is Column C, Row 5, which indicates an overall death sentencing
rate of .18 (20/112) among all death-eligible cases. Within Column C,
a comparison of Rows 1 and 2 (minority defendants) with Rows 3 and
4 (white defendants) documents higher death sentencing rates in the
white-defendant cases than in the black-defendant cases, which is
consistent with the race-of-defendant findings reported above. 2 33 In
addition, a comparison of Column C, Rows 1 and 2 reveals a partial
explanation for the lower death-sentencing rate in the minority-defendant cases, i.e., the .09 (2/23) rate in the minority-defendant/minorityvictim cases (Row 2) is one-half the .18 rate reported for the minoritydefendant/white-victim cases (Row 1).234 However, this unadjusted 9showed a considerably lower death-sentencing rate in the black-defendant cases
than in white-defendant cases. EJDP, supra note 11, at 315, tbl. 50, n.1 (among
all death-eligible cases, the unadjusted death-sentencing rate for the white-defendant cases was .10 versus .07 for the minority defendant cases). However,
upon the introduction of controls for the race of the victim, black defendants faced
only a slightly reduced risk of being sentenced to death, while a substantial
white-victim effect persisted in the data. In a logistic regression analysis, which

controlled for 39 non-racial variables, the black-defendant effect was slightly negative (an odds multiplier of .94, p.=.88), while the race-of-victim effect was
strongly positive (an odds multiplier of 4.3, p.=.00 3 ). Id. at pp. 319-20, tbl. 52.
232. 49% (22/45) of the minority-defendant cases involved a white victim, while only
7% (5/67) of the white-defendant cases had a minority victim. As noted above, we
limit this analysis to the major urban counties of the state because only two
white-victim cases were prosecuted in greater Nebraska.
233. Supra subsection VII.B.3.
234. If the death sentencing rate in the minority-defendant/minority-victim cases had
been the same as the rate in the minority-defendant/white-victim cases, the overall black-defendant death sentencing rate would have been .18 (8/45) instead of
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percentage point white-victim disparity is based on small samples and
is not statistically significant.
Columns A and B of Part I document that the principal source of
the less punitive treatment in the minority-defendant/minority-victim
cases is the judicial death-sentencing decisions. Specifically, Row 2,
Column A, indicates that these cases advanced to a penalty trial at
only a slightly lower rate, .57, than the .60 overall average rate shown
in Row 5. In contrast, Column B, Row 2, reports a judicial death-sentencing rate of .15, which is only one-half the .30 overall rate shown in
Row 5. It was the combined effects of these two outcomes that produced the .09 overall death-sentencing rate reported in Column C,
Row 2 for the minority-defendant/minority-victim cases, which is onehalf the overall rate of .18 (20/112) shown in Row 5.
Part II of Figure 13 presents the unadjusted white-victim disparities among all cases in the major urban counties. The results show
weak race-of-victim effects (5 percentage points) in the prosecutorial
decisions (Column A) and a slightly larger effect in the judicial decisions (9 percentage points). The overall unadjusted white-victim disparity among all death-eligible cases shown in Column C is 9 points
and the ratio of the death-sentencing rates is 1.8 to 1 (.20/.11).
The adjusted race-of-victim effects shown in Part III of Figure 13
tell a similar story. With the introduction of controls for offender culpability, the white-victim disparity in the prosecutorial decisions is 7
points (Column A). In the judicial decisions (Column B), the disparity
is 13 points with a 1.7 to 1 ratio (.31/.18). These results are consistent
with a pattern and practice of disparate treatment based on the race
of the victim. They are also consistent with a pattern of race-of-victim
effects documented in many states. 2 35 However, because of the small
236
samples involved none of the disparities is statistically significant.
the actual rate of .13 (6/45), both of which are lower than the overall rate in the
white defendant cases of .21 (14/67).
235. Supra note 11.
236. As is suggested by the data in Part I of Figure 13, race-of-victim effects are concentrated in the minority-defendant cases for which we have a sample of 45 cases
that are almost evenly split between the white victim (n=22) and minority-victim
(n=23) cases. The adjusted white-victim disparities in the rates that these cases
advance to penalty trial are 7 points (.60 v. .53) controlling for the number of
aggravating circumstances in the cases and 19 points (.63 v. .44) controlling for
the regression-based scale. Neither of these adjusted disparities is statistically
significant. Nor are the adjusted white-victim disparities in the judicial deathsentencing decisions statistically significant. Those disparities are 24 points (.33
v. .09) controlling for both the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases
and the regression-based scale. For the death-sentencing rates among all deatheligible cases, the disparities controlling for these two measures are 4 points (.12.08) and -3 points (.11-.14) respectively.
For the white-defendant cases with only 5 minority victim cases, controlling
for the two measures of offender culpability applied above, the adjusted disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are 3 points (.59-.56) and 13
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For the bottom line of death sentencing among all death-eligible
cases in the analysis (Column C), the disparity is only 3 points and the
ratio of the rates declined to 1.2 to 1 (.19/.16).237
We also estimated race-of-defendant effects in the major urban
counties, controlling for the race-of-the victim. The results of those
analyses, which are consistent with the data in Part I of Figure 13,
effects in either charging
revealed no significant minority-defendant
2 38
or sentencing outcomes.
The data, therefore, do not support a finding that a pattern and
practice of race-of-victim discrimination exists in either charging or
sentencing decisions in the major urban counties. These results also
indicate that the absence of data suggesting a pattern and practice of
disparate treatment based on the race of the defendant is not an artifact of a failure to control for the race-of-victim effects in the system.
points (.59-.46) respectively; the adjusted disparities in the judicial death-sentencing rates are 8 points (.33-.25) and 12 points (.34-.22); and the adjusted death
sentencing disparity among all death-eligible cases are -5 points (.20-.25) and 8
points (.21-. 13) respectively. None of these disparities is statistically significant.
237. Supplemental estimates computed with three alternative measures of defendant
culpability reveal similar results with respect to both charging and sentencing
decisions. Concerning race-of-victim effects in the rates that cases advance to
penalty trial in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 7 points (NS); controlling for the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the white-victim disparity is 21 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is 14 points (NS).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases, the white-victim
disparity is 18 points (NS); controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 24 points (NS); controlling for
the salient factors measure, the disparity is 20 points (NS).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the
cases, the white-victim disparity is 6 points (NS); controlling for the number of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 14 points
(NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 12 points (NS).
238. Among the white-victim cases, there are 62 white defendants and 22 minority
defendants. After adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances in the
cases and the regression-based scales, the adjusted minority-defendant disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are 3 points (.62-.59) and (.61.58) respectively. However, the adjusted minority-defendant disparities in the
judicial sentencing decisions are mixed: +8 points (.41-.33) and -9 points (.25-.34).
The adjusted minority-defendant disparities among all death-eligible cases are
zero points (.20-.20) and -8 points (.14-.22) using the two measures of offender
culpability referred to above, none of which is statistically significant.
Among the minority-victim cases (n=28), the sample of white defendants (n=5)
is too small to support a meaningful analysis. To the extent that adjusted disparities exist in these cases, if anything, they suggest more punitive treatment of the
white defendants, although none of them is significant.
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Evidence of Minority-Defendant/White-Victim Disparate
Treatment

Research in other jurisdictions and many legal practitioners suggest that even if the data fail to support "main" race-of-defendant or
race-of-victim effects in the system, one is likely to see a significant
race effect when minorities cross the racial divide and kill whites.
The data in Figure 14 test the hypothesis that minorities who kill
whites are treated more punitively than are all other racial combinations of defendants and victim. The unadjusted disparities in Part I,
Column A support this hypothesis with respect to the prosecutorial
charging decisions, i.e., a 16-percentage point higher penalty-trial rate
for minority defendants with white victims. However, Column B
shows no race effects in the sentencing decisions. The combined effect
of these two decision points produces the 5-percentage point minoritydefendant/white-victim disparity among all death-eligible cases shown
in Column C.
The adjusted effects shown in Part II are comparable to the Part I
results, except for the 13-point disparity shown in Column B; however,
the bottom line in Column C shows no effect at all. 2 39 These data,
therefore, fail to support an inference of disparate treatment in judicial sentencing decisions. Nevertheless, because the statewide results
of the prosecutorial charging decisions (Part I, Column A) are consistent with a pattern and practice of disparate treatment, we gave them
closer scrutiny in Figures 15 and 16.
The Figure 15 data-Part I (plea bargains) and Part II (advancing
to penalty trial)-show more punitive effects for minority defendants
with white victims. The disparities are primarily concentrated in the
single aggravator category (Column B) where the disparities are large
and statistically significant.
239. The adjusted disparities computed with our supplemental measures of offender
culpability are to the same effect. Concerning the impact of the defendant/victim
racial combination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the statewide black-defendant/white-victim disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the
salient factors measure, there is no disparity; controlling for the regression-based
scale, the disparity is 7 points (p=.09).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity is -14 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity
is 6 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -3
points (NS).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity is -4 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors
measure, the disparity is 3 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale,
the disparity is -4 points (NS).
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Figure 16 introduces controls for the place of prosecution. In the
major urban counties (Part I), there is a modest, but not significant,
effect in the rates that minority-defendant/white-victim cases advance
to a penalty trial (Column B) as well as in the penalty trial deathsentencing rates (Column C).240 However, Column D indicates that
after adjustment for defendant culpability in a scale based on an analysis of death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, the
death-sentencing rate is lower for minority defendants in white-victim
cases than it is for all other defendant/victim racial combinations.241
The data for greater Nebraska (Part II) show minority-defendant/
white-victim effects that are consistent with a theory of disparate
treatment (Column D), but because of the small disparities based on
very small samples, they fall well short of establishing a pattern and
practice of differential treatment of similarly situated defendants.242
240. When the comparison is between Douglas/Sarpy Counties and Lancaster County,
the data indicate a 10 pt. non-significant (p=.4 4 ) disparity in Douglas/Sarpy with
a higher penalty-trial rate in the minority-defendant/white-victim cases. In
Douglas County, the rate for the minority defendants with white victims is 5
points lower (p=.8 6 ).
241. The disparities estimated with our supplemental measures of culpability, the results are comparable. Concerning the impact of the defendant-victim racial combination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in major urban counties,
controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
cases, the minority-defendant/white-vicitm disparity is -8 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -17 points (NS); controlling
for the regression-based scale, the disparity is +3 points (NS). For the judicial
death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity in the major counties is -7 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is
-6 points (p=.01); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -3
points (NS).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity in the major urban counties is -6 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling
for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -6 points (NS).
242. The disparities estimated in greater Nebraska with controls for our supplemental
measures of offender culpability are comparable. Note that there were four minority-defendant/white-victim cases, one of which advanced to a penalty trial,
and resulted in a death sentence. Concerning the impact of the defendant-victim
racial combination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in greater
Nebraska, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity in greater Nebraska is -18 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is -7 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -9 points (NS).
Because only one minority-defendant/white-victim case advanced to a penalty
trial, we conducted no additional analyses of that outcome.
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant/white-victim disparity in greater Nebraska is -7 points (NS); controlling for
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The unadjusted disparity is 21 percentage points - .50 (2/4) for the minority-defendant/white-victim cases v. .29
(20/68) for the "other cases." Twenty-four "other cases" were omitted from the adjusted analysis reported here
because of an absence of minority-defendant/white-victim casesat the same level of culpability.

the salient factors measure, the disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the
regression-based scale, the disparity is 1 point (NS).
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Our overall conclusion is that the minority-defendant/white-victim
disparities in the statewide data are a byproduct of the fact that 85%
(22/26) of the minority defendants with white victims are prosecuted
in the major urban counties, which advance all cases to penalty trial
at much higher rates than is the case in the counties of greater Nebraska. Just as it did in the analysis of the main minority defendant
effects in statewide prosecutorial decisionmaking, the introduction of
controls for the place of prosecution explains away the minority-defendant/white-victim effect.
Finally, what is a likely explanation for the failure of our findings
to support an inference of a pattern and practice of disparate treatment on the part of Nebraska's prosecutors and judges? One possibility is weak methodology and insufficient data on the cases. We
consider this implausible because the same methodology has documented compelling evidence of disparate treatment in other jurisdictions and it has produced striking evidence in this study of disparate
treatment based on the SES of the victim. However, as noted earlier,
the statistical methodology that we used cannot detect disparate
treatment in a small number of cases. To detect disparate treatment
there must be a quite strong pattern and practice of it across a substantial number of cases.
Another possible explanation is that prosecutors and sentencing
judges are sensitive to the danger of unconscious bias and make a conscious effort to treat cases evenhandedly. Race discrimination is
widely perceived to be an important legal and political issue in capital
sentencing and, at least with respect to race-of-defendant discrimination, the law on the issue is clear. A plausible explanation, therefore,
is that the law has had a deterrent effect in controlling the impact of
any bias, conscious or unconscious, that may have otherwise been reflected in the decisions.
The results of this analysis stand in sharp contrast to data from
Georgia and Philadelphia, which document race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim effects in jury sentencing. 2 43 The Nebraska results,
therefore, support the Proffitt hypothesis that judicial sentencing is
likely to be more principled and consistent than jury sentencing in
capital cases.
VIII.

EVIDENCE OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF STATE LAW
AND POLICY ON MINORITY DEFENDANTS

The preceding analysis does not support a theory of disparate
treatment in capital charging and sentencing decisionmaking on the
243. See EJDP, supra note 11 (detailing race-of-victim effects injury and prosecutorial
decision making); PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10 (detailing race-of-defendant
and race-of-victim effects in jury sentencing decisions).
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basis of the race of the defendant or victim. However, the impact of
differential prosecutorial charging policies in the major urban counties and greater Nebraska presents a good example of an "adverse disparate impact" on racial minorities statewide. The adverse impact
exists even though there is no significant evidence of the disparate
treatment of minorities within either the major urban counties or
greater Nebraska. We consider those results in section A below.
Also, among the 24 offenders who have been sentenced to death in
Nebraska, in terms of the three such defendants from that group who
have been executed to date, there is a disparity that adversely affects
minority defendants. We consider those results in section B below.
A.

Evidence of a Statewide Disparate Impact on Minority
Defendants in the Rates that Death-Eligible Cases
Advance to Penalty Trial

The data document a statewide adverse disparate impact on minority defendants that flows from a combination of three things: (1)
state law, which delegates to local prosecutors broad discretion in the
prosecution of death-eligible cases, (2) a significant difference between
the major urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska in the
rates that prosecutors advance death-eligible cases to penalty trials,
and (3) the fact that 90% of Nebraska's minority defendants in deatheligible cases are prosecuted in the major urban counties of the state.
Nebraska law and the law of all other states of which we are aware
delegates extremely broad discretion to prosecutors in capital charging decisions. 2 44 In Nebraska, as noted above, prosecutorial discretion appears to be exercised without regard to charging practices in
in the rates
other counties. As a result, there is significant variation
24 5
at which prosecutors advance cases to penalty trial.
Most striking in this regard is the difference in those rates between
the major urban counties and greater Nebraska in terms of the rates
that the death penalty is waived and cases are advanced to penalty
trials. For both outcomes, Figure 17 documents the unadjusted disparities as well as the disparities computed after adjustment for offender culpability. The bottom line is that after adjustment for
offender culpability, Part II, Column B indicates that death-eligible
are more than twice as likely
defendants in the major urban counties
2 6
(.58/.28) to advance to a penalty trial. 4
244. There is precedent in the employment context for treating the impact of a discretionary stage in a decisionmaking system as a source of disparate impact. See
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
245. Among the 31 counties with one or more death-eligible cases, the average penalty-trial rate was .48 (89/185) ranging from .66 (48/73) to .0 (in 14 counties).
246. The disparities estimated with our supplemental measures of offender culpability
are to the same effect. Geographic disparities in prosecutorial charging and plea
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Legend:
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=

Major Urban Counties
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Level of Significance of Disparity: ****=.0001
'See infra Figure 29, page 625, note 4 for an explanation of the disparity between the sample sizes
in Column B, Parts I and 11of this Figure.
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The second relevant datum is that 90% (45/50) of the minority
death-eligible defendants are prosecuted in Nebraska's major urban
counties. Figure 18 documents the consequences of the interaction between (a) the higher penalty-trial rates in the major urban counties
and (b) the disproportionate concentration of minority defendants in
those counties. The result shown in Column B is a substantially
higher penalty-trial rate in minority-defendant cases statewide, i.e.,
32% (14/44) higher without adjustment for defendant culpability (Part
I) and 36% (16/44) higher when the rates are adjusted for defendant
culpability (Part II). This adverse impact occurs in spite of the evidence presented above suggesting a policy of evenhanded treatment of
24 7
minority defendants in both areas of the state.
Figure 19 indicates that the disparate impact against minority defendants is concentrated in the cases with one or two aggravating circumstances. The minority-defendant disparity among these cases is
the principal source of the overall 14-point minority-defendant dispar248
ity shown in Column A of the figure.
This adverse impact on minorities is analogous to the adverse impact on minorities, noted above, that exists in states in which the level
of expenditures for public education are almost solely within the discretion of local school boards and there is wide variation in the tax
bases available to support public education. This often results in
lower expenditures per pupil in predominately minority communities
than in predominately white communities.
Given the adverse impact of prosecutorial charging decisions on
minorities, statewide, one could reasonably expect to see an adverse
impact against minorities in the imposition of death sentences among
all death-eligible cases. Indeed, if sentencing judges imposed death
bargaining decisions are substantial after adjustment for all of our measures of
defendant culpability. For the rates that cases result in a negotiated plea, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases,
the disparity in rates between the major urban counties and greater Nebraska is
-31 points (p=.0001); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is
-29 points (p=.0001); controlling for a regression-based scale, the disparity is -34
points (p=.0001); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column C, the
odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is .27 and statistically
significant.
Concerning the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the major urban county
disparity is 31 points (p=.0002); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is 31 points (p=.0001); controlling for the regression-based scale, the
disparity is 32 points (p=.0001); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4,
Column E, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is 2.8 and
statistically significant.
247. Supra subsection VII.B.3.
248. When the regression-based scale is used, the data document a similar effect concentration of disparities among the cases with weak and middling levels of
culpability.
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FIGURE 18
STATEWIDE MINORITY-DEFENDANT DSPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES TERMINATE IN A NEGOTIABLE PLEA OR A
UNILATERAL WAIVER OF THE DEATH PENALTY (COLUMN A) AND
ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL (COLUMN B): NEBRASKA, 1973-1999
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sentences at comparable rates in white- and minority-defendant cases,
this is exactly what one would see. However, as the data in Parts I
and II of Figure 7 indicate, this does not occur. The reason it does not
is that in spite of the more punitive treatment of the minority defendants statewide (Column A), the penalty-trial judges sentence minority
defendants to death at a lower rate than they do white defendants
(Column B). The bottom line results for the state as a whole are
shown in Column C. These data reveal only small, non-significant
and inconsistent disparities on the order of 2 and 3 percentage points.
These results clearly indicate that the race-of-defendant disparities in
the rates that cases advance to penalty trial statewide do not produce
that death sentences are ima statewide adverse impact in the rates
24 9
posed among all death-eligible cases.
What then are the implications of the adverse impact on minorities
flowing from the sharp disparities in the rates that death-eligible
cases advance to penalty trial in the major urban counties as contrasted to greater Nebraska? Under existing law, the adverse impact
raises no legal claim. But does it have moral implications? One view
is that the adverse disparate impact on minority defendants is not a
matter of moral concern because it is merely an anomaly resulting
from the fact that racial minorities primarily reside in the state's major urban areas.
An alternative view is that the disparate impact is a matter of
moral concern for two reasons. The first is that, notwithstanding its
demographic origins, the adverse impact places a significant and disproportionate burden on minority defendants. 250 The second concern
is that the breadth of discretion permitted prosecutors under state
law, which is the legal source of the disparate impact, has not been
justified in terms of necessity. One possible justification for existing
law is a long tradition supporting the broad exercise of prosecutorial
249. On the issue of geographic disparities in sentencing outcomes, we estimated similar results controlling for alternative measures of defendant culpability. Controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the
major urban county disparity in judicial death-sentencing rates is 5 points (NS);
controlling for the salient factors measure, there is no disparity; controlling for
the regression-based scale, there is no disparity; in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column G, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable
is .95, and is not statistically significant. For death sentences imposed among all
death-eligible cases, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the major urban county disparity is 9 points (NS); controlling for the
salient factors measure, the disparity is 6 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 4 points (NS). In the logistic regression analysis
in Table 4, Column I, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is
.93, and is not statistically significant.
250. In employment and housing discrimination law, a substantial adverse disparate
impact against a protected group will not stand unless it can be justified by a
compelling business interest.
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discretion in all cases. However, given the severity of the penalty of
death and the consequences of advancing a case to a penalty trial, one
can legitimately question whether the cost can be justified by tradition
alone.
Another possible justification for the disparate impact is the importance of penalty trials as a vehicle for delivering justice, i.e., death
sentences in truly deathworthy cases. In this regard it is important to
distinguish between cases involving a single aggravating circumstance and cases involving two or more aggravators. Figure 19 documents minority-defendant disparities in the rates that cases advance
to a penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. Column A reports an unadjusted disparity of 14
percentage points in all cases, a population that includes 50 minority
and 135 white defendants. Column B documents the disparity in the
one-aggravator cases, which embrace 63% (116/185) of the death-eligible cases and 70% (35/50) of the minority-defendant cases. Among
this substantial group of cases, there is a significant disparate impact
that contributes substantially to the overall disparity reported in Column A.
Figure 20 breaks down charging and sentencing outcomes by geography and the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases.
Part I presents the results for the major urban counties and Part II
presents the data for greater Nebraska. The data in Column B present the outcomes of the one-aggravator cases. Part II indicates that
in greater Nebraska, 20% (8/41) of the single-aggravator cases advanced to penalty trial and none resulted in a death sentence. Part I
indicates that in the major urban counties, 53% (40/75) of the singleaggravator death-eligible cases advanced to a penalty trial. But as is
shown in Part I, Column B (darkest bar), only three of those 40 penalty trials resulted in a death sentence, yielding a death-sentencing
rate of 4% (3/75). Moreover, each of those death sentences was reduced to a life sentence in the Nebraska courts. 2 5 1 The one-aggravator cases, which are a significant source of the disparate impact
in the rates that cases advance to penalty trials, contribute, therefore,
very little to the overall level of death penalty imposition in Nebraska
as a whole and in the major urban counties.
The data underlying Figure 19 indicate that there is also a significant adverse impact among the 69 cases involving two or more aggravating circumstances. Specifically, there is a 19-percentage point (.74.55) average minority-defendant disparate impact among those cases
(not shown in Figure 19). However, there is a much stronger justification for the adverse impact on minority defendants in these cases be251. Supra note 76. See infra note 413 for evidence of concern in the Nebraska Legislature about the adverse disparate impact on minority defendants in the rates
that similarly situated death-eligible cases advance to penalty trial.
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cause they produce 90% (26/29) of the death sentences that are
imposed statewide and 85% (17/20) of the death sentences imposed in
the major urban counties (not shown in Figure 19).
B.

Evidence of an Adverse Impact on Minority Defendants
in the Execution of Death-Sentenced Offenders

Among the 24 Nebraska offenders sentenced to death from 1973
through 1999, the data document a minority-defendant disparity in
terms of the three defendants who have actually been executed. Specifically, the population of offenders sentenced to death consists of 7
minorities and 17 whites, while the population of defendants actually
(Joubert) and two minority
executed consists of one white defendant
2 52
defendants (Williams and Otey).
Figure 21 presents an overview of the minority defendant disparities in execution rates. The most striking statistic is shown in Part I,
Column C: minority defendants constitute 67% (2/3) of the offenders
who have been executed to date. When compared to their 33% (7/21)
representation rate (Column A) among all defendants sentenced to
death (who did not die on death row of natural causes), that statistic
suggests that death-sentenced minority defendants face a higher risk
of execution than do death-sentenced defendants who are white.
We recognize the small numbers underlying these statistics, but in
terms of public perceptions, executions are the most visible and important outcome of the process. Of the three persons thus far executed,
the two black defendants had white victims and the one white defen2 53
dant had two white victims.
In spite of the findings presented above, there is no compelling evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of the race of the defendant
or the victim in Nebraska's charging and sentencing system. One
would never know it, however, on the basis of these three cases.
Though they may fail as proof of racial discrimination, their symbolic
force is substantial. The political salience of these two executions
motivates us to assess the extent to which it reflects a pattern and
practice of disparate treatment against minority offenders or disparate impact against minority offenders who have been sentenced to
252. Four white offenders, Palmer, Moore, Ryan, and Lotter, remain on death row,
and three white offenders died on death row of natural causes. The three white
offenders on death row who died of natural causes are Harper, Perry, and Bjorklund. Unless otherwise indicated, as in Figure 23, these cases are excluded from
the balance of this analysis. For the disposition of the death-sentenced cases
without regard to race see supra Figure 1.
253. In an October 2001 hearing on the findings of this research in the Judicial Committee of the Nebraska Legislature, Senator Ernie Chambers focused on that statistic as the most graphic evidence of what he believed to be the racist character
of the Nebraska system of capital punishment.
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RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN EXECUTION RATES AMONG
DEATH-SENTENCED OFFENDERS: NEBRASKA, 1973-19991
Part I. Proportion of Minority Defendants at Successive Stages in the Post-Sentencing Process
A
Defendants
Sentenced
to Death

2 .......
(7/21)

B
Death Sentences that
Were Executed or
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Risk of Execution
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Part II. Unadjusted Minority-Defendant Disparities in the Risk of Execution Among
Death-Sentenced Offenders
(the number in parenthesis above each set of bars is the average rate for all cases)

A
Execution Rates
Among All DeathSentenced Offenders
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n= (1/14)

Legend:

B
Rates that Death-Sentenced
Defendants Were Executed
or Remain at Risk of Execution

(.33)

7
(2/7

White-Defendant Cases

n= (5/14)(2/7)

Minority-Defendant Cases

'Three defendants, all white, who died of natural causes on death row (Harper, Perry, Bjorklund) are
excluded from this Figure. The seven minorities sentenced to death were: Bird Head, Jones, Otey, Reeves,
Stewart, Victor, and Williams. Otey and Williams were executed. There are no minorities currently on
death row. The fourteen white defendants sentenced to death, who did not die on death row of natural
causes, were: Anderson, Drinkwalter, Hochstein, Holton, Hunt, Joubert, Lotter, Moore, Palmer, Rust,
Ryan, Sheets, Simants, and Simpson. Of the whites sentenced to death, Joubert
was executed and four
remain on death row: Lotter, Moore, Palmer, and Ryan.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

601

death. In this section, therefore, we seek to explain and understand
why of the 7 minorities sentenced to death during the 25 year period of
our study, two black offenders with white victims have been executed
while, during the same period, of the 11 white offenders sentenced to
death, only one was executed and he is widely considered to be the
"worst of the worst" Nebraska offender during the entire period of this
2 54
study.
Part I, Column B of Figure 21 indicates that if the focus shifts to
death-sentenced offenders who have either been executed or remain at
risk of execution on death row, the picture is quite different. Minorities constitute 29% (2/7) of this group, a figure that is quite comparable to the 33% (7/21) minorities among the whole pool of deathsentenced offenders shown in Column A. However, two white death
row members included in this tabulation have, by Nebraska standards, been on death row only a short while, thereby reducing the imminence of their risk of execution. 2 55 Otey and Williams are the two
minorities in this pool, as there are no minorities on death row from
2 56
the period covered by this study.
Part II of Figure 21 presents the same data in terms of selection
rates. Column A documents a 4.1 (.29/.07) times higher execution rate
in the minority-defendant cases. While Column B indicates that, in
terms of the rates that offenders were executed or remain at risk of
execution, the rate is slightly lower for the minority offenders.
There are several possible explanations for the minority-defendant
disparity described above. The first is the offender's length of time on
death row. Williams and Otey were on death row for a very long time:
Otey for 16 years and Williams for 13 years. To put this theory in
perspective, it is useful to compare them with white offenders who
were on death row for comparable periods of time and avoided execution. For this purpose, we focus on the white offenders who were sentenced to death in 10-year periods before and after Otey and Williams
were sentenced, but have not been executed. In the earlier 10-year
period, two death sentences were imposed against white offenders
who remained on death row for many years, i.e., Rust (19 years) and
Holton (13 years). In the 10 years after Otey and Williams went to
death row, they were joined by eight white offenders, who also spent
254. The black offenders are Otey (who raped and murdered a woman), executed September 1994, and Williams (who murdered two women, one of whom he raped),
executed December 1997. State v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979);
State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d 18 (1979). The white offender is
Joubert (who methodically murdered two children), executed July 1996. State v.
Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986).
255. Lotter has been there about 7 years and Ryan has been there about 15 years. The
other whites are long-time death row inmates-Moore (21 years) and Palmer (21
years).
256. Nor have any racial. minorities been sentenced to death since January 2000.
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long periods of time there, i.e., Anderson (22 years), Hochstein (22
years), Palmer (21 years), and Moore (21 years). 25 7 It is clear, therefore, that years on death row alone does not explain why Otey and
Williams were executed while none of the white offenders were.
What then distinguishes the white offenders, with many years on
death row, from Otey and Williams? The short answer is judicial relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. A significant proportion of the white offenders got such relief
while Otey and Williams did not.
Relief from either the Nebraska Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit may have two consequences relevant to avoiding execution. If, on
remand, another death sentence is imposed, the offender's clock for
filing appeals starts anew. This re-start extends his time on death
row, with a greatly diminished risk of execution for many years. If, on
remand, the offender is sentenced to life imprisonment or less, he
leaves death row altogether. The white offenders with whom we are
comparing Otey and Williams were very successful on both of these
fronts. 258 In contrast, Otey and Williams were completely unsuccessful at the first step of obtaining any form of judicial relief. Their
"clocks" for filing appeals were never re-set. As a result, their cases
moved steadily along toward execution.
The question, therefore, is how likely it is that the race of the defendant played a role in Otey's and Williams' failure to secure any
form of judicial relief. One possibility is that unconscious bias in the
courts affected their cases. To address this question, we first computed
unadjusted race-of-defendant disparities in appellate outcomes in the
Nebraska Supreme Court and in the Eighth Circuit, which are
presented in Figure 22. The Part I results are based on the outcomes
for both courts, while Parts II and III present separate results for the
two courts. The samples are quite small, but they suggest that in general minority defendants do better than white defendants on appeal
(Part I), particularly in the Nebraska Supreme Court (Part II).
257. In this later period, two minorities (Jones and Reeves) were sentenced to death.
Jones's sentence was remanded by the Nebraska Supreme Court, State v. Jones,
213 Neb. 1, 328 N.W.2d 166 (1982), and he was later sentenced to life; Reeves
remained on death row for 20 years before having his sentence remanded by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984),
followed by a prosecutorial waiver of his death sentence.
258. Anderson, Hochstein, Palmer, and Moore obtained new trials in which new death
sentences were imposed. Anderson v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997);
Hochstein v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997); Palmer v. Grammer, 863
F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Kinney, 119 F.Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Neb. 2000).
Rust and Holtan received life sentences on remand. State v. Rust, Docket 91,
Page 555, p. 28 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1994); State v. Holtan, Docket 92, No. 634,
p. 20 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1989). Anderson and Hochstein ultimately had their
sentences reduced to life by the Nebraska Supreme Court. State v. Anderson &
Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001).
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The unit of observation in this Figure is death sentences imposed (n=29) rather than death-sentenced
offenders (n=24). Three offenders received two death sentences (Anderson, Hochstein, and Moore) and
one (Palmer) received three.
'White defendants Anderson and Hochstein obtained relief in both state and federal court as did minority
defendant Reeves.
Eight white defendants with death sentences reversed/vacated in the Nebraska Supreme Court are:
Simants, Hunt, Sheets, Drinkwalter, Palmer (I), Palmer (11),Hochstein (IH),and Anderson (II). This
tabulation also includes a ninth white defendant, Simpson, whose sentence was vacated in the trial court on
the grounds of mental retardation. The thirteen white defendants denied relief in the Nebraska Supreme
Court are Palmer (I11),Moore (1), Moore (11),Ryan, Lotter, Harper, Perry, Bjorklund, Anderson (1),
Hochstein (I), Holton, Rust, and Joubert.
The five minority defendants with sentences vacated in the Nebraska Supreme Court are Stewart,
Bird Head, Reeves, Victor, and Jones. The two minority offenders denied relief are Otey and Williams,
who have been executed.
4Part 11 is limited to cases that have been reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. The six white defendants with
sentences vacated are: Holtan, Rust, Anderson (1), Hochstein (I), Moore (I), and Moore (11). The four white
defendants denied relief are Joubert, Harper, Ryan, and Palmer (I1). The one minority defendant granted
relief was Reeves (who later also obtained relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court); Otey and Williams were
denied relief and executed.
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It is in federal court (Part III) that minorities do less well. The 30percentage point minority-defendant disparity is consistent with disparate treatment, but the sample sizes are too small to support such
an inference even if all of the cases were factually and legally identical
and had equally competent counsel. Of course, the cases are not identical and we lack the capacity to compute adjusted disparities holding
constant many legitimate case characteristics (e.g., the law, the facts
of the cases, and the trial court decisions that underlie the appellate
claims) that normally determine appellate outcomes.
However, there is one possibly relevant characteristic for which we
do have data-the culpability of the offender. The literature and practitioners suggest that offender culpability is often a factor in appellate
decisions. 25 9 We see a similar effect in the Nebraska data with the
most highly aggravated death-sentenced cases being less likely to prevail on appeal and ultimately less likely to avoid the risk of execution. 26 0 When we adjust the race disparities in Figure 22 for offender
culpability, the race disparities are reduced. Moreover, the facts of
Otey and Williams could appear to the court as particularly aggravated-violent rape murders. (The same can be said of the Joubert
case with two child victims). 26 1 In contrast, the culpability levels of

white-defendant cases with which we are comparing Otey and Williams could be perceived as somewhat less severe. 2 62

259. See, e.g., EJDP, supra note 11, at 214, tbl. 46 (reporting that on a six-level culpability scale, the reversal rate of death sentences on procedural grounds in the
Georgia Supreme Court during the 1970s was .39 (7/18) among the two least aggravated levels and .22 (8/36) among the two most aggravated levels); JAMES S.
LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN
CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT ii, 183, 320 (2002), availableat

http://www.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2 (finding that at the federal habeas
stage, for each additional aggravating factor, the reversal rate drops by 15%).

260. We classified the cases in terms of culpability with a four-level culpability scale
based on a logistic regression model. The following statistics indicate the disparity in rates between the most aggravated level of cases and the three less aggravated levels of death-sentenced cases: obtaining judicial relief in state or federal
court (.50 [7/14] v. .75 [9/12]); obtaining relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court
(.29 [4/141 v. .53 [8/151); avoiding the risk of execution completely (.46 [6/131 v. .82
[9/11]).
261. When State v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d. 36 (1979), and State v. Williams,
205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d. 18 (1979), are viewed in the context of other rape murder and multiple victim cases, their distinctive level of aggravation is less obvious. See infra Appendix D, Categories G.1 (includes rape murders) and D.1
(includes multiple victim cases).
262. State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982) (finding defendant robbed
and shot two victims on two separate occasions who were older cab drivers responding to defendant's request for pickup); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313
N.W.2d 648 (1981) (finding defendant beat and strangled his victim-pawn dealer
who purchased coins and silver from the defendant in the past); State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980) (finding defendant paid
another $1,500 to kill defendant's boss because defendant was dissatisfied with
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To explore further the possible impact of race in the ultimate disposition of death-sentenced cases, we estimated race-of-defendant disparities in the rates that offenders who obtained judicial relief on
appeal were ultimately able to obtain complete relief from the risk of
execution and leave death row with a sentence of life imprisonment or
less.
Complete relief from the risk of execution was obtained in two
ways. In a few cases, after the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the
death sentence, it proceeded to reduce the sentence to life imprison3
ment thereby removing the offender from death row. 26 More commonly, complete relief was obtained on remand through an acquittal,
charges or waive the death penalty, or
a prosecutorial decision to drop
26 4
a penalty-trial life sentence.
Figure 23 presents unadjusted race disparities in the rates that
death-sentenced offenders have avoided the risk of a death sentence
and left death row alive. Part I embraces all of those decisions, while
Part II is limited to prosecutorial and judicial decisions on remand
that removed the offender from death row. In each analysis, minority
offenders have been more successful in avoiding the risk of execution.
The data suggest that the minority-defendant disparity in the actual execution rate (two of the three offenders thus far executed were
black defendants with white vicims) reflects the failure of Otey and
his working conditions); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977)
(finding defendant robbed a bar at gunpoint and shot victim after herding the
victim and others into the bathroom where they were tied up by the eventual
victim); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977) (finding defendant
and others robbed a grocery store, and during a pursuit by police, defendant

killed a civilian who came to the assistance of the pursuing police).

263. Examples are State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273
(2001), State v. Victor, 259 Neb. 894, 612 N.W.2d. 513 (2000), and State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). We also include in the analysis one
case, State v. Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978), in which final relief
from the death sentence was granted by the trial court before an appeal was
taken to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
264. Examples are Simants (found not guilty by reason of insanity on retrial); Sheets
(The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated Sheets' conviction on hearsay grounds because a taped statement of a co-perpetrator implicating Sheets, which the coperpetrator had given to the police in exchange for a waiver of the death penalty
in his case, was played to the jury in Sheets' trial after the co-perpetrator had
committed suicide thereby denying Sheets an opportunity to cross examine him.
Without the taped statement, the prosecutor believed the case against Sheets
was too weak to take to a jury and dismissed the charges, whereupon Sheets was
released from death row, a free man. Scot Bauer, Nebraska Death-Row Inmate
Set Free, THE GRAND ISLAND INDEPENDENT (Neb.), June 13, 2001, at http://
Reeves and
www.theindependent.com/stories/061301/new-deathrowl3.html);
Drinkwalter (death sentence waived); and Jones, Bird Head, Holton, and Rust
(resentenced to life imprisonment). As noted above, supra note 258, on remand
the following were resentenced to death: Anderson and Hochstein (I), Moore (I),
Palmer (I), and Palmer (II).
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23

FIGURE

UNADJUSTED MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT
DEATH-SENTENCED DEFENDANTS AVOID THE RISK OF ExECUTION:

1973-1999'

NEBRASKA,

(the number in parenthesis above each pair of bars is the average rate for all cases)
Part 1: The Risk of Execution Avoided Regardless of the Source of Relief 2
(.67)

+7 pts. -

.64

.71:

(9/14) (5n)
Part II: The Risk of Execution Avoided Through
3 Prosecutorial and Judicial Sentencing
Decisions Following a Judicial Remand
(.64)

+45 pts.

1.0

.55
(6/11) (3/3)

Legend:

=

White Defendants

l

Minority D

'The unit of observation in this Figure is the death-sentenced offender regardless of how many death
sentences were imposed in his case. Three white defendants who died on death row of natural causes are
excluded from the Figure.
eath-sentenced whites who avoided the risk of execution are Holtan, Rust, Anderson, Hoehstein,
Simpson, Simants, Sheets, and Drinkwalter. Whites who did not avoid risk of execution are: Joubert
(executed) and Ryan, Moore, Lotter, and Palmer (on death row). Death-sentenced minorities who avoided
the risk of execution are Stewart, Victor, Jones, Bird Head, and Reeves. Otey and Williams were executed.
Of the fourteen defendants who avoided execution, the Nebraska Supreme Court reduced the sentence to
life in four cases: Stewart, Anderson, Hochstein, and Victor. A trial court set the sentence to life as to
Simpson.
3In nine cases, the risk of execution was avoided by a prosecutorial charging or judicial sentencing
decision on remand from a Nebraska Supreme Court or federal court decision reversing the conviction or
vacating the death sentence: Simants, Hunt, Jones, Sheets, Drinkwalter, Bird Head, Reeves, Holton, and
Rust.
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Williams to obtain judicial relief that would have slowed down their
movement toward execution or have resulted in remands that may
have taken them off death row entirely. We find no race-of-defendant
disparities in the appellate decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court
or in the charging and sentencing decisions of Nebraska prosecutors
and sentencing judges in the cases that are remanded by the courts.
The rate of success in federal courts is associated with the race of the
defendant, but because of the small samples and the lack of controls
for many legitimate case characteristics, the data do not support an
inference of bias in the Eighth Circuit. It also appears that offender
culpability may have contributed to Otey's and Williams' lack of success in federal court. One, therefore, can plausibly characterize the
disparity as an adverse impact of an unpredictable discretionary process that performs a vital criminal justice function in reducing the risk
of error and arbitrariness in the system. From this perspective, the
adverse impact would be clearly justified.
Finally, it is useful to consider how likely it is, as the years go by,
that the minority disparate impact in the rate of actual executions
(among the 21 offenders sentenced during the period of our study) will
persist, diminish, evaporate, or reverse. The foregoing analysis indicates that this will depend on the outcomes of judicial appeals and
possible remand and commutation decisions for the four white offenders currently on death row. (As noted above, there are no minorities
on death row for the period covered by this study or otherwise.)
If one of the four white offenders currently on death row is executed, the comparative execution rates will be .29 (2/7) for minorities
versus .14 (2/14) for whites (a +15 point disparity). If two of the white
offenders on death row are executed, the disparity will be +8 points
(.29-.21); if three are executed, there will be no disparity (.29-29); and
if all four are executed, there will be a -7 point disparity (.29-.36).
PART D
IX.

EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN CHARGING
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES BASED ON THE
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) OF THE
DEFENDANT AND VICTIM

We measure the socioeconomic status of defendants and victims in
terms of their occupations. There is a substantial literature on the
importance of different occupations and the prestige associated with
each. 26 5 For this analysis, we drew on the results of a nationwide 1989
opinion poll that asked a "representative sample of non-institutional265. The literature is summarized well in Keiko Nakao & Judith Treas, Updating Occupation Prestige and Socioeconomic Scores: How the New Measures Measure Up,
in 24 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 1-72 (Peter V. Marsden ed., 1994).
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ized adults to evaluate the prestige of occupational titles."2 66 We used
these scores to rank-order the occupations reported in our case records
for defendants and victims and created a three-level scale of high,
middle, and low SES for each. 26 7
A.

Defendant SES

The statewide data document no significant disparities in charging
and sentencing outcomes on the basis of the SES of the defendant.
That is, there is no evidence that defendants are treated differently
because of their SES. Nor are such effects apparent when we focus
separately on the major urban counties and greater Nebraska.268
B. Victim SES
266. Id. at 5. The scores are reported at id. at 42-69. Sociologists also use prestige
scores to estimate a "socio-economic index" (SEI) by regressing the prestige scores
on the education and income levels of the people who are employed in the different occupations. These scores appear to be the preferred measures in sociological
studies of "occupational mobility and related process of status allocation" because
they are better predictors of these outcomes than are the unadjusted prestige
scores. David L. Featherman & Robert M. Hauser, Prestige or Socioeconomic
Scales in the Study of OccupationalAchievment, in 4 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS &
RESEARCH 403, 405 (1976). However, we believe that the unadjusted prestige
scores are more relevant to our research because they reflect the perceived "standard of living, power and influence over other people, level of qualifications, and
the value to society" of people in different occupations. Id. at 404.
267. Although we obtained a prestige score for each victim, we were guided in our
three-level classification by the codes for Questions 50 (defendants) and 82 (victims) in the DCI, which were as follows: High SES: Professional and Managerial
(professional [doctor, lawyer, etc.], executive or business person, small business
person or farmer [other than farm worker], judge, legislator, government official,
and military officer); Law Enforcement and Military (police officer and military
officer), and Government Officer; Middle SES: White-Collar (office worker, apartment/hotel manager, store manager, secretary, government employee), Misc. (juvenile, student, retired persons, homemaker, supported by family, disabled),
Enlisted Military Personnel; and Low SES: Blue-collar and unskilled laborers
including farm workers, Service Workers (including security guard, store clerk,
service station attendant, waiter, waitress, domestic, custodian, etc.), Unstable or
Extralegal (including drifter, professional criminal (organized crime), prostitute
or pimp, individual criminal (e.g., thief), drug dealer, sporadic odd jobs, no particular skill, chronically unemployed (including recipient of public assistance)).
268. There were five high SES defendants. One of them advanced to a penalty trial
and received a life sentence, for an overall death-sentencing rate among high SES
death-eligible offenders of .00 (0/5). The comparable rate for the mid-range SES
defendants was .32 (7/22). However, the rate for low SES defendants was .14 (20/
145). The comparison of low SES defendants versus all others showed no significant effects before or after adjustment for defendant culpability. The number of
high SES defendants was too small to support a meaningful analysis of high SES
offenders versus others.
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Statewide Disparities

A "high victim SES effect" means there is a greater risk of a penalty trial and death sentence for the defendant when his or her victim
has high SES. A "low victim SES effect" means there is a reduced risk
of a penalty trial and death sentence when the victim has low SES.
The statewide data document disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes based on the SES of the victim both before and after
adjustment for defendant culpability. The evidence of both high and
low victim SES effect appears throughout the state.
Part I of Figure 24 presents adjusted data on the statewide impact
of victim SES, while controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. 2 69 Column A indicates the impact on the rates
that death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial, while Columns B
and C indicate the impact on penalty trial death-sentencing rates and
death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases. In each column
the incremental increase in the relevant rate is indicated. For example, Column C indicates that for death-sentencing rates among all
death-eligible cases, the disparity between the low and middle victim
SES categories is 10-percentage points, a ratio of 3.0 (.15/.05), and
that the disparity between the middle and high victim SES categories
is 13-percentage points, a ratio of 1.9 (.28/.15). The death-sentencing
rate in the high victim SES cases is 5.6 (.28/.05) times higher than it is
in the low victim SES cases. In each column the association between
the outcome variable and three victim SES levels is statistically significant at the .01 level or higher.
The practical significance of victim SES in the system is suggested
by a comparison of the data in Part I of Figure 24 with the data in
Part II of the figure, which document the impact that the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances has on charging and sentencing
outcomes. 2 70 The comparison indicates that the impact on charging
and sentencing outcomes of each increment in victim SES level
(shown in Part I) is quite comparable to the impact of each additional
statutory aggravating circumstance in the case (shown in Part II).
The practical importance of victim SES is also reflected in the regression models in Table 4 (Row 2.d)271; it is useful here to compare
the regression coefficient for victim SES with the coefficient for the
number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the two models for
prosecutorial decisionmaking (Columns B to E). The coefficients for
victim SES (disregarding the sign of the coefficient) range from .59 to
.72, while the coefficients for the number of aggravating circum269. These data are comparable to those presented in Figure 19, Column A, but after
adjustment for defendant culpability.
270. These data are drawn from Figure 3 supra.
271. See Table 4 supra p. 553.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

0

z

u

0.

wuJ

3.)

)

_

3z 0

"3

O

~~0"

E-4
o

'~00

w

ZE0

E3

"'

11
-Z('

E-z

~

E3

3

3-'

Cd

E

~3

3V'

>

>

20021

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

6.

0'

0'

z

z
z

10

<
Zu
0

00

0

z-

U.'0

ois.

u0

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

stances in Row la range from .51 to .72. This suggests that each
change in victim SES had an impact on prosecutorial decisionmaking
that was comparable to the impact of each additional statutory aggra2 72
vating circumstance in the cases.
Figures 25 and 26 present statewide data on the impact of high
and low victim SES before and after adjustment for the number of
statutory aggravators in the cases. Figure 25 presents the data on
victims with high SES. Part I, Column A reports an unadjusted disparity of 17 percentage points. The effects are almost exclusively concentrated in the two-aggravator cases (Column C), where the room for
the exercise of discretion is broad.
Part II offers a picture of the impact of high victim SES on (1) the
rates cases advance to a penalty trial (Column A), (2) judicial sentencing decisions (Column B), and (3) death-sentencing among all deatheligible cases, after adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases (Column C). The data indicate statewide victim
SES effects in both charging decisions (Column A shows 28 percentage
points) and sentencing decisions (Column B shows 23 percentage
points). It is the presence of disparities at both of these decision
points that produces the overall 20-point impact among all death-eligible cases shown in Part II, Column C.
Figure 26 presents a comparable analysis of low victim SES disparities, a category of cases in which eight death sentences were imposed.
Part I (Column A) indicates an unadjusted -12-percentage point disparity in death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases, while
footnote 2 reports a statistically significant -15-percentage point disparity after adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances
in the cases. Columns C and D identify the two- and three-aggravator
cases as the principal types of cases in which these disparities appear.
Part II of Figure 26 indicates that the disparities appear in both
the prosecutorial charging (Column A) and judicial sentencing decisions (Column B), which combine to produce the -14-percentage point
impact among all death-eligible cases (Column C).273 The data also
document that the disparities are concentrated in the cases involving
one and two statutory aggravating circumstances.
We estimated the impact of victim SES with a variety of measures
of defendant culpability. The results show a pattern of statewide
272. A similar analysis of judicial sentencing decisions (Columns F and G) reveals a
statistically significant victim SES coefficient, but the magnitude of the victim
SES variable is only 41% (1.2/2.9) of the size of the coefficient for the number of
aggravating circumstances in the cases.
273. In the analysis of minority-defendant effects, the disparities appeared in the
prosecutorial decisions but not in the judicial sentencing decisions.
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high274 and low 2 75 victim SES effects that is consistent with the data
in Figures 25 and 26.
Overall, these results are consistent with a pattern and practice of
disparate treatment on the basis of victim SES. However, the results
of the race analysis presented above suggest caution in inferring that
such a pattern exists, in fact, without introducing controls for the
place of prosecution. In the next section, we test the hypothesis that
the statewide victim SES disparities we have documented are a byproduct of differential charging and sentencing practices in the major
urban counties and greater Nebraska, even though these practices
are, in fact, evenhanded in each place with respect to victim SES.

274. Concerning statewide high SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the statewide high SES victim disparity is 12 points (p=.01);
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 16 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 25 points (p=.01); in the
logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column D, the odds multiplier for the victim SES variable is .55 (from high to middle to low), which is statistically
significant.
For judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity is 3 points (p=.01);
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 6 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 21 points (p=.01); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column F, the odds multiplier for the victim
SES variable is .30, which is statistically significant.
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim
disparity is 7 points (p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 7 points (p=.08); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity
4
is 15 points (p=.0 ).
275. Concerning statewide low SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the statewide high SES victim disparity is -20 points
(p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -11 points
(NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -17 points
(p=.0 5 ).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity is -19 points
(p=.0 3 ); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -20 points
(p=.0 5 ); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -18 points
(p=.05).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity is -14 points (p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -13 points (p=.01); controlling for the regression-based scale, the
disparity is -10 points (p=.01).
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2. Disparitiesin the Major Urban Counties and Greater
Nebraska
Recall that the race-of-defendant effects documented statewide in
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions were largely the
product of evenhanded but different charging and plea bargaining
practices in the major urban counties and greater Nebraska. In this
section we examine that possibility with respect to victim SES.
Figure 27 separately replicates the three-level victim SES analysis
presented in Figure 24 for the major urban counties and greater Nebraska. The victim SES effects are apparent in both areas of the
state. The specific patterns of SES effects in prosecutorial charging
and judicial sentencing decisions vary in the two areas, but the bottom
line of disparities among all death-eligible cases is strong and consistent in both areas.
Figure 28 highlights these patterns by focusing separately on the
high and low victim SES effects in the major urban counties and
greater Nebraska after adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. The data in Part I, which focus on the high
SES victim effects, document patterns in both parts of the state that
are quite comparable in terms of magnitude and levels of statistical
significance. 27 6 Part II tells a similar story for the low SES victim
276. High victim SES effects in the major urban counties: Concerning high SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the high SES
victim disparity in the major urban counties is -5 points (NS); controlling for the
salient factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 7 points (NS).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity in the major
urban counties is -8 points (p=.04); controlling for the salient factors measure,
the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dis2
parity is 14 points (p=.0 ).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim
disparity in the major urban counties is 1 point (NS); controlling for the salient
factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression8
based scale, the disparity is 13 points (p=.0 ).
Nebraska:
Concerning high SES victim
in
greater
High victim SES effects
disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, there is no
high SES victim disparity in greater Nebraska. Controlling for the salient factors
measure, the disparity is -4 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based
3
scale, the disparity is 22 points (p=.0 ).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity in greater
Nebraska is -14 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -9 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is
-24 points (NS).
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27

VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) EFFECTS IN CHARGING AND
SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER
NEBRASKA, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999
(the bars indicate penalty-trial rates (Column A) and death-sentencing rates
(Columns B & C))

B
A
Rates that Death
Rates at which DeathEligible Cases Advance Sentences are Imposed
2
in a Penalty Trial
to a Penalty Trial'
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4
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C
Death-Sentencing Rates
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'The victim SES effects in Part I for this outcome are not significant (p=.15), while the effects in Part I1 are
significant at the .01 level.
2The victim SES effects in Part I for this outcome are significant at the .01 level and the effects in Part I1are
significant at the .08 level.
The victim SES effects in Parts I and II for this outcome are significant at the .01 level.
In Lancaster County, there are no statistically significant victim SES effects in either charging or sentencing
outcomes. In Douglas and Sarpy Counties, there are2significant victim SES effects in the rates that cases advance to
a penalty trial (low .50; medium .76; high .80) (p=.0 ) and in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates (low .00; medium
.20; high .37) (p=.01). In death sentencing among all death-eligible cases in Douglas and Sarpy Counties, the victim
SES effects are significant at the .001 level (low .00; medium .18; high .31).
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effects. 27 7 These data strongly suggest that defendants whose crimes
are comparable in terms of their criminal culpability are treated differently on the basis of the SES of their victims by both prosecutors
and sentencing judges.
The victim SES effects that we have documented indicate that a
morally irrelevant circumstance of the cases unrelated to the culpability of the defendant may be (1) an important factor in prosecutorial
and judicial decisionmaking and (2) that the system denies the equal
standing of all victims.278 However, we add the following caveat on

this finding.
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim
disparity in greater Nebraska is -1 point (NS); controlling for the salient factors
measure, there is no disparity; controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 2 points (NS).
277. Low victim SES effects in the major urban counties: Concerning low SES victim
disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the low SES
victim disparity in the major urban counties is -9 points (NS); controlling for the
salient factors measure, the disparity is -1 point (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -11 points (NS).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity in the major
urban counties is -13 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is -14 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -17 points (p=.04).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity in the major urban counties is -8 points (NS); controlling for the salient
factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regressionbased scale, the disparity is -6 points (NS).
Low victim SES effects in greater Nebraska: Concerning low SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the low SES victim
disparity in greater Nebraska is -15 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -27 points (p=.04); controlling for the regressionbased scale, the disparity is -21 points (p=.04).
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity in greater Nebraska is -37 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the
disparity is -31 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -30 points (NS).
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity is -12 points (p=.08); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -17 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity
is -14 points (p=.01).
278. As Robert Schopp argues, a system's reliance on such factors violates the principal of "comparative justice" and remains a "serious defect in the institution ...
because it constitutes a failure of the institutional structure to conform to the
principles that justify that structure .... [And] it represents a failure of the
institutional function of disciplining the manner in which the state exercises co-
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Although the disparities on the impact of victim SES effects are
adjusted for offender culpability, we have no data on the process of
communication between the family members of the victims and the
prosecutor and the judge. This has relevance to the interpretation of
our data for two reasons. First, there is evidence that the influence of
family members with prosecutors is associated with the SES of the
victim, with the higher status family members receiving more deference. 27 9 To the extent that this is the case, it may explain, at least in
part, the more punitive practices of prosecutors in cases with high
SES victims and their less punitive practices in cases with low SES
victims. 28 0 Second, there is evidence that the relevance and persuasiveness of the family member written submissions to the sentencing
judge may be also be associated with victim SES.281 The reason appears to be that writers with higher education and social status focus
more effectively on the virtues of the decedent and the resulting loss of
the survivors. To the extent the victim impact statements affect judiercive force against its citizens." Schopp, supra note 3, at 825-26. A comparable
rationale underlies the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against race-of-victim discrimination. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 n.8 (1987) (claiming standing based on the argument that application of the State's statute has
created a classification that is "an irrational exercise of governmental power"...
because it is not "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective"). Professor Schopp expresses a further concern that disparate treatment
based on victim SES
discriminates against the victims (immediate and extended) whose
murders are treated as less important than other similar murders in
that their murderers receive lesser penalties .... If the state refrains
from prosecuting and punishing crimes against some classes of victims,
such as prostitutes or transients, the state effectively denies the equal
standing of those victims, and of others who share the traits that define
those classes.
Schopp, supra note 3, at 830-31.
279. In the opinion of Attorney Jerry Soucie, at least in Omaha and Lincoln, high SES
family members are generally more effective than low SES family members in
terms of bringing pressure to bear on the office of the county attorney if they
disagree with a plea bargain: "A lower SES victim's family might get a single shot
on the 10 o'clock news, but that would be it. The VP of an advertising firm will
have rallies, posters, letters to the editor, etc." Soucie E-mail, supra note 85.
280. Also, several of the high status victims are police officers, who are a protected
class under the Nebraska death-sentencing statute, i.e., the murder of a police
officer may implicate statutory aggravating circumstances 1(g), 1(h), or 1(i). See
Table 1 supra. However, none of the three police victim death-eligible cases resulted in a death sentence.
281. Attorney Jerry Soucie reports that lower SES writers tend to dwell on sentencing
dispositions ("I hope he is executed or never let out of prison") in their impact
statements, which in his opinion "don't ...have much of an impact on the sentencing judge. They are seen as a way for the family to vent their frustrations";
in contrast, "[h]igher SES statements tend to be longer and more reflective of the
loss. They tend not to focus on the disposition, but discuss hurt, loss, etc. They
may have slightly greater impact, but I don't know that for sure." Soucie E-mail,
supra note 85.
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FIGURE

HIGH (PART I) AND Low (PART II) VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
(SES) DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN
MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA, ADJUSTED FOR
THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE
CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999
(the bars indicate the penalty trial (Column A) and death-sentencing rates (Columns B & C) after adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases)t
Part 1. High Victim SES Effects

A
Rates at Which
Cases Advance to
a Penalty Trial
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in Penalty Trials

A. Major Urban Counties'
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Death-Sentencing
Rates Among All
Death-Eligible Cases
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2pts.**
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..
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53

i~ii.26j+
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(8)

1Legend:

(64)

(6)
High Victim SES

(15)

21pts.**
(8)

(63)

Other Victims

'The source of the high victim SES disparities shown in this panel are Douglas and Sarpy Counties where there is a
20 point disparity (.80 v. .60) (p = .18) in the adjusted rates that cases advance to a penalty trial; a26 point disparity
(.37 v. .11) (p = .02) in penalty trial death-sentencing rates; and a 25 point disparity (.31 v. .06) (p = .01) in the rates
death sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases. In Lancaster County, the charging and sentencing rates
are lower in the high victim-SES cases than in the other cases.
2The discrepancies in case counts between Part 11,Columns A and C reflect the fact that in one case the sentencing
court believed it had no discretion to impose adeath sentence under the law. Accordingly, that case is omitted from
Columns C.
*=significant at .10 level; **=significant at .05 level; ***=significant at the .01 level.
Continued on Next Page
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Part Ii. Low Victim SES Effects
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(CONTINUED)

A
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a Penalty Trial

A. Major Urban Counties
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I

3Douglas and Sarpy Counties are the source of the low victim SES adjusted disparities shown in this panel. For

those two counties, the overall disparity in the adjusted rates at which cases advance to penalty trial is -26 points
(.52 v. .78), (p = .02); the penalty-trial death-sentencing disparity is -25 points (.06 v. .31)(p = .02); the overall
adjusted disparity in death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases is -22 points (.04 v. .26) (p = .001). In
Lancaster County, the adjusted charging and sentencing rates are higher in the cases with low SES victims.
4 The discrepancies in case counts between Part 11,Columns A and C reflect the fact that in one case the sentencing
court believed it had no discretion to impose a death sentence under the law. Accordingly, this case is omitted from
Columns C.
*=significant at .10 level; **=significant at .05 level; ***=significant at the .01 level; ****=significant at the .001
level.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

cial sentencing decisions, they may partly explain the association we
have documented between victim SES and those outcomes.
Because the level of victim SES is associated with the influence of
their surviving family members in the charging and sentencing process, adjustment for that influence would likely reduce the magnitude
of the SES disparities that we document. 28 2 The amount of that effect
is unknown, but given the magnitude of the victim SES effects that we
have documented, we consider it unlikely that the control would explain away all or even a significant part of the disparity. Moreover,
even if it did explain away the effect statistically, there remains the
question of whether that adjustment would cure the defect in the system associated with the victim SES disparities-discrimination
against victims (immediate and survivors) whose murders are treated,
in fact, as less important because of the SES of decedents and their
survivors.
The victim SES effects documented in the Nebraska death-sentencing system are consistent with findings of other studies. 28 3 The
literature suggests that such effects in prosecutorial decisionmaking
may be explained by the perceived impact that victim SES may have
on prospects for either a jury guilt-trial conviction and/or the court's
imposition of a death sentence. In addition, press coverage and manifestations of community concern about a homicide are often correlated
with the victim's SES. The impact of victim SES on both prosecutors
and judges may also reflect differential identification, generally unconscious, with high and low status victims.
Finally, what could explain the differences in the results of our
race and victim SES findings? Each analysis was conducted with the
same database and methodology, yet the results are quite different.
One explanation may be that prosecutors and judges are not sensitive
282. The impact of the control is likely to be greater on the prosecutorial disparity
than on the judicial disparity. We also tested the hypothesis that the victim SES
effects may reflect (a) a greater willingness on the part of the sentencing judges to
find statutory mitigation present in low victim SES cases, when the evidence
would support such a finding, and/or (b) a reduced willingness to find statutory
mitigation present in high victim SES cases, when the evidence would support
such a finding. A correlation analysis of trial court findings of statutory mitigation when the evidence of statutory mitigation was either "strong" or "sufficient"
to support a finding of the presence of statutory mitigation by a "preponderance"
of the evidence does not support the hypothesis. Specifically, the willingness of
the sentencing judges to find mitigation when the evidence supported such a finding was slightly higher (r=.08) in the high victim SES cases and slightly lower
(r=-.05) in the low victim SES cases, with neither effect being statistically
significant.
283. See, e.g., EJDP, supra note 11, at 588 (reporting that research from Georgia,
1973-1978, presents a logistic regression coefficient of -2.63 and an odds multiplier (p=.001) for a low SES victim effect in an analysis of death-sentencing rates
among death-eligible defendants convicted of murder).
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to the issue of SES discrimination. We noted above that race discrimination is widely perceived to be an important political and legal issue
in capital sentencing. As a result, prosecutors and sentencing judges
appear to be sensitive to the question. In contrast, there is no law that
specifically addresses the defendant and victim SES issues. Also,
prosecutors and judges may not be aware of the biases that may have
produced these results. Recall that in the 1970s, the issue of race-ofvictim discrimination was not widely perceived as an issue. Indeed,
not until McCleskey did the Supreme Court rule that race-of-victim
discrimination was unlawful. In Georgia, statewide data from the
1970s, on the one hand, revealed evenhanded treatment of black and
white offenders, but, on the other hand, the same data documented
race-of-victim disparities comparable to the victim SES disparities we
see in Nebraska.
The results may also reflect a more subtle effect of bias based on
victim SES. It is possible that most prosecutors and judges are less
aware of such bias and as a consequence are less likely to be deterred
in acting on it even if they perceive it as inappropriate. We consider it
instructive in this regard that the retired judges whom we interviewed
could offer no explanation for the victim SES effects in our results and
did not appear to regard such discrimination as a particularly important issue.
X.

EVIDENCE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES

A.

Unadjusted and Adjusted Geographic Disparities

In this section, we examine further the impact of geography on
28 4
We document discharging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska.
parities in prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing practices in
28 5
Our
the state's major urban counties vis-d-vis greater Nebraska.
cases
the
in
concentrated
are
disparities
findings indicate that these
with low to median offender culpability. We consider several possible
explanations for the disparities.
Figure 29, Part I, presents unadjusted geographic disparities in
charging and sentencing outcomes between the major urban counties
and greater Nebraska for the entire 1973-1999 period. Column A documents a 28-percentage point disparity in the rates that death-eligible
cases advanced to a penalty trial. This means that the risk of a penalty trial was 1.9 (.59/.31) times higher in the major urban counties
284. We examined above, section VIII.A, the process by which more punitive
prosecutorial policies in the major urban counties produce an adverse impact on
minority defendants.
285. See supra note 169-71 and accompanying text for a definition of the major urban
counties.
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than it was in greater Nebraska. In contrast, the penalty-trial deathsentencing rate, shown in Part I, Column B was 13 percentage points
(.43-.30) higher in greater Nebraska than it was in the major urban
counties. The combined effect of these two decision points is shown in
Part I, Column C: a 5-percentage point higher death-sentencing rate
in the major urban counties than in greater Nebraska.
Part II of Figure 29 presents the statewide results after adjustment for defendant culpability, measured by the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. Column A shows a slightly larger
geographic disparity in the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial,
but Column B documents penalty-trial death-sentencing rates that
are quite comparable: .27 and .29. The bottom line is shown in Column C of Part II, a 5-percentage point higher death-sentencing rate
among all death-eligible cases in the major urban counties. Although
this disparity is not statistically significant, in practical terms it
means that over the 27-year period covered by this research, the risk
of a death sentence for death-eligible offenders has been 50% (5/10)286
higher in the major urban counties than it has been in greater Nebraska, although for the average death-eligible offender in each locale,
the difference has been only 5 percentage points (.15-.10).287
Figure 30 presents data on the relationship between the magnitude of the geographic disparities and the culpability levels of the
cases. Part I, which focuses on the prosecutorial charging decisions,
reports in Column A a 30-percentage point (.58 -.28) adjusted disparity between the major urban counties and greater Nebraska in the
rates that cases advance to penalty trial. Columns B through E report
disparities controlling separately for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. The data show sharp disparities across every
culpability level. In contrast, Part II, which presents comparable results for the judicial decisions, shows mixed results across culpability
levels, which explains why the overall disparity in Column A, controlling for offender culpability, is so small.
B.

Geographic Disparities Over Time

Figure 31 depicts Nebraska charging and sentencing practices in
the major urban counties and greater Nebraska counties in five-year
intervals since 1973. The vertical bars for each time period from left
to right present (a) the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial
(the penalty-trial rate), (b) the judicial penalty-trial death-sentencing
286. The denominator is the death-sentencing rate in greater Nebraska and the numerator is the difference in the rates between the two parts of the state.
287. We conducted a variety of supplemental analyses in which we estimated geographic disparities controlling for other measures of offender culpability. The results concerning the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are reported in the
text accompanying note 246, supra.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
FIGURE

625

29

UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED DISPARITIES BETWEEN MAJOR URBAN
COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA IN CAPITAL MURDER CHARGING
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES: NEBRASKA,
A
Rates at which Cases
Advance to a Penalty Trial
With the State Seeking a
Death Sentence'

B
Rates that Death
Sentences are
Imposed in Penalty
2
Trials

1973-1999
C
Death-Sentencing
Rates Among All
Death-Eligible
Cases

Part I. Unadjusted Geographic Disparities
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Part II. Geographic Disparities Adjusted for the Number of Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases
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(107)
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= disparity significant at the .001 level
'The penalty-trial rates were .67 (54/81) inDouglas and Sarpy Counties; .41 (13/32) inLancaster County; and .31
(22/72) ingreater Nebraska.
2The penalty-trial death-sentencing rates were .28 (15/54) in Douglas and Sarpy Counties; .38 (5/13) in Lancaster
County;
and .43 (9/21) in greater Nebraska.
3
The death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible offenders were .19 (15/81) in Douglas and Sarpy Counties; .16
(5/32) in Lancaster County; and .13 (9/71 ) in greater Nebraska.
'The reduced number of major urban county cases in Part II is explained by the fact that all cases with four or more
aggravators (n=6) were prosecuted in major urban counties. Because there are no greater Nebraska cases with
comparable levels of culpability these six cases are omitted from the adjusted rates calculation in Part
II.
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rate, and (c) the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases,
without adjustment for defendant culpability. The data reveal three
striking patterns. First, in the major urban counties (Part I), the judicial death-sentencing rates (middle bars) are uniformly lower than the
rates at which prosecutors advance cases to a penalty trial (left bars).
However, in greater Nebraska (Part II), with the single exception of
the first five years (Column B), the penalty-trial death-sentencing rate
has approximated (Column C) or exceeded (Columns D to F) the rate
at which prosecutors advance cases to a penalty trial. This suggests
that outside the major urban counties, prosecutors are more discriminating in advancing to penalty trial cases that are likely to result in a
28 8
death sentence.
The second pattern of interest in Figure 31 is the sharp decline in
judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties since
1982, while in greater Nebraska the average rate has increased, although the sample sizes are small. The third pattern of interest in
Figure 31 is a sharp decline in greater Nebraska in the rate that cases
have advanced to a penalty trial since 1987, while the penalty-trial
rate has remained stable and much higher in the major urban counties during this same period.
Figure 31 sheds light on another issue: the Legislature's perception
in early 1978 of "radically differing results" in different parts of the
state. 28 9 A comparison of Column B in Part I and Part II suggests
what the Legislature may have had in mind. 290 This contrast documents judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties for
the period 1973-1977, which are twice as high as the rates in greater
Nebraska (.44 v. .20). The disparity in the unadjusted rates that cases
advanced to a penalty trial was substantially higher in the major urban centers (.56 v. .42). Moreover, the death-sentencing rate among
all death-eligible offenders was 3.1 (.25/.08) times higher in the major
urban counties.
In Figure 32, we focus more sharply on the trends suggested by
Figure 31 by disaggregating the data before and after 1983, when the
decline in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates in the major urban
counties began. The data in Figure 32 present unadjusted geographic
288. We are modeling a case winnowing process. The penalty-trial death-sentencing
rates vis-a-vis the rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial is a measure of
how discriminating prosecutors are in advancing cases to penalty trials in terms
of the criteria the judges use in imposing death sentences.
289. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
290. Because the Legislature was unlikely to have had any substantial information on
the culpability of the individual death penalty defendants, it is likely that the
disparities unadjusted for defendant culpability present the best picture of the
Legislature's perceptions. In fact, the disparities perceived by the Legislature
were based on Senator Ernie Chambers' analysis of a database he created from
newspaper reports of homicide prosecutions in Nebraska.
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disparities for our three principal outcomes. Part I presents data on
prosecutorial decisionmaking. A comparison of Columns B and C of
Part I indicates that in both geographic areas a smaller proportion of
cases advanced to a penalty trial after 1982, but the unadjusted geographic disparity is essentially the same in each time period: 28 and
31 percentage points, both statistically significant.
Part II shows disparities in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates
for both periods. Note that the direction of the disparities changed
completely. In the earlier period (Column B) the rate was nearly twice
as high (.57 v. .27) in the major urban counties while in the later period (Column C) it was more than 3 times (.60 v. .17) higher in greater
Nebraska.
The data in Part III depicting death-sentencing rates among all
death-eligible cases show the effects of the changes in penalty-trial
death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties documented in
Part II. Again, the disparities reversed. In the earlier period, the
death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases was 3.7 (.37/.10)
times higher in the major urban counties while in the later period it
was 1.4 times (.14/.10) higher in greater Nebraska.
In Figure 33, we again disaggregate the data into pre- and post1983, and estimate geographic disparities after adjustment for defendant culpability. The measure of defendant culpability in Figure 33 is
the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. A
comparison of Columns B and C of Part I indicates that after controlling for defendant culpability, the geographic disparities in the rates
at which cases advance to a penalty trial are in the same direction and
somewhat more pronounced and statistically significant in the post1982 period.
Part II confirms that the direction of the geographic disparity in
judicial death-sentencing is different in the two periods. But after adjustment for defendant culpability, the disparities are dramatically reduced and no longer statistically significant. We have rarely seen the
introduction of controls for defendant culpability have such a substantial effect on an unadjusted disparity of the magnitude shown in Figure 32, Part II.
Part III presents the adjusted geographic disparities in the rates
that death sentences were imposed among all death-eligible cases.
Column B indicates that in the earlier period, the death-sentencing
rate in the major urban counties was substantially higher (15 percentage points) than it was in greater Nebraska. In the later period, the
disparity changes direction and is much smaller, declining from 15
percentage points to a non-significant 1 point. These results indicate
the importance of evaluating sentencing practices on the basis of
death-sentencing outcomes that have been adjusted for defendant culpability. The results (Figure 33, Part II, Column B) also suggest that

[Vol. 81:486

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
FIGURE

32

UNADJUSTED GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING
OUTCOMES: NEBRASKA, 1982 AND EARLIER V. 1983-1999
Time Period

C
1983-1999
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Part I. Rates at
Which Death-Eligible
Cases Advance to a
Penalty Trial
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Part II. Rates that
Death Sentences
are Imposed in
Penalty Trials
-43 pts.***

n=

(21)

(11)

(46)

(10)

Part III. DeathSentencing Rates
Among All DeathEligible Cases
.
.32
a- (32)

Legend:
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Level of statistical significance of disparity: *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01 and beyond.
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Greater Nebraska I
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33

GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES:
NEBRASKA,

1982

AND EARLIER V.

1983-1999,

CONTROLLING FOR THE

NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES
(the bars indicate the penalty-trial rates (Part I) and death-sentencing rates (Parts II
& III) after adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in
the cases)

Time Period

B
Before
(1973-1982)'

A

C
After
(1983-1999)

Part I. Rates at
Which Death-Eligible
Cases Advance to a
Penalty Trial

-

n=

(26)

(29)
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(15)
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Part II. Rates that
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Penalty Trials
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Part III. DeathSentencing Rates
Among All DeathEligible Cases
-1 Pt.
n=
Legend:

(26)

(29)

=" Major Urban Counties

1
(81)

(42)

=" Greater Nebraska I

The 1982 and earlier casesreported below do not include six death-sentenced casesfrom the major urban counties because those
casesinvolved four or more aggravating circumstances and there were no caseswith more than three aggravators in greater
Nebraska.
Level of statistical significance of disparity: *=. 1 0 ; **=.05; and ***=.0 1
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both before and after 1982, judges in the major urban counties and
greater Nebraska shared a comparable conception of what constituted
a "death case," although in the post-1982 period, the data (Part II,
Column C) document somewhat higher judicial death-sentencing rates
in greater Nebraska.
Our first conclusion is that adjustment for defendant culpability
does not explain the geographic disparities in the rates that capital
cases advance to a penalty trial either before or after 1983 (Figure 33,
Part I). Moreover, during the pre-1983 period, defendant culpability
does not explain the geographic disparities in the rates that death
sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases (Part III, Column B), even though it does explain the disparities in penalty-trial
death-sentencing rates during this period (Part II, Column B). During
the post-1983 period, defendant culpability explains 29 1 a significant
portion of the geographic disparities in both sentencing rates (Part II,
Column C) and in the rates that death sentences are imposed among
all death-eligible cases (Part III, Column C).
Our second conclusion is that since 1982, judicial sentencing policies have tended to offset and partially cancel out prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices. Specifically, the higher rates at
which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial in the major urban counties appear to have been offset somewhat by sentencing rates
of the judges in the major urban counties that are slightly below the
statewide norm. Similarly, the practices of prosecutors in greater Nebraska in advancing death-eligible cases to a penalty trial at rates below the statewide norm are offset, in part, by the sentencing practices
of the judges in those counties that are slightly above the statewide
norm.
The changes documented above since the early 1980s suggest that
the 1978 amendments to the death-sentencing statute (requiring comparative proportionality review at the trial court level) and the Nebraska Supreme Court's narrowing of the scope of several statutory
aggravating circumstances and limiting death sentencing statewide
likely influenced the decline of death-sentencing rates in the major
urban counties. These factors may also have contributed to the emergence statewide of a de facto "two aggravator" rule as a presumptive
threshold for the imposition of a death sentence. Changes of this magnitude do not normally occur by chance.
These data raise some obvious questions about the reasons for the
persistent geographic disparities in prosecutorial decisionmaking. In
the balance of this section, we consider the possible differences in the
291. What we mean by "explain" is that when the analysis takes into account different
levels of criminal culpability of the defendants in the two different parts of the
state, what initially appear to be large differences in sentencing practices turn
out to be only modest non-significant differences or no differences at all.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

633

two geographic areas that could explain the disparities. Our analysis
on each of these issues presented below indicates that none of these
factors explain away the geographic disparities in prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices (measured by the rates at which
cases advance to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence). We also consider other qualitative explanations that appear
more plausible.
C.

Alternative Explanations for Geographic Disparities in
the Rates that Cases Advance to a Penalty Trial

One plausible theory to explain the geographic disparities in the
rates that cases advance to a penalty trial is that prosecutors outside
the major urban counties are more conservative than their counterparts in the major urban counties in their assessment of the level of
deathworthiness in a death-eligible case that is required to justify the
state's seeking a death sentence. Another possibility.is that prosecutors in the two areas may differ in terms of the discretion they believe
they have under the law to waive the death penalty in first-degree
capital murder cases unilaterally or in a plea bargain.292
Knowledgeable Nebraska legislators, judges, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and others have suggested several other possible
explanations:293
1. More resources are available to prosecutors in large urban counties to prosecute capital cases.
2. Prosecutors in the major urban counties have more experience with capital
prosecutions and therefore are more inclined on the basis of this experience
to advance a case to penalty trial than are their counterparts in greater
Nebraska.
3. Judicial attitudes about the deathworthiness of an individual case may
have a significant effect on the willingness of a prosecutor to advance a
capital case to a penalty trial.
4. Prosecutors may be influenced in their decisions to advance a capital case
to a penalty trial by the imminence of their re-election.
5. Differences in the frequency with which problems of proof "compel" a
waiver of the death penalty in order to obtain a conviction.
6. Different levels of violent crime that influence prosecutorial charging
policies.
7. Traditions in prosecutorial charging practices that reflect different public
expectations in predominately stranger versus more closely knit
communities.
8. Differences in support for capital punishment on the part of individual
prosecutors.

We have developed measures that permit us to test empirically the
plausibility of several of these alternative explanations for the geo292. Interviews with prosecutors in the Douglas County Attorney's Office suggest that
such a perception may exist in that office.
293. We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions of County Attorneys at the
2001 Annual Meeting of the Nebraska County Attorneys Association.
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graphic disparities in the rates at which cases advance to penalty
trial. However, some of the more plausible explanations are not susceptible to empirical testing.
1.

Disparitiesin FinancialResources

It is commonly believed throughout the country that small counties
can be adversely affected if they are required to independently finance
complex, long-term criminal trials, an apt description of many capital
prosecutions. 29 4 Accordingly, one reasonably might expect to see
fewer capital cases advance to a penalty trial in counties with fewer
prosecutorial resources. 29 5 Capital litigation requires prosecutorial
resources, compensation for the attorneys of indigent defendants, and
juror fees.
We tested in two ways the hypothesis that disparities in
prosecutorial resources explain geographic disparities in the rates
that cases advance to penalty trials in Nebraska. We first developed a
series of quantitative measures of prosecutorial resources 296 and correlated them with the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial. The
only measure that showed a significant relationship to the penalty
trial outcome was the variable for the County Attorney's overall
2 97
budget, which is substantially higher in the major urban counties.
Next, we introduced that variable into a logistic regression analysis designed to explain which cases advanced to a penalty trial. The
model also included variables for defendant culpability, the race and
SES of the defendant and victim, and whether the case was prosecuted in a large urban or other county (the "geography" variable). In
this analysis, the variable for the magnitude of the prosecutorial
budget was statistically significant, but it suggested that after controlling for geography and defendant culpability, the larger the
prosecutorial budget on average, the less likely the cases were to ad294. In Nebraska, for example, many counties in the state are currently staffed by a
part-time County Attorney. Senator Ernie Chambers and the retired judges we
interviewed share the judgment that prosecutors in smaller counties are substantially deterred from pursuing death-eligible cases capitally because of their financial implications. We heard stories of counties that were taken to the edge of
bankruptcy financing capital litigation. The case of State v. Ryan, 222 Neb. 875,
387 N.W.2d 705 (1986), was one example given.
295. There is also an issue of caseload. In a number of major urban counties in this
country that have substantial prosecutorial resources, the case load is so high
that there are few resources available to finance capital trials and plea bargains
are a common means for disposing of capital cases.
296. The measures are: (a) the County Attorney budget for 1997-98, (b) the salary of
the County Attorney, and (c) the salaries of the Deputy County Attorneys in the
county, all of which are derived from the County Budget Reports to the Nebraska
State Auditor: 1997-98 (1999).
297. The Pearson correlation coefficient was .21, significant at the .01 level.
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vance to a penalty trial. 298 In addition, the "geography" variable,
which distinguishes between the rates at which cases advance to a
urban and other counties, remained substantial
penalty trial in 2large
99
and significant.
Our second approach was to consider the availability of resources
from the Attorney General's Office to assist small counties in the conduct of complex criminal cases. In a number of states, including Nebraska, the Office of the Attorney General offers prosecutorial services
to assist smaller counties in the conduct of complex criminal cases.
The Nebraska experience has been that smaller counties request such
assistance in criminal prosecutions approximately 5 to 8 times a
year. 30 0 Requests routinely are made for such assistance in homicide
cases, although the exact number is unknown. According to Assistant
Attorney General William Howland, no such request for assistance in
ever been
the prosecution of a complex case, capital or non-capital, has
30 1
denied by the Office of the Nebraska Attorney General.
These analyses suggest that differences in prosecutorial resources
do not explain the differences in the rates at which capital cases advance to penalty trial in Nebraska's major urban counties and greater
Nebraska. However, the costs of litigation involve considerably more
than prosecutorial resources-most notably attorneys' fees for defendants and juror fees which can put a serious strain on the budget of a
small county. Moreover, the availability of support in the Office of the
Attorney General does not mean that smaller communities necessarily
will request assistance as an alternative to waiving the death penalty.
In many smaller counties, there appears to be significant resistance to
"outside" intervention from the Office of the Attorney General. To the
extent that these factors contribute significantly to the geographic disparities in penalty-trial rates that we have documented, they are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
2.

The Experience of Prosecutorsin CapitalLitigation

The hypothesis that the experience of prosecutors in handling capital cases could explain the differences in the rates that cases advance
to penalty trial is entirely plausible. Capital trials with the state
seeking a death sentence are a significant test for lawyers on both
sides. It would be understandable if prosecutors with less experience
298. The regression coefficient was -. 01, significant at the .05 level.
299. The regression coefficient for prosecution in a major urban county was 3.8, significant at the .01 level, which is larger than the 1.1 coefficient estimates in our core
models reported in Table 4.
300. Interview with William Howland, Assistant Attorney General, Nebraska Attorney General's Office, at the annual meeting of the Nebraska County Attorneys
Association (March 20, 2001).

301. Id.
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were more inclined to waive the death penalty unilaterally or by way
of a plea agreement, than their counterparts with more years of experience in capital litigation.
To test this hypothesis, we developed a series of measures of the
experience of prosecutors in handling homicide cases in general and
capital cases in particular during the time period covered by this project. The measures distinguish between simply handling a homicide
prosecution and trying the case. 3 02
The measure of prosecutorial experience revealing the strongest
correlation with whether a death-eligible case advanced to a penalty
trial is the number of capital trials the prosecutor conducted. 30 3 It
indicates that, on average, the higher the number of capital trials, the
higher the likelihood that a prosecutor's cases will advance to a penalty trial. This result is consistent with expectations since the larger
number of penalty trials in the major urban counties would naturally
result in more experience with such litigation for the prosecutors in
those counties.
The next step of the analysis was to include the variable for prosecutor experience in trying capital cases in the regression analysis designed to explain which capital cases advanced to a penalty trial. In
that analysis, the variable for prosecutorial experience did not emerge
as a significant predictor in explaining which cases advanced to a penalty trial, and its inclusion in the analysis did not weaken the strong
effect of the geography variable, which distinguishes between the
large urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska.304
It is interesting to note that prosecutorial experience in trying capital cases is also strongly correlated with the imposition of a death
sentence in a penalty trial. The data suggest that the more capital
trials a prosecutor has conducted, the greater the likelihood the court
will return a death sentence. 30 5 One might expect to see this on the
assumption that the more experienced prosecutors would be assigned
to the most aggravated cases, which have a greater likelihood of a
302. The measures are based on counts of prosecutor and defense attorney names
among the over 700 cases in our larger universe of homicide cases from which we
culled the death-eligible cases. The record of each of those cases indicates the
names of the lawyers on each side and whether the case was tried or resulted in a
guilty plea. With this information, we created a measure of how many homicide
and capital cases each prosecutor and defense counsel handled from 1973 to 1999
and how many of those cases were tried. One limitation of these measures is that
they cover the entire period of the study and are not tailored to the prior experience of each prosecutor and defense attorney at the time of each prosecution.
303. The correlation coefficient was .22, significant at the .001 level.
304. The regression coefficient for the prosecutorial experience in trying capital cases
variable was .31, significant at the .26 level. The regression coefficient for the
major urban counties versus greater Nebraska counties variable was 1.3, significant at the .01 level.
305. The simple correlation coefficient is .26, significant at the .02 level.
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death sentence. However, after adjustment for defendant culpability
in a regression analysis, the association between prosecutorial experience and the death-sentencing outcome continues to hold.306
Also of interest is the apparent impact of defense counsel's experience on the likelihood of a penalty trial and a death sentence in a penalty trial. Contrary to expectations, the more experienced the defense
counsel, the higher the risk of a penalty trial, 30 7 even after controlling
for defendant culpability and the place of the trial. The experience of
defense counsel showed no unadjusted association with the death-sentencing outcome, and there was no effect apparent in the regression
30 8
analysis, which controlled for defendant culpability.
This analysis suggests that the experience of the prosecution in
conducting capital litigation, especially trying capital cases, may have
some effect on the frequency with which capital cases advance to a
penalty trial. However, it does not significantly explain the documented disparity in the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial
in the major urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska.
We noted above that one way smaller counties can compensate for
a lack of prosecutorial experience in handling capital litigation is to
seek assistance from the Office of the Attorney General. However, we
also noted, in this regard, that in many smaller counties there is significant resistance to that course of action.
3. Judicial Sentencing Practices as a Proxy for Judicial
Attitudes
Some have suggested that in the exercise of discretion concerning
the advancement of cases to penalty trial, prosecutors are constrained
by their perceptions of the trial judge's attitude regarding the propriety of the death penalty in the case. On the one hand, if the prospects
are high that the judge will impose a life sentence, economy may suggest that a faster way to get there is simply to waive the death penalty
and avoid the risk of irritating the court with an unnecessary sentencing hearing. On the other hand, there are cases in which the prosecutor wants to waive the penalty trial in a plea bargain but the court
expressly refuses to countenance the agreement and insists on a sen9
tencing hearing. 30
306. In this analysis, the coefficient for the number of capital trials conducted is 3.4,
significant at the .02 level, a very large effect.
307. r=.32, p=.0001.
308. r=.l1, p=.36. In the regression analysis, the coefficient for the experience of defense counsel in trying capital cases was .66 (p=.24).
309. Our records document two such cases in which the court records clearly indicate
that the court insisted on conducting a penalty trial when the prosecutor sought
to waive the death penalty as part of a plea bargain. There may be other occurrences of this that were not apparent on the records in our files.
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To test this hypothesis we ideally need a measure of the trial
judge's attitude about the appropriateness of the death penalty in
each case. However, we have no factual basis for creating that measure. What we have instead is the basis for creating a measure of
judicial penalty-trial voting practices that likely reflects the culpability levels of the cases heard by each judge (i.e., the more aggravated
the case, the more likely it is that death is the result).
Our principal measure of judicial attitudes was the proportion of
penalty-trial cases in which each judge had been involved (for judges
with participation in three or more sentencing hearings) that resulted
in a death sentence. Because of the small number of judges who had
heard three or more cases, we developed alternative measures that
count the number of cases in which each judge participated and the
result was a death sentence. 31 0 The measures also distinguished between cases in which the judge had presided alone or had empanelled
a three-judge court. We developed these measures on the basis of the
information in the DCI indicating the name(s) of the judges who par3
ticipated in each sentencing hearing. 11
None of the measures of judicial attitudes showed a significant relationship with the rate that prosecutors advanced cases to a penalty
trial, either with or without controls for defendant culpability. 31 2 In
fact, the data are consistent with a greater likelihood of a penalty trial
when the judge has participated in more cases that resulted in a life
rather than a death sentence.3 13 We are inclined to discount, therefore, the likelihood that the geographic disparities in the rates that
310. We prepared a similar measure of the number of times a judge's case resulted in
a life sentence.
311. These measures have limitations, i.e., we have small samples for many judges
and there is a distinct correlation between the number of cases heard with either
sentencing outcome and the number of years the judge has been on the bench,
although it is unclear the bias this may introduce. Another possible concern is
that we have no controls for the relative culpability levels of the defendants in
cases that each judge hears. For example, the judges associated with many lifesentenced cases may have participated in a disproportionate number of cases
with low levels of culpability. However, we consider it reasonable to assume that
there is a random distribution among the judges in terms of the culpability levels
of the cases that they hear.
312. The simple correlation, r, of our principal measure, the death-sentencing rate
among all cases heard by each judge, was -. 07, p=.39. There is a weak non-significant positive correlation between the number of solo penalty trials of the judges
that resulted in a death sentence and the advancement of cases to a penalty trial
(r=.12, p=.16). However, there is also a similar weak positive correlation between
the number of solo penalty trials and the advancement of cases to a penalty trial
(r=.12, p=.16).
313. In the regression analysis, the coefficient for the number of life sentence outcome
cases in which the judge has participated was .21, p=.03. This may reflect the
fact that the judicial death-sentencing rates are lower in the major urban counties where the cases are most likely to advance to a penalty trial, although the
place of prosecution was controlled for in the regression. In addition, the
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capital cases advance to a penalty trial are the product of judicial influence over prosecutorial decisions.
4.

The Imminence of ProsecutorialElections

Because of the political salience of the death penalty in many jurisdictions, the record of an elected prosecutor or elected judge in prosecuting and sentencing in capital cases is sometimes a salient factor in
their re-election campaigns. It is commonly believed, therefore, that
in some jurisdictions, elected prosecutors and judges may be influenced in their decisionmaking by the imminence of their re-election.
We tested this hypothesis by first creating a measure of the time
between the date of conviction of each capital case and the prosecutor's next election. (We did not apply this analysis to the sentencing
judges because they are appointed.) We then correlated this measure
with the rate that prosecutors advance cases to penalty trial. We also
created a scale that classified the cases in one-to-four year periods between the prosecutor's next election and the date of conviction. Statewide, and at the local level, these measures showed no effect in
bivariate analyses or in logistic regression analyses.
Finally, we conducted a logistic regression analysis that (in addition to measures for defendant culpability, the race of the defendant
and the victim, and the SES of the defendant and victim) included
variables for (a) judicial propensity to impose a death sentence, (b)
county attorney budgets, (c) the experience of the prosecutor and defense counsel, and (d) the imminence of prosecutorial elections. In
terms of explaining the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial,
only the experience of defense counsel variable had a significant coefficient. 3 14 The coefficient for the geography variable remained substan3 15
tial and significant beyond the .10 level.
5. Differences in the Frequency of Problems of Proof that
"Compel" Plea Bargains
The data in this study concerning prosecutorial charging and plea
bargaining practices are limited to the information available to us in
court records and pre-sentence investigation reports (PSI).316 Also,
probability of a penalty trial is lower for judges with higher levels of participation
7
in cases that result in a death sentence (the logistic coefficient is -1.4 (p=.1 )).
314. b=1.0, p=.02.
7
315. b=2.7, p=.0 .
316. At the proposal stage of the study, we intended to request the individual prosecutors who handled guilty pleas to provide us with their comments on their motivations for entering the pleas, if collecting that information was feasible. However,
subsequent discussions with members of the Crime Commission Subcommittee
that supervised the study indicated that it was probably unreasonable to expect
that much fruitful information would be provided to us on this issue. These dis-
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for 100 cases where it was unclear if a plea-bargain offer had been
made by the prosecution, we inquired of both the prosecutor and defense counsel if such an offer had been made. However, neither of
these sources identify proof problems that may have "compelled" a
waiver of the death sentence and the offer of a plea bargain as the
exclusive means of obtaining a conviction. 3 17 In such cases, the decision to waive the death penalty would not necessarily reflect a discretionary decision concerning the deathworthiness of the defendant, but
rather may reflect a practical judgment informed by the need to obtain
a guilt-trial conviction.
We do not believe it plausible that our inability to distinguish between "compelled" and "non-compelled" plea bargain agreements has
biased our documented geographic disparities concerning the rates
that cases result in plea bargains and advance to penalty trials. Such
bias would occur only if the compelled plea bargains were a much
more common phenomena in greater Nebraska (where plea bargains
are more common and penalty trials are less common) than they are
in the major urban counties, particularly Douglas County, which advances death-eligible cases to penalty trial at a higher rate than any
other county in the state. We consider it more likely that the incidence of compelled plea bargains is randomly distributed throughout
the state. In this regard, recall that the geographic disparity in the
rates that cases advance to penalty trial is very large. Accordingly,
bias in our finding as a result of this omitted variable would require a
significantly higher incidence of compelled plea bargains outside Nebraska's major urban counties than occurs in the major urban centers.
We consider this unlikely.
The upshot of our analyses is that none of the rival hypotheses offered to explain the geographic disparities in the rates at which cases
cussions raised the concerns that County Attorneys would be uncomfortable providing us their mental impressions regarding the strength of their cases, the
quality of evidence used to convict defendants or as the factual bases for pleas,
and similar information. Such mental impressions would ordinarily not be discoverable by defendants because they would be subject to a work-product privilege. A concern was raised that if these matters were disclosed for this study, the
disclosure would constitute a waiver of the attorney's work-product privilege over
those mental impressions, and defendants may be able to seek discovery of that
information to support litigation in their cases. We also raised the possibility of
collecting this type of information at the annual meeting of the Nebraska County
Attorneys Association held in March of 2001, and requested that County Attorneys advise us if, in their judgment, County Attorneys would be willing to disclose this information. Discussions with County Attorneys at that meeting did
not allay the concerns raised earlier regarding discovery of that information.
None of the County Attorneys with whom we spoke at that time indicated that
they would be willing to provide that information.
317. A classic example is when the testimony of a co-perpetrator is the only source of
information available in a case and a condition for the co-perpetrator's cooperation is a plea bargain including the waiver of a death sentence.
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advance to penalty trial appear plausible. Our conclusion, therefore,
is that those geographic disparities are more likely explained in the
two ways suggested above. The first possibility is different
prosecutorial perceptions of the breadth of prosecutorial discretion
3 18
under the law to waive the death penalty in capital prosecutions.
The second possibility is differential perceptions of the degree of culpability and deathworthiness of similarly situated death-eligible offenders that needs to exist before a case is advanced to a penalty trial
with the state seeking a death sentence. What might explain these
different perceptions in the major urban counties and greater
Nebraska?
The disparities in prosecutors' policies may reflect differences in
community attitudes and concerns about crime and the necessity of
prosecuting capital murder cases to the full extent of the law. Certainly, Nebraska's major urban counties have higher crime and homicide rates than do the other counties. 3 19 Prosecutors in the major
urban counties may well be reacting to those community attitudes and
concerns.
Additional explanations that have been offered to explain the geographic disparities in penalty trial rates are less susceptible to empirical testing but they may provide the most plausible explanations for
the disparities. An explanation offered by state Senator Ernie Chambers is that because smaller communities are more closely knit, offenders there are more likely to be known in the community and less
likely to be viewed as demonized by the community than is the case in
the major urban counties where offenders are more likely to be viewed
as strangers whom few people know and with whom even fewer people
identify. The argument posits that these differences have an impact
318. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for a description of the different legal
interpretations.
319. In the Nebraska "metropolitan" statistical areas, where 864,156 persons reside,
the FBI "Crime Index Total" was 46,775 in 1999 (5.4 %). The crime index total is
"composed of selected offenses used to gauge fluctuations in the overall volume
and rate of crime reported to law enforcement. The offenses included are the
violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and arson." In the cities outside metropolitan areas, where 392,151
persons reside, the crime index total was 15,923 (4.1%). In rural areas, where
409,693 persons reside, the crime index total was 5,746 in 1999 (1.4%). FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REP., INDEX OF CRIME BY STATE

(1999).

Because of the concentration of minority defendants in the major urban areas,
where cases advance to a penalty trial at a higher rate, there is a significant
correlation between the proportion of minority homicide defendants (capital and
non-capital) in the county and the frequency with which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial (r=.27, significant at the .0001 level). The death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases is also positively associated with the
proportion of minority homicide defendants in the county but the correlation is
weak and not statistically significant (r=.11, p=.16).
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on prosecutorial perceptions of offender culpability and deathworthiness and impact their willingness to seek death sentences in deatheligible cases.
Senator Chambers also suggested that outside the major urban
counties there are prosecutors who are personally opposed to capital
punishment and that those sentiments interact with concerns about
the cost of capital litigation and the lack of prosecutorial experience in
capital litigation to hold down the rate at which death-eligible cases
advance to penalty trial.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a combination of factors appears to explain the differences in penalty-trial rates ranging from differing perceptions about prosecutorial authority to waive the death
penalty in first-degree murder cases, finances available to support
capital litigation, prosecutorial experience trying homicides, perceptions of community support for aggressive charging practices in deatheligible cases, and a tradition of resistance in smaller counties to requesting the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General in the
conduct of capital litigation. To the extent that this analysis is correct, it appears unlikely that charging practices in greater Nebraska
are likely to come into line with those of the major urban counties. A
reduction of these geographic disparities is more likely, therefore, to
arise from changes in charging practices in the major urban counties.
Finally, what are the legal and moral implications of the geographic disparities we have documented in the rates that death-eligible cases advance to penalty trial? As we noted above, 320 this
evidence will not support a legal claim in Nebraska or any other jurisdiction of which we are aware. However, from the perspective of comparative justice the problem is clear. Compared to offenders
prosecuted in greater Nebraska, death-eligible defendants in the major urban areas are subjected to a much higher risk that their cases
will advance to a penalty trial solely by reason of where they are prosecuted. The place of prosecution is a morally irrelevant factor that has
nothing whatsoever to do with a defendant's criminal culpability and
deathworthiness. This, of course, was the reason that in 1978 the Nebraska Legislature expressed its concern about the lack of geographic
32 1
It is
uniformity in the state's administration of the death penalty.
clear, however, that in the absence of further legislative or judicial
action, the geographic disparities documented in this study will
persist.

320. Supra note 5.
321. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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PART E
XI.
A.

EVIDENCE OF CONSISTENCY AND SELECTIVITY IN
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES

Introduction

In this section we assess the extent to which the charging and sentencing outcomes of the Nebraska death penalty system are consistent
and selective. By "consistency" we refer to the frequency with which
penalty trials are conducted and death sentences are imposed in cases
with comparable levels of defendant culpability. By "selectivity" we
refer to the extent to which penalty trials and death sentences are
limited to the most aggravated and deathworthy cases. Concerns
about consistency and selectivity flow from the principle of comparative justice, which condemns "either dissimilar treatment of relevantly
similar cases or similar treatment of relevantly dissimilar cases." 3 22
1.

Consistency

Consistency addresses the issue of horizontal equity 3 23 that underlies the arbitrariness rationale of Furman v. Georgia. In Justice Stewart's explanation of why the death sentences before the Furman Court
were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual," he noted that "of all the people convicted of
rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as
these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."324 He
concluded that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution cannot tolerate "legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." 3 25
In this research, we define a death sentence in an individual case
as "inconsistent" and "comparatively excessive" if there exist many
other cases involving defendants with comparable levels of criminal
culpability that result in life sentences or less. We refer to the other
defendants with comparable levels of criminal culpability as the defendant's "near neighbors." For example, if it can be demonstrated
that a death-sentenced defendant has a large number of near neighbors in terms of their criminal culpability and none of those offenders
has been sentenced to death, the logic of Furman v. Georgia suggests
322. As noted above, Schopp, supra note 3, and accompanying text, the principle of
comparative justice also condemns discrimination on the basis of the race and
SES of defendants and victims "because it differentiates among offenders on the
basis of morally irrelevant factors .... " Id. at 827.
323. Horizontal equity calls for similar treatment of relevantly similar cases.
324. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
325. Id.
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that this defendant's death sentence is inconsistent and comparatively
excessive.
There are at least three levels of concern about inconsistency in
capital charging and sentencing. First, inconsistent outcomes are unprincipled. Second, they undercut any deterrent effect the death penalty may have. Third, they reflect an insufficient community
consensus on the level of culpability that is required to justify the execution of a fellow citizen. 32 6
The level of consistency of an individual death sentence determines
the risk that it is "comparatively excessive," while the level of consistency across all charging and sentencing outcomes in a system is a
measure of the risk that the system as a whole is "arbitrary and
capricious." 32 7
Inconsistency and comparative excessiveness are relative matters
and one's assessment of the risk of such sentences depends on two
things. First is the level of frequency with which death sentences are
imposed among a death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors. For
example, if the death-sentencing rate among a defendant's near neighbors is above 80%, the system is operating quite consistently and there
is no risk of comparative excessiveness in that death sentence. However, if the death-sentencing rate among a defendant's near neighbors
326. Justice White addressed these concerns in Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12, by
stating:
[W]hen imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with
confidence that society's need for specific deterrence justifies death for so
few when for so many in like circumstances life imprisonment or shorter
prison terms are judged sufficient, or that community values are measurably reinforced by authorizing a penalty so rarely invoked. Most important, a major goal of the criminal law-to deter others by punishing
the convicted criminal-would not be substantially served where the
penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to influence the conduct of others."
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976), Justice White, concurring, also
emphasized the link between the frequency with which death sentences are imposed and the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
327. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Beyond the infrequency of
death sentencing perceived by the Furman Court, the crucial flaw in the deathsentencing systems declared unconstitutional in Furman was the complete absence of legislative standards to guide the discretion of the sentencing authorities. The death-sentencing amendments adopted in every death sentencing state
after Furman,including Nebraska, provide these standards in the form of statutory aggravating circumstances. For this reason, a claim of comparative excessiveness in a jurisdiction with sentencing standards no longer implicates the
Eighth Amendment under current law. Gregg, 428 U.S 153. However, many
state legislatures, including the Nebraska Legislature, have expressed concern
about inconsistency in death sentencing in general and comparatively excessive
death sentences in individual cases.
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is 2%, the level of consistency is very low and the risk is very high that
his death sentence is comparatively excessive.
The second consideration is one's normative judgment concerning
the degree of inconsistency that is acceptable from a moral and legal
perspective. Some might consider unacceptable any death sentence
imposed in a case in which the death-sentencing rate among that defendant's near neighbors is not well-above 50%.328 Another quite different view might consider death sentences unacceptable only if the
death-sentencing rate among each defendant's near neighbors is less
than 10%. With these two considerations in mind, it is possible to
classify death-sentenced cases on a continuum that reflects the level of
death-sentencing among each death-sentenced offender's near neighbors. The degree of one's concern about the overall consistency of the
system produced by such evidence will reflect his or her judgment of
the degree of inconsistency that is morally and legally acceptable.
2.

Selectivity

Selectivity focuses on the extent to which penalty trials and death
sentences are limited to the most culpable cases. It reflects another
goal of Furman v. Georgia,which is reflected in the observation of Justice White that he could perceive no "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [a death sentence] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."329
328. Few state courts have given extended consideration of the minimal level of death
sentencing required among a death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors to rule
out concerns about comparative excessiveness. One state justice who has addressed the issue under a frequency system of proportionality review believes
that the law requires a death-sentencing frequency among near neighbors that is
well above 50% to negate concerns about comparative excessiveness. State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722, 744 (Wash. 1986) (Utter, J., dissenting) (stating that the
death-sentencing rate among similar cases should be "significantly greater than
50 percent"). To the same effect one could argue that a 50% chance of a death
sentence among similar cases is equivalent to the toss of a coin and that a much
higher level of consistency is required. Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 1974),
a capital rape case, suggests that a death-sentencing frequency below 25% among
similar cases raises serious concerns about comparative excessiveness. This case
can also be read to imply that a death-sentencing rate above 25% among a defendant's near neighbors is sufficient to satisfy concerns about comparative
excessiveness.
329. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313. A violation of the principle of vertical equity involves
the imposition of death sentences for offenders with relatively low levels of criminal culpability and the imposition of life sentences or less for considerably more
culpable offenders, including the most culpable defendants.
Among both the public and the courts there is substantially greater support
for the goal of selectivity than there is for the goal of consistency. For example, in
its proportionality reviews of death sentences, the New Jersey Supreme Court
pays lip service to the goal of consistency, but is very much concerned about the
selectivity of the death sentences it reviews. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790
A. 2d 798, 807 (N.J. 2002) ("Although precedent-seeking review [which focuses on
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Figure 34, which documents the distribution of life and death
sentences, controlling for offender culpability, provides a sense of the
system's selectivity. The four levels of offender culpability, based on a
logistic regression model of death sentencing outcomes among all
death-eligible cases, are indicated on the horizontal axis. The number
of life and death sentenced cases at each level of culpability is shown
on the vertical axis. The life and death sentences at each culpability
level are consistent with a reasonably selective system, i.e., there appear to be relatively few death sentenced cases in which the offender's
level of culpability is lower than an offender who received a life
sentence.
We measure selectivity in two ways. The first is the frequency of
penalty trials and death-sentencing outcomes over time. We also compare Nebraska frequencies with comparable data from other jurisdictions for which we have data. The assumption here is that less
frequent death sentencing is more selective death sentencing. However, this assumption needs to be tested since it is always possible
that, even though death sentences are infrequently imposed, they may
not be allocated to the most aggravated and deathworthy cases. Indeed, this is exactly what characterized the Georgia system that the
court invalidated in Furman v. Georgia-in terms of culpability, the
few cases that resulted in death sentences could not be meaningfully
distinguished from the many cases that did not result in a death
sentence.
The second component of a selectivity analysis, therefore, calls for
a measure of culpability that enables one to identify the most aggravated cases in the system and to assess the extent to which death
sentences are limited to those cases. We do this in three ways. Our
first measure of culpability is the frequency of death sentencing
among similarly situated offenders, whom we characterize as the defendant's near neighbors. This approach assumes that if a very high
proportion of an offender's near neighbors are also sentenced to death,
his case is highly aggravated and deathworthy. However, this may
not always be true.
An alternative approach is to apply an a priori measure of culpability that is based on a legislative judgment of culpability. For this purpose we use the number of aggravating circumstances in the case.
the selectivity issue] is intended to complement frequency analysis [which focuses
on the consistency issue] . .. we traditionally have placed greater reliance on
precedent-seeking review."). The proportionality reviews of the Florida Supreme
Court focus exclusively on the selectivity issue. The court does not even address
the issue of consistency in its analyses, which are limited to a comparative analysis of appealed death sentenced cases. See, e.g., Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922,
933 (Fla. 1999) (the goal of the review process is to "reserve" the death penalty for
crimes that fall "within the category of both (1) the most aggravated, and (2) the
least mitigated of murders").
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Our second alternative measure reflects the judgments of prosecutors
and judges in seeking and imposing death sentences. For this purpose, we rank the cases in terms of culpability as estimated in a logistic regression analysis.
Our third measure of selectivity identifies the number and proportion of death sentences imposed in cases with a level of criminal culpability that is equal to or less than the culpability level of the 9 5 th
percentile life-sentenced case. In an ideal system, no offender with a
level of criminal culpability less than the most culpable life-sentenced
offender would be sentenced to death. Although this goal is probably
beyond reach under current conditions, the extent to which a system
approximates this norm is relevant evidence of the level of selectivity
of a death sentencing system.
B.

Evidence of Inconsistency and Comparative
Excessiveness

The following analysis has two parts. First, we present evidence of
the consistency of the Nebraska system in imposing 29 death
sentences during the period covered by this study. The approach we
apply is known as the "frequency approach" to proportionality review.
It is the approach that was urged on the Nebraska Supreme Court in
the 1980s by Chief Justice Krivosha.330 The frequency approach is
factually based and attempts to estimate for each death-sentenced offender the frequency with which death sentences are imposed among
his or her near neighbors.331 The estimates produced for each case in
this manner provide a basis for assessing how consistently the system
as a whole imposes death sentences. These data also lay the foundation for assessments of whether individual death sentences are comparatively excessive.
Second, we test the Proffitt hypothesis by comparing the Nebraska
record on consistency with comparable evidence from New Jersey, a
state with jury sentencing.
1.

The Nebraska Data
a.

Quantitative Analysis

The data we have developed on the consistency of Nebraska's
death-sentencing system are presented in Figure 35, Table 5, and Appendix C. Figure 35 provides an overview of the death-sentencing
330. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
331. David Baldus, When Symbols Clash:Reflections on the Future of the Comparative
ProportionalityReview of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 15951606 (1996) (discussing the distinction between the frequency approach and the
"precedent seeking approach" that is applied by most appellate courts that conduct proportionality reviews, including the Nebraska Supreme Court).

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

649

rates among the cases that we define as near neighbors to each of Nebraska's death-sentenced offenders. Part I presents near neighbor
death-sentencing rates among the other defendants whose cases advanced to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence. This
part reflects only the degree of consistency of judicial penalty-trial
sentencing decisions. Part II broadens the inquiry and focuses on the
death-sentencing rates among near neighbors who were selected from
the universe of all death-eligible offenders in this study. This part reflects the impact on the consistency of outcomes of both prosecutorial
charging and judicial sentencing decisions. It also documents the fact
that a number of offenders whose cases did not advance to a penalty
trial have levels of criminal culpability that are comparable to the defendants who were sentenced to death.
We calculated the frequency of death sentencing among each
death-sentenced defendant's group of near neighbors by utilizing an
average estimate based on our principal measures of defendant culpability: (a) the number of aggravating circumstances in the case, (b) the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case, (c)
the salient factors of the case measure, and (d) a regression-based culpability scale. 3 3 2 For each death sentence imposed, these measures
identify eight overlapping but different groups of near neighbors. The
first four groups of cases consist of near neighbors whose cases advanced to a penalty trial, while the second four groups of cases consist
of near neighbors identified among all death-eligible cases regardless
of whether they advanced to a penalty trial. Each of these frequencies
presents a different estimate of the death-sentencing rate among a
group of offenders with levels of culpability comparable to each deathsentenced offender. We then averaged those groups of four estimates
for each death-sentenced case-one group based on the penalty-trial
near neighbors and one group based on the near neighbors among all
of the death-eligible defendants. 3 33 Those two averages determine
where each death-sentenced case is classified in Part I (penalty-trial
near neighbors) and Part II (near neighbors identified among all
death-eligible cases) of Figure 35.
Part I, Column I indicates that when the analysis is limited to penalty-trial near neighbors, for 38% (11/29) of the death-sentenced defendants, the average death-sentencing rate among the cases we
classified as comparable in terms of culpability was above .80. 3 34 We
332. Supra section IV.B.
333. The estimate for each offender under each measure is presented in Appendix C.
Column L of the Appendix presents the average of the four estimates based on
the penalty-trial near neighbors, while Column M presents the average of the
four estimates based on the near neighbors drawn from all death-eligible cases.
334. The numbers above .80 are the average of four different estimates of death-sentencing rates among similarly situated offenders in categories on the culpability
scale in which there were three or more offenders. The estimates for each death-
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characterize these death sentences as presumptively or prima facie
evenhanded and comparatively non-excessive. A final judgment on
the issue would require close analysis of the records of the cases that
properly
we have identified as near neighbors to assure that they are
33 5
classified as comparable in terms of defendant culpability.
Appendix C, Column L also identifies three death-sentenced cases
in which the average death-sentencing rate estimated among near
neighbors was less than or equal to the .33 average death-sentencing
rate among all penalty-trial cases. 33 6 We classify these three death
sentences, which fall in Part I, Columns C and D of Figure 35, as presumptively or prima facie comparatively excessive because .33 is in
the range of death sentencing that one would expect to see if the death
sentences were randomly assigned among all of the penalty-trial
cases. Again, close analysis of the records of the cases that we have
identified as their near neighbors (with our four measures of defendant culpability) may indicate that, in fact, the cases of those offenders were actually much less culpable than these death-sentenced
defendants, which would explain the low death-sentencing rate among
their near neighbor cases. If that were the case, good practice would
call for the identification of the near neighbors who were in fact most
comparable to these defendants in terms of their criminal culpability.
The data in Part II of Figure 35 reflect the impact of both judicial
sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions. Because
the data suggest that prosecutorial decisionmaking statewide is considerably less discriminating in terms of defendant culpability than is
judicial decisionmaking, 33 7 we would expect to see considerably less
consistency in the results that reflect the influence of prosecutorial
decisionmaking. That is exactly what we see in the results presented
in Part II, i.e., the system appears considerably less discriminating in
terms of limiting death sentences to the most aggravated cases. None
of the death sentences in Part II is classified in Column I where the
death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is 80% or higher. In adsentenced defendant under each measure are presented in Appendix C. We used
only estimates based on three or more near neighbor cases.
335. This analysis is exactly what counsel for the defendant and the state do when
this approach is used in a judicial proportionality review. The cases are distinguished on their facts to persuade the court to select what each side considers the
appropriate group of near neighbor comparison cases. If such an analysis reveals
a misclassification, the death-sentencing rates among the properly defined category of near neighbors would provide the basis for assessing the level of death
sentencing among the defendant's similarly situated near neighbors.
336. See cases 2, 8, and 26, Appendix C, Column L.
337. As noted above, supra notes 206-07, the results of multiple regression analyses
are much more predictable in the analysis of judicial decisionmaking than they
are in the analysis of prosecutorial decisionmaking. This finding should not be
surprising given the substantial geographic disparities we have documented in
the rates that cases advance to penalty trial. See infra sections X.A and XII.B.
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dition, 52% (15/29) of the death cases are in categories in which fewer
than 50% of the defendant's near neighbors received a death sentence
(Columns A to E). However, in only one case is the death-sentencing
rate among near neighbors less than the average rate (.16).
Assuming the validity of the culpability classifications of each of
the death-sentenced cases shown in Figure 35, what do these data tell
us about the extent to which the system as a whole produces consistent results? In such a system one would find that virtually all death
sentences were limited to defendants in culpability categories in
which 80-100% of similarly culpable offenders received a death sentence, i.e., they would be classified in Column I in Part I of Figure 35.
This would mean that all of the sentencing judges applied a common
conception of which offenders were truly deathworthy. Similarly, in
Part II nearly all of the cases would be classified in Column I, which
would mean that, statewide, both the sentencing judges and the prosecutors shared a conception of which offenders were the worst of the
worst. 33 8 The Nebraska system falls short of that model of consistency since only 38% (11/29) of death sentences in Part I fall into such
a highly selective category and none of the death sentences in Part II
fall into that category.
What about the other extreme-a substantially random system in
which the culpability and deathworthiness of the offenders had little
or nothing to do with who received a death sentence? In such a system, each group of near neighbors would approximate a random sample of all of the cases in each analysis. In Part I, all of the cases would
be more or less equally distributed above and below Column D, which
embraces the .33 average penalty-trial death-sentencing rate. 339 In
Part II, the cases would be distributed among the bars above and below Column B, which embraces the .16 average death-sentencing rate
among all death-eligible cases.
The data in Parts I and II of Figure 35 indicate that the system
clearly does not allocate death sentences randomly in terms of criminal culpability. All but one of the death sentences imposed are classified in a category in which the death-sentencing rate among the
338. Of course, the sentencing judges make no formal determination of the
deathworthiness of the death-eligible cases that do not advance to a penalty trial.
The impact of prosecutorial decisionmaking is felt in every case.
It is important to note that the approach we use here for estimating deathsentencing rates among similar cases can be viewed as biasing the results somewhat in the direction of suggesting more consistency than actually exists. The
reason for this is that in each category of cases in which a death-sentenced offender was classified, we counted that defendant's death sentence as a death sentence that was imposed among similarly situated cases.
339. If the average death-sentencing rate were .35 and there were 10 near neighbor
cases, the standard deviation around .35 would be plus or minus 15 percentage
points and one case in 20 would be in the .65 or the .05 category.
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defendant's near neighbors is higher, and often very much higher,
than the average death-sentencing rate among all cases.
However, even in Part I, the data suggest that many more death
sentences are imposed in categories in which the death-sentencing

rate among the defendant's near neighbors is well below .80. Moreover, in both Parts I and II there are a number of death-sentenced cases
classified in and around (Column E) the category in which 50% of the
defendant's near neighbors are sentenced to death. In assessing consistency, a 50% probability of receiving a death sentence is important
because it approximates the outcome of a coin toss. Death sentences
are imposed with this level of frequency or less among near neighbors
(Columns A to E) in 28% (8/29) of the cases in Part I and 52% (15/29)
of the cases in Part II.
Even though we base our estimates on four different measures of
defendant culpability, Table 5 indicates that the average of those estimates is highly correlated with the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. Column A classifies the cases in terms of the
number of aggravating circumstances. For each of those subgroups of
cases, Columns B and C list the average rate that death sentences are
imposed among each death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors;
Column B presents the estimates based on the penalty-trial near
neighbors; and Column C presents the estimates based on near neighbors among all death-eligible cases. For example, Row 2, Column B
indicates that for the cases with two aggravating circumstances, death
sentences are imposed on average 54% of the time among penalty-trial
near neighbors. (The parenthetical below the 54% estimate indicates
that the range of estimates for the 12 cases in this category was from
40% to 62%.)
The differences between the estimates in Columns B and C parallel
the differences between the estimates shown in Parts I and II of Figure 35; i.e., the Column B estimates reflect the impact of judicial penalty-trial decisionmaking alone, while the Column C estimates reflect
the impact of both judicial and prosecutorial decisions among all
death-eligible cases.
The data in Table 5 clearly indicate that the greatest risk of inconsistency and comparative excessiveness exists in cases involving one
or two aggravating circumstances. For cases with three or more aggravating circumstances, there is a very high level of consistency
when the point of comparison is the treatment of other penalty-trial
defendants (Column B) and a consistent level of sentencing above .50
when the point of comparison is all death-eligible cases (Column C).
b.

QualitativeAnalysis

Another way to assess the consistency of outcomes of a death penalty system is to compare narrative summaries of the cases that re-
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5

ESTIMATED DEATH-SENTENCING RATES FOR DEFENDANTS WITH
COMPARABLE LEVELS OF DEFENDANT CULPABILITY IN 29 NEBRASKA
DEATH-SENTENCED CASES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES:

NEBRASKA,
A

1973-1999'
B

C

Circumstances and
Number of DeathSentenced Cases

Comparable PenaltyTrial Cases

Comparable Cases
Among All DeathEligible Defendants

1
(n=3)

29%
(.22-.33)

9%
(.09-.28)

2
(n=12)

54%
(.40-.62)

39%
(.80-.51)

3
(n=8)

82%
(.79-.87)

61%
(.42-.66)

4-6
(n=6)

87%
(.79-.90)

75%
(.70-.79)

Number of Aggravating

' The second line of data in each box indicates the range of estimates for death sentences
imposed among near neighbors for the cases classified in that box.

suited in death sentences with narrative summaries of factually
comparable cases that received a sentence of life imprisonment or less.
The vehicle for this approach is presented in Appendix D, which classifies each of the 185 death-eligible cases identified in this research in
terms of its "salient factor," as those factors are enumerated in Appendix B. For each case under each salient factor category, we identify
the county in which the case was prosecuted and present a brief factual and procedural summary of the case. Under each sub-heading,
we first present narrative summaries for the cases that resulted in a
death sentence; these are followed by the cases that advanced to a
penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence and the court
returned a life sentence, and those cases are followed by the cases that
did not advance to a penalty trial.
For example, Salient Factor category D ("Multiple Victims") embraces 25 cases in which the most prominent statutory aggravating
circumstance in the case was multiple victims, which are further subclassified according to the following levels of criminal culpability:
1. Aggravated with Low Mitigation (n=13)
2. Aggravated with High Mitigation (n=3)
3. One Statutory Aggravator with Low Mitigation (n=4)

4. One Statutory Aggravator with High Mitigation (n=5)

A review of the narrative summaries indicates that death
sentences were limited to five cases in the most aggravated category-
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D.1. We invite the reader to scrutinize the facts of all of these cases to
assess the extent to which (a) the five cases that resulted in death
sentences can be meaningfully distinguished from the cases that did
not and (b) the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial can be
meaningfully distinguished from those that did.
c.

A Note on ProportionalityReview in the Nebraska
Supreme Court

We described above how, since 1986, the Nebraska Supreme Court
basically has abandoned the field when it comes to formal comparative
proportionality reviews. 340 The reviews conducted since then have
been strictly pro forma and of little consequence in terms of promoting
consistency in the system. One wonders, therefore, whether that process would have been significantly improved if the Court had followed
the lead of Chief Justice Krivosha in the 1980s in his application of a
frequency approach to the review process along the lines required by
the Legislature's 1978 amendments. In six cases he would have vacated the death sentence as comparatively excessive while, in three,
he would have affirmed.
Our analysis of these nine cases indicates that the level of consistency measured by the defendant's rate of death sentencing among
"near neighbors" was actually higher for the death sentences that he
would have reversed as comparatively excessive than it was for the
death sentences that he would have affirmed as not comparatively excessive. 34 1 The most likely explanation for the differences in his results and ours is that the Chief Justice's universe of comparison cases
was not limited to death-eligible cases as we have defined that term; it
was limited to homicides from the 1970s and 1980s, and he lacked
measures of criminality that would have enabled him to distinguish
34 2
In short, these
finely between the culpability levels of the cases.
results confirm the critical importance to the meaningful conduct of
340. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
341. In our analysis of the seven cases that he would have reversed as comparatively
excessive, the average level of death sentencing among the defendant's near
neighbors among all death-eligible cases over the entire period 1973-1999 was .67
(ranging from .47 to .79), while in the cases he would have affirmed as not excessive, the comparable statistics were .41 (ranging from .41 to .42). If the analysis
is limited to penalty-trial near neighbors, for the death sentences he deemed to be
excessive, the average death-sentencing rate among near neighbors was .82
(ranging from .59 to .90), while for the three death sentences he considered not to
be excessive, the average death-sentencing rate among near neighbors was .64
(ranging from .57 to .79).
342. The 1978 statute contemplated a universe of comparison cases that embraced all
criminal homicides, rather than only those that were death-eligible. For example, approximately 50% of the comparison cases used in the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion in Palmer (III) did not meet the test of death eligibility that we
applied in the research.
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proportionality review of good data on potential near neighbors and
good measures of defendant culpability.
2.

Testing the Proffitt Hypothesis with a Comparative
Assessment

How well does the Nebraska system work in comparison to systems in other jurisdictions? We have comparable data on the consistency of penalty-trial sentencing outcomes only for the New Jersey
system (1983-1991).343 Nebraska and New Jersey have similar lists of
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The principal
distinction between them is that New Jersey has almost exclusively
jury death sentencing while Nebraska has exclusively judicial death
sentencing conducted by appointed judges. In addition, as noted
above, the Nebraska judges operate under a statute that requires
them to consider the risk of comparative excessiveness when they impose death sentences. Against this background, we should expect to
see less risk of comparatively excessive death sentences in the Nebraska system in the penalty-trial decisions and we could also expect
this effect to result in a level of consistency among all death-eligible
cases that is higher in Nebraska than it is New Jersey. As we explain
below, the data are consistent with these expectations.
We compare the two systems with three measures. The first is the
proportion of death sentences that are imposed in cases in which 70%
or more of the defendant's near neighbors receive a death sentence.
The second and third measures are the proportion of the death
sentences imposed in cases in which the death-sentencing rate among
the death-sentenced offender's near neighbors is (a) lower than 50% or
(b) lower than the average death-sentencing rate among all cases considered in the analysis. The analysis below documents that when the
focus is exclusively on penalty-trial decisions, the Nebraska system is
distinctly superior, but when the analysis reflects the impact of judicial sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions, the
systems are quite comparable.
a.

Death-Sentenced Cases in Which 70% or More of the
Defendant's Near Neighbors Receive a Death
Sentence

When we limit the first measure to penalty-trial near neighbors,
the Nebraska system appears to be more consistent than the New
Jersey system. Specifically, in 48% (14/29) of death sentences imposed
in Nebraska, the death-sentencing rate among penalty-trial near
343. NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 166.
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neighbors is 70% or higher. The comparable figure in New Jersey is
29% (10/34).344
When the near neighbors are drawn from the universe of all deatheligible cases and the numbers reflect the impact of both prosecutorial
charging and penalty-trial sentencing decisions, the Nebraska and
New Jersey systems are comparable. In Nebraska, 17% (5/29) of the
death sentences meet the 70% standard while in New Jersey 15% (5/
34) meet it.345
b. Death-Sentenced Cases in Which Fewer than 50% of the
Defendant's Near Neighbors Receive a Death
Sentence
On the second issue, concerning the proportion of death sentences
imposed in cases in which the rate of sentencing among near neighbors is below 50%, the Nebraska system is also more effective than the
New Jersey system. When the focus is limited to death-sentencing
rates among near neighbors whose cases advanced to a penalty trial,
the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than fifty percent only 21% (6/29) of the time in Nebraska and 35% (12/34) of the
time in New Jersey.
When the focus expands to embrace death-sentencing rates among
comparable defendants in the entire population of death-eligible offenders, the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than
52% (15/29) of the time in Nebraska death cases and 62% (21/34) of
the time in the New Jersey death cases.
c.

Death-Sentenced Cases in Which the Death-Sentencing
Rate Among the Defendant's Near Neighbors is Less
than the Overall Average Rate

The third issue focuses on the proportion of death sentences imposed in cases in which the rate of sentencing among the defendant's
near neighbors is below the average death-sentencing rate. Here, we
find that the overall average death-sentencing rates in Nebraska and
New Jersey are comparable. The penalty trial death-sentencing rates
are 33% in Nebraska and 30% in New Jersey. For death sentencing
among all death-eligible cases, the rate is 16% in Nebraska and 15%
in New Jersey. When the near neighbors are limited to penalty-trial
defendants, the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less
than the overall average 3% (1/29) of the time in Nebraska and 9% (3/
34) of the time in New Jersey.
When the near neighbors are drawn from all death-eligible cases,
the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than the over344. Id. at Tbl. 19.
345. Id. at Tbl. 20.
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all average 3% (1/29) of the time in Nebraska and 6% (2/34) of the time
in New Jersey.
Overall, these comparative data suggest that New Jersey and Nebraska are quite effective in avoiding clearly excessive death
sentences, i.e., those with death-sentencing rates among near neighbors that are well below the overall average for all cases in the analysis.346 In terms of limiting death sentences to the most aggravated
cases, the penalty-trial outcomes in Nebraska are clearly superior, but
when the analysis embraces the impact of judicial sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions, the results are only
slightly better in Nebraska.3 4 7
As suggested above, the greater consistency of the Nebraska penalty-trial decisions vis-A-vis New Jersey is most likely the product of
Nebraska's system of exclusively judicial sentencing under a statute
that requires the sentencing judges to assess the risk of comparative
excessiveness associated with each death sentence they impose. The
New Jersey penalty-trial decisions, in contrast, are almost entirely
jury decisions. However, when the impact of prosecutorial charging
decisions is added to the analysis, the risk of comparative excessiveness in the two systems appears to be quite comparable in terms of the
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases.
C.

Evidence of Selectivity in the Imposition of Death
Sentences
1. QuantitativeAnalysis

We focus here on the extent to which death sentencing is limited to
the most aggravated cases-the "worst of the worst" as they are commonly described in the Nebraska media. We also examine the extent
to which the process of appellate review in the Nebraska Supreme
Court appears to enhance or diminish the selectivity of the system as
the death-sentenced cases move toward execution.
We have documented that death sentencing has become less frequent over the last twenty-five years. We believe this is, in significant
part, because of the narrowing of statutory aggravators by the Nebraska Supreme Court and the conduct of proportionality review in
sentencing hearings. A good example in this regard is the 1977 case of
Rodney Stewart, in which the trial court found six aggravators present. The Nebraska Supreme Court found only one present and reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment. This is a strong model
for greater selectivity.
To expand this inquiry, we need a more systematic measure of offender culpability. Our first measure in this regard is the frequency of
346. See supra discussion in this subsection.
347. See supra subsections XI.B.2.a and XI.B.2.b.
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death sentencing among similarly situated cases. A high frequency of
death sentencing among a death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors reflects a strong consensus on the part of prosecutors and judges
that this defendant's case is particularity deathworthy, while a low
rate of death sentencing among his near neighbors reflects a weaker
consensus about the deathworthiness of his case. Because a high or
low rate of death sentencing among similarly situated cases also implicates the level of consistency that we discussed in the previous section, the concepts of consistency and selectivity are closely related.
We first revisit Figure 35, which classifies the cases in terms of the
frequency of death sentencing among similarly situated offenders.
Part I, which is limited to a comparative analysis of only penalty-trial
cases, indicates that in 48% (14/29) of the cases the death-sentencing
rate among the defendant's near neighbors is greater than .70. Part II
reflects the judgments of both judges and prosecutors. From that perspective, in only 17% (5/29) of the death-sentenced cases is the rate of
death sentencing among similarly situated offenders greater than .70.
Figure 35 also indicates that there are a significant number of death
sentences imposed among cases in which there appears to be a quite
low level of consensus on the deathworthiness of the offender.
Next, we consider the extent to which the Nebraska Supreme
Court appears to respond to offender culpability in its assessments of
"legal" error in the cases and to strive informally to limit executions to
the most aggravated cases. By finding legal error more often in less
aggravated death-sentenced cases, a court can weed out some portion
of the least aggravated cases and keep in the system the more aggravated cases for which there is a stronger consensus on the offender's
culpability. We noted above that there does appear to be an impact, as
has been documented in other research. 348 Specifically, when we focus on cases affirmed and reversed, we see that among the cases affirmed, the average rate of death sentencing among the defendant's
near neighbors is .75 (ranging from .49 to .90) whereas among the
cases vacated the average is 20 percentage points lower, .55 (ranging
from .33 to .82). 3 49 Thus, even though the Nebraska Supreme Court
may not formally conduct meaningful proportionality reviews, it appears that offender culpability may be a distinct factor in its
decisionmaking.
We evaluated selectivity in three other ways. First we examined
the distribution of death-sentenced cases in terms of the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Recall that in
terms of predicting who is sentenced to death the number of ag348. Supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text.
349. Among the offenders who have been executed the statistics are .75 (ranging from
.59 to .88) and for those currently on death row, the statistics are .69 (ranging
from .49 to .85).
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gravators in the case is, by far, the best predictor. This is consistent
with the legislative policy; i.e., if one aggravator is sufficient to justify
a death sentence, that justification must surely rise as the number of
aggravators in the case increases. We found that 48% (14/29) of the
death sentences were imposed in cases with three or more aggravators, 41% (12/29) were imposed in two-aggravator cases, and
10% (3/29) were imposed in single-aggravator cases.
We also rank ordered the cases in terms of their predicted
probability of receiving a death sentence. When the predictions were
based on an analysis of penalty trials, 45% (13/29) of the defendants
had a predicted likelihood of being sentenced to death that was over
.90 and when the analysis was based on death sentencing among all
death-eligible cases, those same 13 offenders had a predicted
probability of .80 or higher. These were the defendants with three or
more aggravating circumstances in their cases. For the remainder of
the cases, with the exception of the single-aggravator cases, the estimates were between .50 and .70 (For the one-aggravator cases, the
estimates were below .10).
When we focus on the five defendants executed or currently on
death row, the predicted probabilities for only two (Williams and Lotter) are in the top, most aggravated category. Among the 12 most aggravated cases by this measure, three died on death row of natural
causes and eight others have left death row alive. Among this top
group, only Williams was executed.
Among the least aggravated of the two-aggravator cases and the
single-aggravator cases, all have left death row alive.
As noted above, our third measure of selectivity focuses on the percentage of death sentences that possess criminal culpability scores
that are equal to or less than the culpability score of the 9 5 th percentile
life-sentenced case. Among all death-eligible cases, 28% (8/29) of the
Nebraska death sentences are in that category. As a point of comparison, based on comparable methodology, among post-Furman Georgia
cases that resulted in a jury guilt-trial conviction between 1973 and
1979, 29% of the death sentences fell into this category, while in the
pre-Furman period, 61% of the Georgia death sentences fell into this
0
category.35
The upshot of these findings is that while death sentences are imposed in highly aggravated cases with reasonable regularity, many
death sentences are also imposed in less aggravated cases. Moreover,
those executed thus far and those now remaining on death row are not
necessarily the most culpable offenders, many of whom had their
sentences vacated and left death row alive.
350. EJDP, supra note 11, at 91.
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Qualitative Analysis

Another way to assess the consistency of outcomes of a death penalty system is to compare narrative summaries of the cases that resulted in death sentences with narrative summaries of factually
comparable cases that received a sentence of life imprisonment or less.
The vehicle for this approach is presented in Appendix D, which classifies each of the 185 death-eligible prosecutions identified in this research in terms of its "salient factor," as those factors are enumerated
in Appendix B. For each case under each salient factor category, we
identify the county in which the case was prosecuted and present a
brief factual and procedural summary of the case. Under each subheading, we first present narrative summaries for the cases that resulted in a death sentence; these cases are followed by the cases that
advanced to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence
and the court returned a life sentence, and those cases are followed by
the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial.
For example, salient factor category D ("Multiple Victims") embraces 25 cases in which the most prominent statutory aggravating
circumstance in the case was multiple victims, which we further subclassified according to the following levels of criminal culpability:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Aggravated with Low Mitigation (n=13)
Aggravated with High Mitigation (n=3)
One Statutory Aggravator with Low Mitigation (n=4)
One Statutory Aggravator with High Mitigation (n=5)

A review of the narrative summaries indicates that death
sentences were limited to five cases in the most aggravated categoryD.1. We invite the reader to scrutinize the facts of all of these cases to
assess the extent to which (a) the five cases that resulted in death
sentences can be meaningfully distinguished from the cases that did
not and (b) the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial can be
meaningfully distinguished from those that did.

XII.
A.

PART F
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Principal Findings and Conclusions
1.

Race-of-Defendant and Race-of-Victim DisparateTreatment

Our first finding is that there is no significant evidence of systemic
disparate treatment on the basis of the race of the defendant or the
race of the victim in either the major urban counties or the counties of
greater Nebraska on the part of either prosecutors or judges. 351 In
351. See supra section VII.
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the major urban counties, where 93% (28/30) of the prosecutions in
minority-victim cases took place, the data document white-victim disparities in judicial sentencing decisions that are consistent with a pattern and practice of race-of-victim discrimination. However, because
these disparities are based on small samples and are not statistically
significant, they do not support a conclusion that sentencing judges in
Nebraska's major urban counties systemically treat offenders differ3 52
ently on the basis of the victim's race.

These findings suggest that prosecutors and judges are sensitive to
the issue of racial equity and that the law prohibiting racial discrimination has had a deterrent effect. Our findings also provide support
for the Proffitt hypothesis that judicial sentencing is superior to jury
sentencing in terms of arbitrariness and comparative justice. In contrast to our Nebraska results, data from Pennsylvania, a state with a
weighing system similar to Nebraska, document evidence of disparate
treatment in jury penalty trials based on the race of the defendant and
35
the victim.

3

2. Adverse DisparateImpact on Minority Defendants

Our second finding is that state law, which authorizes broad discretion in prosecutorial charging decisions and the differential charging and plea bargaining practices of prosecutors in the major urban
a statewide
counties and the counties of greater Nebraska, 3produces
"adverse disparate impact" on racial minorities. 54 This adverse impact flows from more punitive prosecutorial charging practices for all
cases in the major urban counties. As noted in the preceding section,
the data indicate that prosecutors in the major urban counties of Nebraska treat whites and minorities evenhandedly. However, the data
also indicate that after adjustment for defendant culpability, those
prosecutors advance all death-eligible cases to penalty trials at a substantially higher rate than do their counterparts in greater Nebraska.
Because 90% of the minority defendants charged with capital murder
in Nebraska are prosecuted in the major urban counties, minorities
are more impacted than whites by the greater willingness of prosecutors in these counties to advance death-eligible cases to penalty trials.
Therefore, by virtue of the counties in which their crimes are committed and/or prosecuted, minority defendants, statewide, face a higher
risk that their cases will advance to penalty trials (with the state
352. To the extent that there may be race-based disparate treatment in the system, it
does not occur with sufficient frequency for our analytic methods to detect.
353. PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10, at 1686-87 (race-of-victim effects), 1688-89,
1758-59 tbls. 6 & El (race-of-defendant effects).
354. See supra section VIII.A.
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seeking a death sentence) than do similarly situated white defendants
35 5
statewide.
The sources of this adverse impact, therefore, are (a) state law,
which delegates to local prosecutors broad discretion in the prosecution of death-eligible cases, (b) significant differences in the rates that
cases advance to penalty trial in the major urban counties and the
counties of greater Nebraska, and (c) the fact that 90% of minority
defendants in death-eligible cases are prosecuted in the major urban
counties of Nebraska. This adverse impact on minorities is analogous
to the adverse impact on minorities that exists in states where local
appropriations for the support of public education are lower in predominately minority communities than they are in predominately
white communities. This finding does not suggest or intimate that the
Nebraska death-sentencing system is racially biased. Our findings
are quite to the contrary.
What are the implications of this adverse disparate impact? From
a legal standpoint, it is clear that this evidence would not support a
legal claim under existing law. But what are the moral implications?
One view is that the adverse disparate impact on minority capital defendants that we have documented is not a matter of moral concern
because it is merely an anomaly resulting from the fact that minorities primarily reside in the state's major urban counties. An alternative view is that the adverse impact is a matter of moral concern
because it places a significant, disproportionate, and unjustified bur3 56
den on minority defendants.
From this perspective, there are two possible justifications for
statewide adverse impact on minorities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trials. The first is tradition, as the charging practices
in the major urban counties have been more punitive in their practices
than in greater Nebraska since 1973. A second, more important justification for the adverse impact is the necessity of aggressive charging
practices as a vehicle for delivering justice. This justification lacks
force in cases with only one aggravating circumstance because death
sentences are rarely imposed in those cases. However, in cases with
two or more aggravators, there is a substantial justification for any
adverse impact caused by aggressive charging practices because many
death sentences are imposed in those cases.
Given the adverse impact of prosecutorial charging decisions on
minorities statewide, one would reasonably expect to see a statewide
355. The discretion of prosecutors to which we refer has nothing to do with non-capital
homicide; it pertains strictly to the discretion authorized with respect to cases
that are death-eligible under Nebraska law.
356. In employment and housing discrimination law, a substantial adverse disparate
impact against a protected group will not stand unless it can be justified by a
compelling business interest.
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adverse impact against minorities in the imposition of death
sentences. Indeed, if the sentencing judges imposed death sentences
at the same rate across the state, this is exactly what one would see,
because statewide, a higher proportion of minority defendants advance to penalty trials. However, this does not occur. The reason it
does not is that the penalty-trial judges in the major urban counties,
where all but one of the minority defendant penalty trials were held,
sentence white defendants to death at a higher rate than they do minority defendants. As a consequence, the statewide data document
only small, non-significant, and inconsistent race-of-defendant disparities on the order of 2 and 3 percentage points in the rates that death
sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases. 35 7 These disparities do not constitute a significant adverse impact against minorities, statewide, in the rates that death sentences are imposed among
death-eligible cases.
3. Minority-DefendantAdverse Impact Among Death Row
PrisonersExecuted
The data reveal an adverse impact on minority offenders in the
frequency with which death-sentenced offenders are actually executed. 3 58 Specifically, of the seven minority offenders sentenced to
death, two (Otey and Williams) have been executed. Of the seventeen
white defendants sentenced to death, only one (Joubert) has been executed. This disparity is not explained by the number of years the offenders have been on death row, for there are a number of white
defendants who either were or have been on death row far longer than
Otey and Williams. The explanation is that white offenders on death
row were more successful in obtaining judicial relief in federal court
than Otey and Williams, who were denied such relief.
In general, the evidence indicates that black offenders have been
less successful than white offenders in obtaining relief in federal
court, although they have been more successful than white offenders
in obtaining relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, because
of the small number of cases in the analysis and the lack of controls
for legitimate case characteristics (concerning the strength of postconviction claims), the data do not support an inference of the disparate treatment of minority offenders in federal court. Moreover, the
perceived severity of Otey's and Williams' offenses may have contributed to their lack of success in federal court. Whether the adverse
impact on minority offenders in execution rates persists over time
with respect to the men sentenced to death between 1973 and 1999,
however, will depend on the outcomes of appeals and possible re357. See supra Figure 7, Parts II & III, Column C.
358. See supra section VIII.B.
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mands in the cases of the four white offenders currently on death row,
as there are no blacks offenders now on death row.
4. Disparate Treatment Based on the Socioeconomis Status
(SES) of the Defendant and Victim
The data provide no evidence of systemic differential treatment of
defendants on the basis of their SES. The data do, however, document
substantial statewide disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes
based on the SES of the victim. Since 1973, defendants whose victims
have high SES have faced a significantly higher risk of advancing to a
penalty trial and receiving a death sentence than have other defendants. Specifically, defendants with high SES victims were 1.7 (.70/.42)
times more likely to advance to a penalty trial, 2.1 (.43/.20) times more
likely to be sentenced to death in a penalty trial, and 3.2 (.29/.09)
times more likely to be sentenced to death among all death-eligible
defendants. 359 Defendants with low SES victims faced a substantially
reduced risk of advancing to a penalty trial and of being sentenced to
death. These defendants were .68 (.39/.57) less likely to see their
cases advance to a penalty trial, .57 (.23/.40) less likely to receive a
death sentence in a penalty trial, and .39 (.09/.23) less likely to receive
a death sentence among all death-eligible defendants.360 All of these
victim SES disparities are statistically significant. Furthermore,
when the focus shifts from the state as a whole to SES effects estimated separately within the major urban and other counties, both
high and low victim SES effects are apparent throughout the state. 36 1
What are the implications of these findings? As noted above,362
under current law, the evidence developed here will not support a legal claim. However, from a moral perspective, we agree with Robert
Schopp's view363 that disparate treatment of the type we have documented violates the principal of "comparative justice" and is a "serious
defect.., because it constitutes a failure of the institutional structure
to conform to the principles that justify that structure ....
[And] it
represents a failure of the institutional function of disciplining the
manner in which the state exercises coercive force against its citizens." We also share his concern that it "discriminates against the
victims (immediate and extended) whose murders are treated as less
important than other similar murders ... ."364
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra Figure 25, Part II.
See supra Figure 26, Part II.
See supra Figures 27 & 28.
Supra note 5.
Schopp, supra note 3, at 825-26.
Id. at 830.
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5. A Trend of Declining Death-Sentencing Rates
The data document a significant decline in death-sentencing rates
since 1982. This trend reflects a slight decline in the rates at which
prosecutors seek death sentences. However, it is principally the product of diminished judicial death-sentencing rates since 1978. This
sentencing trend appears largely to be the product of (a) interpretations of the Nebraska Supreme Court narrowing the scope of a number of statutory aggravating circumstances and (b) the 1978
requirement of comparative proportionality review in penalty trials.
This trend appears to have reduced geographic disparities in deathsentencing outcomes, and enhanced consistency in death-sentencing
outcomes among similarly situated cases.
6.

GeographicDisparitiesin the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion

Our sixth finding is that the Nebraska system is characterized by
sharp disparities in charging and plea-bargaining practices in the major urban counties vis-d-vis the counties of greater Nebraska. 3 65 The
data also document less prominent but important geographic disparities in judicial death-sentencing rates.
In the major urban counties, prosecutors appear to apply quite different standards than do their counterparts elsewhere in the state in
terms of their willingness to waive the death penalty unilaterally or
by way of a plea bargain. The difference is captured in the fact that
after adjustment for the culpability of the offender, death-eligible
cases in the major urban counties are more than twice (.58/.28) as
likely as comparable cases in greater Nebraska to advance to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence. 3 66 The geographic
disparities in prosecutorial charging decisions have existed since 1973
and have grown larger since 1982.367

These disparities are not explained by differing levels of defendant
culpability. Nor are they explained by differences in prosecutorial resources, by prosecutorial experience in handling and trying capital
368
cases, or the attitudes of the trial judge about the death penalty.
However, it is widely perceived in Nebraska that the overall resources
of smaller counties, which affect their ability to compensate defense
counsel for indigent offenders and pay jurors, affect prosecutorial decisionmaking. Specifically, these concerns are believed to create an incentive for prosecutors in smaller counties to negotiate pleas and
waive the death penalty in cases that would be likely to advance to a
365.
366.
367.
368.

See
See
See
See

supra section X.
supra Figure 29, Part II, Column A.
supra Figures 32 & 33.
supra section X.C.
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penalty trial in major urban counties. It is important that, when requested, the Office of the Nebraska Attorney General will provide
prosecutorial assistance in the litigation of capital cases; however, it
appears that in many smaller counties, there is significant reluctance
to rely on "outside" support of this sort. If this explanation for the
comparatively low rate that capital cases advance to penalty trial in
greater Nebraska is correct, it is unlikely that capital charging practices in those counties will change in the foreseeable future.
As suggested above, geographic disparities in the rates that penalty-trial judges impose death sentences are less pronounced. During
the entire period of this study, the adjusted difference in judicial
death-sentencing rates is only 2 percentage points: .27 in the major
urban counties compared to .29 in greater Nebraska. 36 9 However,
this overall disparity masks significant differences before and after
1983. Before 1983, in the major urban counties, the unadjusted deathsentencing rate was more than twice as high (.57 v. .27) as it was in
greater Nebraska. 370 The geographic disparities, both in charging
and sentencing practices in this earlier period, are consistent with the
perceptions of Senator Ernie Chambers when he wrote and promoted
the sentencing reforms that were adopted by the Legislature in 1978.
However, since 1982, there has been a reversal in the geographic disparities in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates. Since then, the unadjusted death-sentencing rate in the counties of greater Nebraska has
been 3.5 (.60/.17) times higher than the rate in the major urban
37
counties. 1
Most of the geographic disparities in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates are explained by differing levels of defendant culpability. After adjustment for defendant culpability, before 1983 the deathsentencing rate in the major urban areas was 6 percentage points
higher (.37 v. .31) than it was in greater Nebraska; since 1982 it has
been 7 points lower (.22 v. .29).372
What impact have these changes in judicial death-sentencing practices had on geographic disparities in the rates that death sentences
are imposed among all death-eligible cases? Over the entire period of
this study, the rate that death sentences were imposed among all
death-eligible cases was 5 percentage points (.15 v. .10) higher than
the rate in the major urban counties. 373 However, the system has
been far from stable. Pre-1983, both penalty trial and death-sentenc369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See supra Figure 29, Part II, Column B.
See supra Figure 32, Part II, Column B.
Id. at Part II, Column C.
See supra Figure 33, Part II.
See supra Figure 29, Part II, Column C. This disparity represents a 50% (5/10)
higher rate in the major urban counties (the denominator is the rate in greater
Nebraska and the numerator is the difference in the rates for the two areas over
the course of this study).
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ing rates were higher in the major urban counties than they were in
greater Nebraska. This produced a death-sentencing rate among all
death-eligible cases that was 2.4 times (.26 v. .11) higher in the major
urban counties than it was in greater Nebraska.374 But, since 1982,
there has been a shift in judicial sentencing practices-a substantial
(15-percentage point) decline in the rate in the major urban counties
and a slight (2-point) decline in greater Nebraska.375
A significant consequence of these changes is that since 1982 they
have tended to minimize the effects of the geographic disparities in
prosecutorial decisions that have continued since 1973. Specifically,
the penalty-trial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties
have minimized the effect of the higher rates at which cases advance
to penalty trials in those counties. Similarly, the higher-than-average
judicial sentencing practices in the counties of greater Nebraska offset
the effects of the lower-than-average penalty-trial rates of their prosecutors. The bottom line since 1982 is that among all death-eligible
cases, the death-sentencing rates in the two areas of the state have
been quite comparable: .12 for the major urban counties compared to
.13 for greater Nebraska.376
This "canceling out" effect of the judicial sentencing decisions does
not change the fact, however, that since 1982 similarly situated offenders in major urban counties face a 33-percentage point (.57-.24)
and 2.4 (.57/.24) times higher risk of advancing to a penalty trial
strictly by virtue of where they are prosecuted than do similarly situated offenders in greater Nebraska.377 Also, of the death-eligible
cases that have advanced to a penalty trial since 1982, those tried in
greater Nebraska have faced a 7-percentage point (.29-.22) and 1.3
(.29/.22) times higher risk of receiving a death sentence than have
similarly situated offenders prosecuted in the major urban
78
counties. 3
As noted, under current law, the evidence of geographic disparities
that we have documented in the administration of Nebraska's death
penalty will not support a legal claim in Nebraska or any other jurisdiction of which we are aware. However, from a moral perspective,
the problem is clear. Solely by virtue of where they reside and/or are
charged, death-eligible defendants prosecuted in the major urban areas face a much higher risk of being subjected to a penalty trial and
374. See supra Figure 33, Part III, Column B.
375. The decline in judicial sentencing rates in the major urban counties in the 1980s
appears to reflect the statewide decline in death-sentencing rates produced by (a)
the Nebraska Supreme Court's narrowing of several statutory aggravating circumstances and (b) the 1978 legislative introduction of comparative proportionality review in penalty trials.
376. See supra Figure 33, Part III, Column C.
377. See supra Figure 33, Part I, Column C.
378. See supra Figure 33, Part II, Column C.
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the concomitant risk of being sentenced to death. An offender's county
of prosecution is a morally irrelevant factor that has nothing whatsoever to do with his or her criminal culpability and deathworthiness.
And it is for exactly that reason that the Legislature in 1978 condemned geographic disparities in the administration of Nebraska's
death penalty-disparities that have grown stronger since that time.
7. Consistency and Selectivity of Charging and Sentencing
Outcomes
Our findings provide support for the Proffitt hypothesis in terms of
its claim of greater consistency in judicial sentencing compared to jury
sentencing. Specifically, the consistency of the Nebraska penalty-trial
decisionmaking appears to be greater than the level of consistency in
jury decisionmaking in New Jersey,379 a state whose death penalty
system is quite comparable to Nebraska's except for the jury sentencing. However, the data do not support a conclusion that the deathsentencing outcomes of the system are uniformly consistent or that
the system limits death sentencing and executions to the most culpaoften referred to in popular parble death-eligible offenders, the group
3 80
lance as the "worst of the worst."
The level of consistency in the Nebraska system suggested by our
data depends on the range of cases one considers in the analysis. In
that regard, there are at least two possible options. One is to limit the
focus to the outcomes of penalty trials, which are strictly a product of
judicial sentencing decisions. A second option is to expand the focus to
embrace the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible
cases, outcomes that are the product of both judicial sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions.
When one's focus is limited to penalty-trial outcomes, the system
appears to work well when compared, for example, to New Jersey, a
state in which penalty-trial death sentencing is almost exclusively a
jury responsibility. (Our principal measure of consistency in each
death-sentenced case is the percentage of defendants with comparable
levels of criminal culpability, the death-sentenced defendant's "near
neighbors" who were sentenced to death.) In Nebraska penalty trials,
48% (14/29) of the death sentences were imposed in cases in which the
death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors were sentenced to death
more than 70% of the time. In New Jersey, the comparable figure is
29% (10/34).381
The Nebraska Supreme Court (as do all other state courts of which
we are aware) resists the adoption of a quantitative standard for as379. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
380. See supra section XI.
381. See supra Figure 35, Part I and note 344 and accompanying text.
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sessing aggravation, insisting that it is not the "number" but the
"weight" of the aggravation that counts. The lower courts also use this
approach. Nevertheless, the data are consistent with the application
of a de facto penalty-trial standard to the effect that for cases with
three or more statutory aggravating circumstances, a death sentence
is almost certain; for cases with two aggravators, the outcome could go
either way, depending on the facts of the case; and for cases with only
a single aggravator, there is a very strong presumption in favor of a
life sentence.
In spite of this penalty trial performance, the data on those cases
suggest that a number of death sentences may have been imposed in
cases that are clearly not among the worst of the worst. 38 2 Specifically, the data suggest that 28% (8/29) of the death sentences were
imposed in cases in which the defendant's penalty-trial near neighbors
were sentenced to death half or less of the time, and in 45% (13/29) of
the death-sentenced cases, the defendant's near neighbors were sentenced to death 60% or less of the time. However, in only one deathsentenced case was the death-sentencing rate among penalty-trial
near neighbors below the average death-sentencing rate for all penalty trials, which is .33.
When the comparative proportionality analysis is expanded to embrace death sentencing among all death-eligible cases, the results look
less favorable than they do when the analysis is limited to penaltytrial near neighbors. 38 3 In that analysis, we find that in only 17% (5/
29) of the Nebraska death-sentenced cases were death sentences imposed in cases in which the defendant's near neighbors were sentenced to death more than 70% of the time. In 52% (15/29) of deathsentenced cases, a death sentence was imposed among the defendant's
near neighbors 50 percent or less of the time. However, only one
death sentence was imposed in a case in which the death-sentencing
rate among the death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors was less
than .16, which is the average death-sentencing rate among all deatheligible offenders.
Of the 24 offenders sentenced to death during the period from
1973-1999, three died on death row of natural causes (they were
highly aggravated cases). Of the remaining 21 defendants, 67% (14/
21) have left death row alive as a result of appellate court decisions
and favorable outcomes on remand. Three offenders were executed
and four remain on death row. With two exceptions, the defendants
executed and currently on death row are not among the most aggravated cases. Those who have left death row alive include most of the
382. See supra Figure 35, Part I.
383. See supra Figure 35, Part II.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

671

least aggravated cases and nearly all of the most highly aggravated
cases.
8. Legislative Ambiguity ConcerningProsecutorialCharging and
Judicial Sentencing Discretion
Our final finding is that there exists in section 29-2521 of the Nebraska Statutes an ambiguity concerning the right of prosecutors to
waive the death penalty in sentencing hearings in death-eligible cases
that result in a first-degree murder conviction. There is also an ambiguity under this provision when the state seeks to waive the death
penalty in first-degree murder cases by not presenting evidence of aggravation. The ambiguity in this situation concerns the obligation of
the sentencing court to make findings on statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and consider the option of a death sentence
in the case.
B.

Policy Recommendations

In this section we present two sets of legislative recommendations.
The first set in subsection XII.B.1 addresses the requirements of Ring
v. Arizona with a minimum possibility of increasing the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the system. The second set addresses
the distortions that this study has documented in the application of
the Nebraska death penalty system since 1973.384 The objective of
these recommendations is to promote comparative justice in the system by (a) enhancing its selectivity, consistency, and geographic uniformity and (b) reducing the risk that the race or socioeconomic status
of the offender or victim are factors in charging and sentencing decisions. Each of these recommendations is based on current Nebraska
practice, or law and policy either currently in place in other jurisdictions or recommended elsewhere.
1.

Legislative Amendments to Satisfy the Requirements of Ring
v. Arizona

A principal finding of this research is that compared to the other
American death-sentencing systems of which we are aware, the Nebraska system has considerable strengths in terms of its capacity to
limit death sentencing to the most aggravated cases and to minimize
the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in charging and sentencing outcomes. Important sources of these strengths are judicial sentencing, Nebraska statutory and case law which regulates the
384. Professor Schopp provides a useful framework for evaluating claims that evidence of distortion in application can justify abolition of capital punishment.
Schopp, supra note 3, at 833-38. In this section we limit ourselves to recommendations that limit the level of distortion in practice.
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weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the requirement that the sentencing judges conduct a comparative proportionality review before they impose a sentence. Accordingly, we
believe that statutory modifications required to meet the requirements of Ring should strive to maintain these strengths to the greatest extent possible.
For this reason, we believe that a return to the pre-Furman Nebraska system of exclusively jury sentencing would unnecessarily
abandon the settled law, tradition, and expectations that have evolved
over the last twenty-five years in the administration of Nebraska's
death-sentencing system and could introduce into the system a significant risk of uncertainty, arbitrariness, and discrimination. Rather,
we believe that the requirements of Ring would be satisfied if the
jury's role were limited to findings of statutory aggravating circumstances in the form of a special verdict at the guilt trial or in a bifurcated hearing on the statutory aggravating circumstances. The
following new section would define the jury's role in a capital
prosecution:
PROPOSED NEW SECTION - NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523.1 - Jury Fact-Finding
Role in Capital Prosecutions.
(1) Whenever the state seeks a death sentence in a first-degree murder
case, the statutory aggravating circumstances on which it intends to rely shall
be charged as an element of the offense in the indictment or information as
the case may be.
(2) When a statutory aggravating circumstance is an element of a firstdegree murder charge, subject to the limitations of paragraphs (3) and (4)
below, the state may present evidence of the aggravating circumstance in a
jury guilt trial and request a jury instruction on the aggravating circumstance, in which event the court shall instruct the guilt-trial jury to make a
special finding of fact on the presence of the aggravating circumstance
charged by the state. The jury shall be instructed that a finding that a statutory aggravating circumstance is present in the case must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and that a jury finding that the circumstance is present in
the case must be unanimous.
(3) Before trial, the defendant in a case in which the state is seeking a
death sentence may waive his or her right to a jury finding of the presence of
an aggravating circumstance in his or her case, in which event the court will
make findings of fact pursuant to section 29-2521 on the presence of any aggravating circumstances charged by the state for which the defendant has
waived his or her right to jury fact-finding. The defendant may also waive his
or her right to a jury guilt trial, in which event the court will decide both the
defendant's guilt or innocence under the murder charge and the presence of
statutory aggravating circumstances if the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder.
(4) Before trial, a defendant may request the bifurcation of the jury's firstdegree murder guilt determination and its finding(s) of statutory aggravation,
in which event, upon a defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, the
court shall promptly conduct a separate aggravation hearing before the same
jury to determine if a statutory aggravating circumstance is present in the
case. In such a hearing, the state and the defendant may present evidence
relevant to the existence of the aggravating circumstance at issue, as well as
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arguments for and against a finding that the aggravating circumstance has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence concerning the presence of
statutory mitigating circumstances will not be presented or argued in the aggravation hearing. A defendant may also stipulate to the presence of a statutory aggravating circumstance in the case, in which event the jury will not be
instructed on the issue and it will be treated by the sentencing court as having
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(5) At the commencement of voir dire in a capital case, potential jurors
shall be advised by the court that the state is seeking a death sentence in the
case.
(6) A guilt- or post-guilt-trial jury, as the case may be, shall also be instructed that (a) its finding that an aggravating circumstance is present in the
case may provide the basis for the imposition of a death sentence by the court
in a sentencing hearing that will be conducted at the conclusion of the defendant's guilt trial if he or she is found guilty of first-degree murder, (b) that a
jury finding that the aggravating circumstance is not present in the case will
limit the discretion of the sentencing judge and require the court to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment, and (c) that if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance present in the case, the sentencing court at a sentencing
hearing may impose a death sentence if it finds, on the basis of all of the evidence in the case, which may include mitigating evidence that the jury has not
heard, that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of a sentence of death.
(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the state from determining that a death sentence shall not be sought in the case.

Section (1)'s charging requirement meets the requirement of Ring
that a statutory aggravating circumstance, which serves as a basis for
38 5
a capital prosecution, must be charged as an element of the offense.
385. The proposal does not exclude the prior-record statutory aggravating circumstance (section 29-2523(1)(a)) from the jury fact-finding requirement. The two
prongs of this aggravator are that the defendant was (a) "previously convicted of
another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person" or
(b) has a "substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity." An exclusion of this aggravating circumstance from Ring's requirements is
suggested by language in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000), on
which Ring is based, that excludes from the jury fact-finding requirement "the
fact of a prior conviction." However, that decision and Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), suggest that the exclusion is limited to nondiscretionary ministerial findings based on a simple reading of a defendant's
prior record. The elements of the Nebraska (1)(a) aggravator involve a much
more discretionary judgment than was contemplated in those Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, Justice Thomas' concurrence in Apprendi, a 5-4 decision which
he joined, suggests that the entire "prior record" exclusion, even when it involves
a simple reading of a defendant's prior record, may not be good law over the long
run. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 507-08 (arguing that the historical record clearly
establishes that "when a statute increases punishment of some core crime based
on the fact of a prior conviction, the core crime and the fact of the prior crime
together create a new, aggravated crime"). Prudence, therefore, calls for the inclusion of all of the statutory aggravators under Nebraska's jury fact-finding
model. To the extent that this raises questions about the presentation of prejudicial evidence in the guilt trial, such as the defendant's prior record, when it would
not otherwise be admissible, sections (3) and (4) of the proposal provide three
defendant options to reduce the risk of prejudice.
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Section (2), which provides for jury guilt-trial findings on statutory
aggravating circumstances, obviates the need for a separate jury penalty trial386 and the guilt-trial jury would be death qualified as it is
38 7
under current practice with only a slight modification.
Sections (3) and (4) address the issue of possible prejudice to the
defendant that may arise from the jury's consideration of both the defendant's guilt and statutory aggravation in a single proceeding. Section (3) enables the defendant to have a jury guilt trial and waive his
or her rights under Ring, which will empower the sentencing court to
make all findings of statutory aggravation as is now done under Nebraska law. The section also enables a defendant to waive a jury guilt
trial in which event the penalty trial will also be conducted by the
court if the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder.
Section (4) permits a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder
to request a bifurcated "aggravation" hearing at the conclusion of the
guilt trial. This section also authorizes a defendant to stipulate to the
presence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, thereby avoiding
the risk that jury fact-finding on aggravation may prejudice the jury
on the guilt issue, a risk that is particularly evident when the (1)(a)
prior-record aggravator is charged. 388 The four options in sections (3)
and (4) will minimize the risk of unnecessarily recreating the pre38 9
Furman dangers associated with unitary capital trials.
386. Under current practice, with the exception of the prior-record statutory aggravating circumstance, (1)(a), the evidence offered to establish statutory aggravating
circumstances is normally presented in the guilt trial and incorporated in the
record of the sentencing hearing by reference thereto. This part of our proposal is
also consistent with the suggestion of Justice Scalia in Ring that "[t]hose States
that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do soby requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or,
more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically
belongs anyway) in the guilt phase." Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2445
(2002).
387. The Nebraska statutes permit voir dire challenges for cause in capital cases when
the venire member's "opinions are such as to preclude him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death." This section should be expanded to include guilt- and penalty-trial "findings of the presence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2006(3) (Reissue 1995).
388. The bifurcated trial and stipulation provisions of our proposal are consistent with
Justice Thomas' perception, stated in Apprendi, of possible alternatives to minimize jury prejudice with respect to proof of a defendant's prior record in a guilt
trial. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 n.10 (stating that it has been common practice to
address concerns about jury prejudice by "permitting the defendant to stipulate
to the prior conviction" or to "bifurcate the trial"). We propose providing the defendant these options with respect to all of the statutory aggravating circumstances, not merely the (1)(a) aggravator based on the defendant's prior record.
389. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220, 228 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In a unitary trial, the defendant would face a dilemma in terms of whether
his testimony on the presence of the statutory aggravating circumstances would
prejudice him in the guilt decision and the unitary trial would conflate a purely
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Sections (5) and (6) require jury instructions on the capital nature
of the prosecution and the implications for the possible imposition of a
death sentence of the jury's fact findings on aggravating circumstances. These sections would ensure that jurors were fully informed
of the consequences of their fact-finding responsibilities.3 90 Furthermore, the instructions would recognize, as has been documented elsewhere, that findings of aggravation and mitigation may reflect the
sentencing authority's judgment of the defendant's deathworthiness. 39 1 The instructions would further recognize that sentencing jurors commonly make up their minds on the life/death-sentencing
outcome by the close of the guilt trial, without the benefit of any evidence on mitigation. 3 92 Finally, the jury role recommended here
would introduce the values of the community into the sentencing process, an important Eighth Amendment interest.393
Section (7) would underscore the right of the state to waive the
death penalty at any stage of a capital prosecution.
Under this proposal, the trial court in a section 29-2521 sentencing
hearing would be in a position to take into account jury fact findings
factual question on guilt with a potentially value-laden judgment on the presence
of statutory aggravating circumstances.
390. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246, 258 (1988) (holding that the "narrowing function" of a finding of statutory aggravation may be "performed by jury
findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or at the guilt phase," but
three dissenting justices criticized the holding because at the guilt phase of a
capital trial, the jury has not been adequately instructed to ensure the "appropriate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility"').
391. See PhiladelphiaStudy, supra note 10 (finding that Philadelphia juries who are
advised that their failure to find mitigation after they have found aggravation
will result in a mandatory death sentence, commonly find an aggravator present
and no mitigation present in the case even though the evidence would clearly
support a finding of mitigation). Nebraska's death qualification of guilt-trial jurors in capital trials under current law reflects a perception of the extent to which
attitudes on a defendant's deathworthiness may influence jury factual findings of
the defendant's guilt or innocence. Supra note 387.
392. In a study of 894 capital jurors, Bowers and Steiner found that nearly half
(48.3%) of the jurors who were questioned thought they knew what sentence
should be imposed during the guilt trial before the sentencing phase began. Of
the jurors who thought they knew what sentence should be imposed during the
guilt trial, 64.1% said they were "absolutely convinced" of what the punishment
should be before the sentencing phase began and 41.3% said they were "pretty
sure" of what the punishment should be before the sentencing phase began. Bowers and Steiner's study also indicates that the propensity to make sentencing decisions during the guilt trial stems from jurors discussing sentencing during
guilt-trial deliberations. William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing
Life or Death: Sentencing Dynamics in Capital Cases, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT

WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 325-26 (J.R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
393. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that juries are "more likely to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death" (citations omitted)).
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on statutory aggravation 394 and defendant stipulations on the presence of aggravation and then proceed to exercise its sentencing discretion in a manner that is quite comparable to current practice. The
court would make findings on statutory mitigation, which is permissible under Ring, weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, conduct a comparative proportionality review, and
impose a life or death sentence. In our judgment, no further changes
in Nebraska law would be needed to satisfy the requirements of Ring
3 95
v. Arizona.
2.

Legislation to Clarify the Scope of Prosecutorialand Judicial
Discretion Under Section 29-2521, Which Defines the Procedure
for a First-DegreeMurder Sentencing Hearing

There is ambiguity under current law concerning a prosecutor's
discretion to waive the death penalty in a death-eligible first-degree
murder case. Although most prosecutors believe they have such discretion, some do not and believe that section 29-2521 requires them to
present evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance in the sentencing hearing if it is present in a case. The second ambiguity concerns the obligation of the trial court to conduct a penalty trial in a
death-eligible first-degree murder case when the prosecutor seeks to
waive the death penalty. Although most Nebraska courts acquiesce in
the prosecution's waiver, some judges press ahead and conduct a penalty trial in spite of the stated preference of the prosecution for a life
sentence. The data indicate, however, that in these cases the court
ultimately acquiesces in the state's desire and imposes a life sentence.
394. Nebraska Revised Statute section 29-2521, which describes the evidence to be
considered by the sentencing court would require a slight amendment along the
following lines: The court shall consider "any jury findings of fact or any defendant stipulations concerning the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances
in the case" that are presented by the state as well as any "matters presented
that relate to any of the mitigating circumstances set forth in section 29-2523,
and if the defendant waives his or her right to jury participation in the proceedings the court shall consider evidence presented by the state that relates to any
statutory aggravating circumstances charged in the case." (new matter
underlined).
395. Supra note 145. A fall 2002 special session of the Nebraska Legislature amended
the penal law to conform it to the requirements of Ring, by providing for a post
guilt trial "aggravation hearing" in which the guilt-trial jury will make findings
on the statutory aggravating circumstances alleged by the state. Findings of
statutory mitigating circumstances, the weighing decision, and the imposition of
a death or life sentence will remain in judicial hands via a three-judge sentencing
panel; solo-judge sentencing is no longer an option in Nebraska. Act of Nov. 22,
2002, LB 1, 2002 Neb. Laws __ , sec. 5, § 29-1603(2) (Ninety-Seventh Leg., 3d

Spec. Sess.) (providing for notice of aggravation in the charging information), sec.
11, § 29-2520 (instituting procedure for the jury aggravation hearing to be presided over by a three-judge panel that includes the guilt-trial judge).
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One consequence of the currently conflicting interpretations of the
code is that in counties where prosecutors believe they lack the authority to waive the death penalty, many penalty trials are held in
cases with low levels of aggravation and with virtually no prospect
that a death sentence will be imposed. The proposed amendment
would make clear that prosecutors have the discretion to waive the
death penalty in death-eligible cases, as they do in every other American death penalty system of which we are aware. The proposal would
also make clear that the prosecution's desire to waive a death sentence in the case controls.
The data indicate, therefore, that the interests of geographic uniformity and consistency 3 96 would be served by the following amendment to the Nebraska statute: 39 7
(2) In a first-degree murder prosecution, the State may, in its discretion, try a
defendant non-capitally, notwithstanding the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the case, in which event a defendant convicted of first-degree
murder will be sentenced to life imprisonment.

The proposed amendment would make clear that the prosecution
has the discretion to waive the death penalty in a death-eligible case
and that the court's obligation to consider death as a sentencing option
depends on the state's decision to seek a death sentence. This would
eliminate the risk of tension between the court and the prosecution, as
well as the need for consideration of death as a sentencing option
when there is no prospect that a death sentence will be imposed.
3.

Legislation to Limit the Power of the Court to Impose a Death
Sentence to Cases in Which It Believes That the Facts of the Case
"Clearly Justify" the Imposition of a Death Sentence and That as
a "Matterof Law" the Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
"Substantially[or Clearly] Outweigh" the Statutory Mitigating
Circumstances

As a condition for the imposition of a death sentence, section 292522 currently requires the sentencing court to determine that the
statutory aggravating circumstances in the case are sufficient "to justify imposition of a sentence of death." A requirement that the court
believes the aggravating circumstances "clearly" justify the imposition
of a death sentence would reinforce the Legislature's intention that

396. Supra section X.
397. This proposal, which is modeled in part on a recent North Carolina amendment
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2004(a) (2001)), would be added as a new paragraph (2) to
section 29-2520. The existing language of section 29-2520 would be renumbered
paragraph (1).
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death sentences be limited to the most aggravated death-eligible
3 98
cases.
We suggest further that the current judicial "weighing" standard
be amended to require a finding that the statutory aggravation
"clearly" or "substantially" outweighs the mitigation to support the
imposition of a death sentence. 39 9 Under current law, there is ambiguity concerning the degree to which aggravation must outweigh mitigation, although the case law clearly suggests that statutory
aggravation must outweigh mitigation by more than a trivial
amount. 40 0 The "clearly" or "substantially" requirement that we prothat death sentences
pose would reinforce the Legislature's intention
401
be limited to the most aggravated cases.
We also recommend a characterization of the weighing decision as
a "matter of law" to make plain that this is the core value judgment for
the court that determines the life or death sentencing outcome.
4.

Legislation to Limit the Power of Prosecutors to Seek a Death
Sentence to Cases in Which the ProsecutorBelieves That the
Facts of the Case "Justify"or "Clearly Justify" the Imposition of
a Death Sentence

Under current law, prosecutors may seek a death sentence in a
death-eligible case regardless of the offender's level of criminal culpability. As a consequence, death sentences are sought by the state in
cases with quite low levels of criminal culpability in which it is extremely unlikely that the court will impose a death sentence. However, this is not the statewide practice. In a number of counties, more
than death eligibility is required to trigger a decision to seek a death
sentence in the case. One such factor is the prosecutor's belief that the
facts of the case justify the imposition of a death sentence. The
398. The proposed amendment would be to section 29-2522(1), underlined here, as follows: [the sentencing judge's decision shall be based on the following considerations:] "(1) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to'clearly justify
imposition of a sentence of death."
399. The proposed amendment would be to section 29-2519, underlined here, as follows: "The Legislature therefor determines that the death penalty should be imposed only.., when as a matter of law the aggravating circumstances existing in
connection with the crime substantially [or clearly] outweigh the mitigating circumstances.. . ." The New York statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 400.27(11)(a) (2001), is
precedent for this standard. (providing that the statutory aggravation must "substantially outweigh" the mitigation in the case).
400. Supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
401. As a means of limiting death sentencing to the most aggravated cases, we believe
that a "substantially outweigh" requirement is preferable to a requirement that
the statutory aggravation outweighs the statutory mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt because it emphasizes that the weighing decision is a legal value-based
judgment rather than a finding of fact that must be allocated to a jury under
Ring.
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amendment proposed here would require the existence of such a
prosecutorial belief as a predicate to a prosecutorial demand for a
death sentence in a death-eligible case. 40 2 The application of this
standard would promote the interests of selectivity and consistency by
bringing the standards guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
into conformity with the standards guiding the exercise of judicial
3
discretion.4O
There is important precedent for this requirement outside Nebraska as well. Specifically, the federal death penalty law authorizes
the government to seek a death sentence in death-eligible cases only
when "the attorney for the government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified
under the [lawi."404 Department of Justice data indicate that in their
application of this section United States Attorneys seek a death sentence in 27% of the cases that are death-eligible under federal law.4O5
A similar provision in Nebraska that required the prosecution to believe that a death sentence in the case was "justified" or "clearly justified," could reduce significantly the level of geographic disparity in
prosecutorial decisionmaking that we have documented in this study.
5. Legislation to Limit Death Sentencing to Cases in Which the
Defendant Had a Substantial Level of Mental
Culpability (Mens Rea)
One risk of arbitrariness under the Nebraska statute is its failure
to require a level of mental culpability that is higher than the minimum level required by the United States Constitution, i.e., recklessness. 40 6 Under Nebraska's felony-murder doctrine, a defendant with
402. The amendment would add the following language, underlined here, to section
29-252 1, which regulates the conduct of penalty trials: "In the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to sentence, and, if the County Attorney believes that the

circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified [or
clearly justified] under the law, shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances set forth in section 29-2523.. .."
403. If the Legislature were to establish a "clearly justified" standard for the judicial
imposition of a death sentence, as we have suggested in the preceding section,
geographic uniformity would be promoted if a similar standard were applied to
limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The evidence is clear that a major
source of inconsistency in the current system is the deviation between the standards applied by prosecutors and judges in their evaluation of death-eligible
cases.
404. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a) (2000) (emphasis added), amended by 116 Stat. 1758 (Nov.
2, 2002).
405. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988-2000) 7 (Sept. 12, 2000) (available in the University of
Nebraska Law College Library).
406. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (stating "we hold that the reckless
disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities
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only a Tison level of recklessness may be sentenced to death. Our review of the Nebraska capital cases indicates that all of the defendants
thus far sentenced to death had a mens rea that was substantially
more culpable than recklessness, i.e., knowledge or intention to
kill.407 Nevertheless, the breadth of Nebraska's current first-degree
murder statute, as limited only by Tison, puts defendants with a mens
rea of recklessness at risk of a penalty trial and death sentence.
Accordingly, we recommend that the mens rea for death-eligibility
be heightened to knowing or intentional killing. The proposed amendment based on the New Jersey statute40 8 would be to section 29-2521,
which regulates the conduct of penalty trials, with new matter
underlined:
In the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as
to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence and, if the defendant
(a) committed the homicidal act by his own conduct, (b) was an accomplice
who procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment or anything of pecuniary value, or (c) was the leader of a conspiracy who
commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the homicide,
shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances set forth in section 29-2523....

6. Legislation to Limit Death Sentencing to Cases in Which the
Defendant's Level of Criminal Culpability is Comparable to That
Historically Found in Cases with Two or More Statutory
Aggravating Circumstances
This amendment would add to the trial court's comparative proportionality review procedure a presumption against the imposition of a
death sentence in cases with a single aggravating circumstance. Our
empirical findings support such a rule in two ways. First, with few
exceptions, both trial courts and the Nebraska Supreme Court have
applied such a rule de facto for over twenty-five years. As a consequence, during the entire period of this research only three death
sentences were imposed in single-aggravator cases and none of those
offenders was executed or remains on death row. The proposed legislation would ratify that rule by adding the following additional standard (underlined) under section 29-2522 (3), which imposes on the
trial courts its proportionality review requirement:
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,
and in the course of this review, the court, in cases involving one statutory
aggravating circumstance, will apply a presumption in favor of a life sentence
known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a
mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal
result").
407. See the narrative summaries of the death-sentenced cases in Appendix D.
408. This proposal is modeled after N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 c. (2002).
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unless the level of criminal culpability in the case is comparable to that present historically in Nebraska capital cases involving two or more statutory
aggravating circumstances.409

This new standard would create an additional comparative proportionality review requirement in cases with a single statutory aggravating circumstance. It would also create a presumption in favor of a
life sentence in those cases. A death sentence would be appropriate in
single-aggravator cases only if the statutory aggravating circumstance
has exceptional weight and there is little or no mitigation in the case.
The legislative history of this amendment should indicate that the
level of "criminal culpability" underlying the new standard embraces
(a) the defendant's "moral blameworthiness," (b) the "degree of victimization," and (c) the "character of the defendant."410
This standard would underscore the Legislature's commitment to
selectivity in death sentencing without limiting the capacity of the
system to deliver justice. The standard would also reduce the amount
of capital litigation by approximately 50%, yielding considerable financial savings. 4 1 1 The proposed limitation may also improve the
strength of the capital cases that are prosecuted, thereby enhancing
the likelihood that the death sentences imposed will be sustained on
appeal.
The proposed limitation would reduce substantially the level of arbitrariness in the system, 4 12 which flows principally from geographic
409. The other two standards in section 29-2522 are (1) "Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify imposition of a sentence of death" and (2)
"Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the
weight given to the aggravating circumstances."
410. State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 808 (N.J. 2002) (propounding death sentence
comparative proportionality decision with the following detail on the three elements of criminal culpability: "Moral blameworthiness - motive, premeditation,
justification or excuse, evidence of mental disease, defect or disturbance, knowledge of victim's helplessness or effect on nondecedent victims, defendant's age
and involvement in planning the murder; Degree of victimization - violence and
brutality of the murder, injury to nondecenent victims; Character of the defendant - prior record, other unrelatied acts of violence, remorse, and capacity for
rehabilitation").
411. 55% (48/88) of the state's penalty-trial cases involved one statutory aggravating
circumstance and a death sentence was imposed in three of them: State v. Hochstein, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001), State v. Andersen, 216 Neb. 521, 344
N.W.2d 473 (1984), and State v. Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978).
412. Important precedent for this proposal is the policy applied by the Florida Supreme Court in its proportionality reviews of death sentences, designed to limit
death sentencing to the most aggravated and least mitigated cases. See supra
note 329. In pursuit of that goal the Florida court applies a presumption that
death sentences will be vacated by the court as disproportionate if they involve "a
single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation." Jones v. State, 705
So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1998). During the 2002 session of the Nebraska Legislature, Senator Kermit A. Brashear, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, introduced
legislation along this line. His proposal goes beyond a presumption and limits
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disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial.413 Our
findings indicate that these effects are heavily concentrated in the single-aggravator cases and, to a lesser extent, in the two-aggravator
cases. Accordingly, the proposed rule would limit geographic disparities in the rates that prosecutors advance cases to penalty trial. Secdeath sentencing to death-eligible cases involving at least two statutory aggravators or the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravator. LB 1281, sec. 4, 97th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2001), availableat LEXIS 2001 Bill Text NE L.B. 1281
(proposing amendments to section 29-2522). See infra note 413 for a description
of the Senator's rationale for this proposal.
413. Concern about the level of adverse disparate impact on minorities is a principal
justification for the proposal of Nebraska Senator Kermit Brashear. As he explains in a statement of intent for his proposal:
[W]ithout dispute, there exists an adverse impact on minority defendants in capital cases.
The source of the adverse impact is state law, which gives prosecutors
broad discretion in prosecution of death-eligible cases, and that racial
minorities principally reside in the major urban counties of Nebraska.
The data from the study clearly indicate that the source of the racial
impact comes from cases in which only one aggravating circumstance is
present.... In order to direct attention to this fact pattern and promote
debate thereon, LB 1281 requires proof of the existence of at least two (2)
aggravating factors in order for a death sentence to be imposed unless
one such proved aggravator is that the murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality."
Introducer's Statement of Intent LB 1281, 97th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., p. 3 (Neb.
2001), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/PDF/StatementOfIntentLB1281.pdf.
Senator Brashear's objective of limiting death sentencing to the most aggravated cases as a means of reducing race effects in the system is consistent with
the recommendation of Justice Stevens in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). In that case the evidence documented significant disparate treatment
based on the race of the victim that was concentrated in the mid-range of cases in
terms of offender culpability. The data also established that there were no significant race effects among the most aggravated cases. Accordingly, Justice Stevens
proposed the following solution: "If Georgia were to narrow the class of deatheligible defendants to those [most aggravated] categories, the danger of arbitrary
and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated." Id. at 366.
Senator Brashear's recommendation is also consistent with a recommendation
of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, appointed by Illinois Governor George Ryan in 2000. A majority of this commission concluded that the
"death penalty has been applied too often in Illinois since it was reestablished in
1977" and recommended that death-eligibility be limited to cases in which the
"defendant has murdered two or more persons, or where the victim was either a
police officer or a firefighter; or an officer or inmate of a correctional institution;
or was murdered to obstruct the justice system; or was tortured in the course of

the murder."

GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS

i, ii (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
commission-report/summary-recommendations.pdf (available in the University
of Nebraska Law College Library).
ONLY
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ond, it would reduce the level of adverse disparate impact against
minority offenders in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial.
Third, the proposed rule would reduce the impact of the socioeconomic
status of victims on charging and sentencing outcomes. Fourth, the
proposal would enhance the consistency and selectivity of the system
and reduce the risk of comparative excessiveness in death-sentencing
outcomes.
7. Legislation (a) to Require the Development of Statewide
Standardsfor the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Capital
Cases, and (b) to Require ProsecutorialConsultation with a
ProsecutorialAdvisory Committee as a Condition for the Court's
Convening of a Penalty Trial
A significant finding of this research is a striking lack of consis4 14
The printency in prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences.
cipal explanation for this inconsistency is a tradition among Nebraska
prosecutors to set and apply their own countywide standards of
deathworthiness without regard to prosecutorial policies and practices
in other parts of the state. The legislation proposed here would result in the establishment of statewide standards for the evaluation
of the deathworthiness of death-eligible defendants beyond those included in existing law.415 These proposals are based on existing
414. Supra section X.
415. The proposal would add the following new paragraph to section 23-1213:
There is hereby created within the Nebraska County Attorney Standards Advisory Council a Death Penalty Advisory Committee (the "committee") consisting of the four county attorney members of the Council.
Within one year of the appointment of this committee, it shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Nebraska County Attorney's Association and the Nebraska Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
promulgate guidelines to guide the exercise of discretion of county attorneys in their determinations of whether to seek a death sentence in
death-eligible cases. The committee will also entertain requests from
county attorneys for confidential advisory opinions on the appropriateness of seeking death sentences in individual cases. In this process of
review, the committee shall also invite from defense counsel a written
submission, and the committee may solicit from the county attorney and
defense counsel any other information it considers relevant. The committee shall render its advisory opinions in writing within three months
of its receipt of submissions from the county attorney and defense counsel. In its deliberations on requested advisory opinions, the committee
shall consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case,
relevant decisions of the United States and Nebraska Supreme Court, its
own prosecutorial guidelines for seeking a death sentence in death-eligible cases, and the pattern of prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing cases in comparable cases since 1973. Under no circumstances will
the committee or the county attorney who requested the opinion disclose
the nature of the opinion to the defendant, the media, or any other
person.
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practices both in the states 4 16 and in the federal death penalty
4 17
system.
This proposal contemplates an expansion of the responsibilities of
the Nebraska County Attorney Standards Advisory Council, a legislatively created body consisting of four county attorneys or deputy
county attorneys (one each from Douglas and Lancaster counties and
two from greater Nebraska), a law professor, and two county commissioners or supervisors. 4 1s The proposal would create a Death
Penalty Advisory Committee (the "committee") within the Advisory
Council, consisting of the four county attorney members of the
9
Council.41
The committee would be charged with the responsibility for
promulgating statewide standards for prosecutors to determine
whether a death penalty in a death-eligible case is appropriate. The
guidelines would be advisory in nature and would create no rights or
duties in the state or capital defendants.
The committee would also review requests of county attorneys for
confidential advisory opinions on the appropriateness of a capital
prosecution in individual death-eligible cases. In its consideration of
requests for such opinions, the committee would consider all evidence
of aggravation and mitigation in the case submitted by the county attorney seeking the advisory opinion and defense counsel, as well as
data on the disposition of Nebraska death-eligible cases since 1973.
The advisory opinion of the committee would be issued in writing
within three months of the final submission concerning the requested
opinion. Under no circumstances would the committee or the county
416. New Jersey charging decisions are governed by the Guidelines for the Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecution, approved by the Attorney General and the County Prosecutors Association. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d
974, 978-79 (N.J. 1992) (discussing the impact of the guidelines). For examples of
state peer review systems, see the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office,
Legal Policies Manual, Chapter III.E. 10, "Appropriateness of Death Penalty in a
Special Circumstances Case." The operation of the procedure is described in Leo
v. SuperiorCourt of Los Angeles County, 1986 Cal. App. 3d 274 (1986). Baltimore
City, Maryland, has a similar review procedure. Lori Montgomery, MD, Questioning Local Extremes on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, May 11, 2002 at C1 ("[A]
team of prosecutors conducts quarterly reviews of every murder case, reviewing
the facts of the crime, the strength of the evidence, the criminal history of the
killer and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Sometimes [Baltimore
City State's Attorney Patricia Coats] Jessamy even invites defense attorneys 'to
sit down with us and help us reach a conclusion."').
417. The operation of the federal system is described in Rory K. Little, The Federal
Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's
Role, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 406-39 (1999).
418. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1213 (2001).
419. If the Legislature believed that a more representative panel of county attorneys
was desirable, the number of county attorneys involved in the advisory committee could be expanded.
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attorney who requested the advisory opinion reveal the nature of the
committee's opinion. The experience of a similar committee in Los Angeles County, California, provides good precedent for the establishment of a Nebraska review committee.420
The proposal would also amend section 23-1218 of the Advisory
Council legislation to charge the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice with the responsibility for providing
the Advisory Committee with up-to-date information on all death-eligible homicides prosecuted in Nebraska since 1973.421
Finally, the proposal would add a requirement to the death penalty
statute that a condition to the trial court's convening a penalty trial in
a death-eligible case would be a certification by the county attorney's
office that it had obtained an advisory opinion from the Death Penalty
Advisory committee.422
8. Legislative Adoption of a "Fairnessin Death Sentencing Act"
This proposal is based, in part on (a) a proposed federal law, (b) a
proposed Florida judicial rule to reduce the risk of unfairness in capital charging, 42 3 and (c) the Kentucky Racial Justice Act 42 4 which may
limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in certain circumstances.
The following is the proposed language:
PROPOSED NEW SECTION - NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523.2 - Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act.
(1) When the state announces its intention to seek a death sentence at the
conclusion of a first-degree murder trial or a court imposes a death sentence,
the defendant may challenge the charging or sentencing decision, as the case
may be, on either of the following grounds:
(a) A penalty trial or death sentence in a case with the defendant's level of
criminal culpability would be geographically excessive and disproportionate
420. See supra note 416.
421. The proposal would add the following new paragraph to section 23-1218, which
defines the support role of the crime commission for the County Attorney Standards Advisory Council:
(10) Create, maintain, and update on a continuing basis for the use of
the Death Penalty Advisory Committee, a machine-readable database
and full narrative summaries of all Nebraska death-eligible cases prosecuted since 1973 and provide the Advisory Committee, as needed, with
any additional information required for its review function.
422. This proposal would add the following sentence to section 29-2520, which provides for the convening of a sentencing hearing in death-eligible cases: "The
court's convening of a sentencing hearing under this section is contingent upon
the prosecution filing with the court a statement that it has received from the
Death Penalty Advisory Committee an advisory opinion on the appropriateness
of seeking a death penalty in the case pursuant to section 23-1213."
423. Inevitability, supra note 16, at 413-16, 420-25 (1994) (considering proposed Florida rule and proposed federal legislation).
424. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) ("Prohibition Against Death
Sentence Being Sought or Given on the Basis of Race: Procedures for Dealing
with Claims").
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given the defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization in
the case, the character of the defendant, and the charging and sentencing
practices of prosecutors and judges throughout the state in comparable cases
since 1973.
(b) The race or socioeconomic status of the defendant or victim, or any
other characteristic of the defendant or victim, which is unrelated to the defendant's criminal culpability, was a factor in the decision to seek or impose a
death sentence in the case, as the case may be.
(2) If a claimant offers statistical evidence to support a claim under this
Act, the validity, reliability, and relevance of such evidence and the inferences
it may support will be assessed by generally accepted standards used to evaluate statistical evidence in employment and housing anti-discrimination litigation under federal law.

9. Legislation to Require the Nebraska Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Commission to Maintain a Databaseof All
Death-Eligible Cases for Use by Courts, the State, Defense
Counsel, and Scholars in the Field
Our findings document the potential of proportionality reviews
conducted by sentencing judges to enhance geographic uniformity in
the imposition of the death penalty. However, the potential of such
reviews in this regard depends on the availability to the court and the
litigants of reliable statewide information on the facts and outcomes of
death-eligible cases that are comparable to the case under review on
whatever dimension the court applies its comparative focus. Such information is not currently available on all death-eligible cases. Specifically, for the death-eligible cases that did not advance to a penalty
trial, very little information is publicly available and, if so, only at the
county level. For the cases that advance to a penalty trial and result
in a death sentence, there are good data available in the opinions of
the Nebraska Supreme Court, which reviews all death-sentenced
cases on appeal. However, for the penalty-trial cases that result in a
life sentence, the trial court orders and opinions are normally quite
thin on the facts of the cases and address the issues from a general
perspective that focuses on the number and types of aggravators and
mitigators in the case, with little reference to the underlying facts that
are needed for a meaningful comparative review of those cases. The
explanation for this situation is that the orders and opinions are addressed to the parties to the case and assume that they are fully aware
of the underlying facts of the case.
For the conduct of meaningful comparative proportionality reviews, detailed information is required on all death-eligible cases. The
availability of such data to scholars would also be in the public interest. To fill this gap, we propose the following amendment to section
81-1425, paragraph (7), that currently requires the Commission on
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (a) to collect "criminal homicide" case data since 1973, which we compiled under contract with the
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commission, 42 5 (b) to update the homicide database annually, and (c)
to transmit the database to the Governor, the Legislature, and the Nebraska Supreme Court:
The homicide database, which the commission will create, maintain, and update on a regular basis under this section, shall include machine-readable
data and full narrative summaries of all Nebraska death-eligible homicides,
with complete factual and procedural detail including for each case that advances to a first-degree murder sentencing hearing, any jury findings of fact
and the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and sentencing order.
In addition to the parties named in this subdivision, all of this information
will be made available on request to trial courts, prosecutors, and defense
counsel in death-eligible cases, as well as to scholars working in this area of
the law. For the purpose of database disclosures made pursuant to this section, the confidentiality requirements of section 29-2261(6) limiting the disclosure of information in pre-sentence investigation reports (PSIs) that may be
included in the criminal homicide database and narrative summaries are
hereby waived, provided, however, that the commission may condition the release of the database and narrative summaries to scholars with the execution
of an agreement that he or she will not, in any publication or otherwise, link
obtained from a PSI that is not
to any individual defendant 4 information
26
clearly in the public domain.
425. Thumbnail sketches of the 185 death-eligible prosecutions between 1973 and
1999 are included in Appendix D of this Article.
426. The Office of the Nebraska Attorney General has ruled that the requirement of
section 29-2261 (6) prohibits the release of any information "found only in the PSI
reports, or which one can ascertain has been derived from the PSI reports." Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 01037 (Nov. 27, 2001) at 6. This opinion also ruled that the prohibition does not apply to information drawn from the PSIs that "may also be found
in other non-confidential sources, such as court orders and appellate opinions."
Id. at 7-8. Because the vast majority of the material in the database and narrative summaries is available in documents that are in the public domain, such as
arrest, charging, guilt- and penalty-trial documents, appellate opinions, and the
media, the prohibitions of section 29-2261 typically have little applicability to the
information in the database and narrative summaries. Their principal application relates to information concerning the defendant's personal history with respect to such matters as sexual orientation, religious preference, education,
occupation, employment history, criminal record, mental health and substance
abuse, and mental illness and mental retardation, when that information has not
been introduced in either the guilt trial or penalty trial, actions that would put
the information in the public domain. Only when this kind of information is not
part of the record of the case does the prohibition on dissemination apply. However, in some cases it is difficult to ascertain whether the information became a
part of the record since the researchers did not have access to all of the papers in
the case. This is where there may be a risk of a violation of the statutory limitation on disclosure. In our judgment, based on our extensive use of these records
for this research project, we believe the amount of protected information in the
database and narrative summaries is quite small but that the task of identifying
what that information is in each case is administratively difficult in the absence
of access to all of the papers in the case, which rarely occurs. Accordingly, we
believe that the interests of the courts and parties in capital cases in having full
information on the facts of the cases that bear on each death-eligible defendant's
criminal culpability clearly outweigh any invasion of offender privacy interests
that might be implicated by disclosure of protected data to the court and parties
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in such cases. Moreover, the amendment would require, as a condition for the
release of the database and narrative summaries to scholars working in this area
of the law, the execution of an agreement that the investigator will refrain from
disclosing any information about individual defendants that is not clearly in the
public domain.
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A

METHODOLOGY

1.

Case Screening Plan and Data Sources

We identified the potential universe of Nebraska criminal homicide
cases from April 20, 1973, to December 31, 1999, with a statewide case
list and other case-identifying techniques. The primary source for
identifying these cases was a list of Nebraska homicide cases generated by the Records Administrator for the Department of Correctional
Services. According to the Department of Correctional Services, this
list contained all criminal homicides for which a defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve any amount of prison time. In addition,
we conducted a comprehensive electronic search of all reported Nebraska cases and reviewed the Criminal Homicide Reports that each
County Attorney is required to file with the State Court Administrator's Office following the prosecution of each homicide. Finally, we requested each County Attorney to review our list of homicides that
were committed during the study period and identify any cases that
were not in our identified universe of cases. With this information, we
developed a screening plan designed to identify (a) all of the homicides
committed in Nebraska during the study period that resulted in a
homicide conviction and (b) which of these cases were death-eligible
under Nebraska law. For each of these cases we coded a 15-page data
collection instrument, known as the Initial Screening Instrument
("ISI"). For each of the cases that we identified as death-eligible, we
completed a detailed data collection instrument ("DCI").
A major challenge in this type of research is obtaining reliable data
on the cases. A defendant's pre-sentence investigation report served
as the first and best source of information regarding a particular defendant, the facts of a particular homicide, and witness information.
A pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI") includes a detailed description of the defendant that is generated by a probation officer following
a criminal conviction. In particular, the PSI will often contain descriptive information regarding the physical, mental, and emotional
health of the defendant. It discusses the defendant's personal family
history, ordinarily contains the defendant's personal criminal history,
and sometimes contains a description of the victim. The PSI also often
contains a description of the crime that is generated from the trial
record, police reports, and interviews with the defendant.
At the outset of the study we attempted to collect a copy of the PSI
and the Department of Correctional Services Classification Study for
each defendant in our universe of potentially death-eligible cases from
the Department of Correctional Services Records. In the cases in
which the Department of Correctional Services did not have a PSI, we
contacted each state probation district and requested a copy of the
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pre-sentence investigation report. The PSIs were often available from
the State Probation Offices; however, as a result of the document retention policies of the State Probation Office, PSIs were sometimes
unavailable. In those cases, we requested the District Court where
the case was originally tried to provide us with the original court record of the case and any bills of exception that were generated in the
case.
We relied on the study files containing the information described
above to screen cases for death eligibility. As each case was reviewed,
law student coders completed the Initial Screening Instrument (ISI).
Once it was determined that a case was death-eligible, we undertook an additional stage of case file information development. For all
penalty-trial cases, including death-sentenced cases, the most important additional data sources were the record of the trial and sentencing, if available, the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court, if the
case was appealed, and the briefs of the State and the defendant.
We obtained information on the racial and social background of the
defendant from the PSI and the Department of Correctional Services
Classification Study. Death certificates provided the primary data
source for information regarding the demographic background of the
victim.
2. Data Coding and Entry
The case files described above provided the basis for the case coding process conducted in Lincoln, Nebraska, during the Summer and
Fall of 2000. The data collection instrument for the non-capital
cases-the ISI-contains 138 entries. In addition, the coders completed thumbnail sketches of each non-capital case. The data collection instrument used to code the capital murder cases-the DCIcontains over 500 entries for each case. Each coder also completed a
detailed narrative summary and a 5- to 10-line "thumbnail sketch" for
each case.
The procedural coding for each statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstance and its strength of evidence measure were individually reviewed and verified. Project staff handled all data entry for the
ISI, DCI, and the narrative summaries. A project staff member not
involved with the data entry visually checked the data entered against
each DCI to flag data entry errors.
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APPENDIX B

SALIENT FACTORS
Measure No. 2
HOMICIDE CASE TYPOLOGY BASED ON STATUTORY AGGRAVATING
AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
VN606

I
Letter
No.
Coder Note: Enter one choice only. Ifmore than one category applies, code the most aggravated category,
with category A being the most aggravated and category J being the least aggravated category.
A low mitigation case refers to one with two or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a)found (or
recognized with respect to the catchall factor) in penalty-trial cases or (b)present innon-penalty trial cases.
However, catchall factors account for only one mitigator regardless of their number. A high mitigation case
refers to one with three or more mitigating circumstances found (or recognized with respect to the catchall
factor inpenalty trials) or present innon-penalty-trial cases (with catchall factors counting as only one mitigator
regardless of their number).
A. PRIOR HOMICIDE - Murder by adefendant with a prior murder or manslaughter conviction - 1(a):
1.Aggravated' Low Mitigation

3.Other Low Mitigation

2. Aggravated' High Mitigation

4. Other High Mitigation

B. POLICE VICTIM- Victim was a law officer killed inthe line of duty and defendant knew or should
reasonably have known that the victim was a law officer - 1(i):
1.Low Mitigation
2. High Mitigation
C. JAILER VICTIM - The victim was a law enforcement officer or public servant having the custody of the
defendant or another - 1(g):
1.Low Mitigation
2. High Mitigation
D. MULTIPLE VICTIMS - Multiple-victim murder - 1(e):
1.Aggravated2 Low Mitigation

3. Other Low Mitigation

2. Aggravated' High Mitigation

4. Other High Mitigation

Aggravated refers to the presence of an additional statutory aggravating circumstance.
2 An

aggravated multiple-victim case involves a contemporaneous felony (e.g., robbery, kidnapping)

other than a drug crime, or an additional statutory aggravating circumstance.
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E. VIOLENT RECORD - Murder by a defendant with asubstantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing
criminal activity or with a prior conviction of acrime involving the use of a threat of
violence to the person - 1(a):
1.Aggravated' Low Mitigation

3.Other Low Mitigation

2. Aggravated' High Mitigation

4.Other High Mitigation

F. CONTRACT KILLING -Murder for (a) hire by a principal or agent (shooter) or (b) for pecuniary
gain-1(c):
1.Aggravated' Low Mitigation

3. Other Low Mitigation

2.Aggravated High Mitigation

4. Other High Mitigation

G. ESCAPE DETECTION - A murder committed inwhich the defendant's motive was an apparent effort
to conceal either the commission of acrime or the identity of the perpetrator
of acrime - 1(b):
1.Aggravated' Low Mitigation
1

2. Aggravated High Mitigation

3.Other Low Mitigation
4.Other High Mitigation

H. HAC OR DEPRAVITY - Murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC) or defendant
manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and

intelligence - 1(d):
1.Low Mitigation
2. High Mitigation
I. GRAVE RISK - A murder inwhich the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to at least two
or more persons.- 1(f):
1. Low Mitigation
2. High Mitigation
J. HINDER GOVERNMENT FUNCTION -The defendant committed the crime to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of the laws - 1 (h):
1.Low Mitigation
2.High Mitigation
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APPENDIX D
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES CLASSIFIED BY A SALIENT FACTORS MEASURE
OF OFFENDER CULPABILITY

Table of Contents

Page

Part I. A Guide to Appendix D Abbreviations .................

697

Part II. Death-Eligible Cases Classified by the Salient Factors
Described in Appendix B .....................................

698

A. Prior Homicide - Murder by a Defendant with a prior murder
or manslaughter conviction - 1(a): ...........................
698
A. 1 A. 3 -

Aggravated' With Low Mitigation2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...

D. Multiple Victims D.
D.
D.
D.

1
2
3
4

-

Multiple-victim murder -

1(e): .......

3

698
698
700

Aggravated With Low Mitigation .................
Aggravated With High Mitigation2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...
One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation ..

700
704
705
706

E. Violent Record (other than a prior murder or manslaughter
conviction) 4 - Murder by a defendant with a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity or
with a prior conviction of a crime involving the use of a threat
of violence to the person - 1(a): ..............................

708

E. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation ..................
E. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation .................
E. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...
E. 4 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation...
F. Contract Killing - Murder (a) for hire by a principal or
agent (shooter) or (b) for pecuniary gain - 1(c): ...............

708
714
715
719

F. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation ..................
F. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation .................
F. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...

720
721
721

G. Escape Detection - A murder committed in which the defendant's motive was an apparent effort to conceal either the
commission of a crime or the identity of the perpetrator of a
crim e - 1(b): ................................................

723

G.
G.
G.
G.

1
2
3
4

- Aggravated With Low Mitigation ..................
- Aggravated With High Mitigation .................
- One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...
- One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation ..

720

723
730
731
738

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

H. HAC or Depravity - Murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC) or defendant manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence 1(d ): .........................................................
H. 1 H. 2 -

740

One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ...
One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation ..

740
745

I. Grave Risk - A murder in which the defendant knowingly
created a grave risk of death to at least two or more persons 1(f): ..........................................................

74 9

I. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation ..................
I. 2 - One Statutory Mitigator With High Mitigation .....

749
750

J. Hinder Government Function - The defendant committed
the crime to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws - 1(h): ....

751

J. 1 J. 2 -

One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation ....
One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation ...

751
752

'Aggravated refers to the presence of an additional statutory aggravating circumstance.
2 See infra Part I, Item 10, pp. 697-98 for a description of "low" and "high" mitigation.
An aggravated multiple-victim case involves either a contemporaneous felony (e.g.,
robbery, kidnapping) other than a drug crime, or an additional statutory aggravating
circumstance.
' Defendants with a prior murder or manslaughter conviction are classified under salient factor category A.
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Part I. A Guide to Appendix D Abbreviations
1 . Defendant. "D" stands for defendant. Unless otherwise indicated
all defendants and victims are male. If a death-sentenced offender's
sentence was vacated on appeal, the subsequent proceeding is designated with a suffix after his name, e.g., Drinkwalter (A) (first) and
Drinkwalter (B) (second). If the offender committed two death-eligible
offenses on different occasions, the different offenses are designated
with a I or II suffix, e.g., Simpson (I) and Simpson (II).
2. Co-Perpetrators."Co-P, Co-P2, Co-P3, etc." stand for the defendant's co-perpetrators.
3. Victim(s). "V, V1, V2, etc." stand for the victim and any additional
victims; "NDV" refers to victims who were injured but not killed.
4. Homicide Grade. "M1, M2, or MS." stand respectively for murder
1, murder 2, or manslaughter.
5. Charge and Conviction. In an M1 prosecution, "Charge: M" indicates that M1 was the original charge, while "Jury: M1," "Bench:
Ml,"or "Plea: M1" indicates the basis of an M1 conviction. The same
nomenclature is used for M2 and MS charges and convictions.
6. M1 Sentencing Hearings. "P. Trial/D.P. Sought" indicates that a
penalty trial was held in which the state presented evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances. "P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented"
means that a M1 sentencing hearing was held but the state presented
no evidence of statutory aggravation.
7. Statutory Aggravation and Mitigation. "Agg. Cir." and "Mit. Cir."
stand for the statutory aggravating and statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found in a penalty trial, unless "presented/not found" is
indicated or (b) present in a non-penalty trial case. "Agg. Cir.: None"
means no aggravation was found to be present by the sentencing
court. The applicable statutory aggravators and mitigators are also
described and identified by section numbers. See Table 1 for a complete list of the statutory aggravators and mitigators which underlie
the salient factors classification system.
8. Non-Statutory Mitigation. "Non-Stat. Mit.: Present" indicates that
non-statutory mitigation was presented and considered by the court in
a M1 sentencing hearing or was present in a non-penalty trial case.
9. Sentence Imposed. "Life" and "Death" indicate that a life or death
sentence was imposed for the homicide, while a term of years imposed
for a homicide less than M1 is indicated by the length of the sentence
imposed, e.g., 20-30 years, or merely "Term of Years."
10. Mitigation in the Case. A "low mitigation" case refers to one with
two or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found (or recognized with respect to the catchall factor) in penalty-trial cases or (b)
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present in non-penalty-trial cases. However, catchall factors account
for only one mitigator regardless of their number. A "high mitigation"
case refers to one with three or more mitigating circumstances found
(or recognized with respect to the catchall factor in penalty trials) or
present in non-penalty-trial cases (with catchall factors counting as
only one mitigator regardless of their number).
Part II. Death Eligible Cases Classified by the Salient Factors
Described in Appendix B.
A. Prior Homicide - Murder by Defendant with a prior murder or
manslaughterconviction 1(a):
A. 1 - Aggravated4 2 7 With Low Mitigation
1. Victor, Clarence - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
12/26/87. D, 55 years old, had done yard work for V, an 82-year-old
woman. On the afternoon in question, D showed up at V's home, carrying a metal pipe. V let D in and a struggle ensued. D beat V with
his fists, and then with the pipe, resulting in 14 broken ribs and brain
hemorrhaging. D lacerated V's throat with a knife 5 times and she
subsequently died from blood loss. Throughout the assault, V was
alive and screaming. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not
found); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
A. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation
1. Simpson, Jerry (II) - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death
10/13/97. D, a 38-year-old, and V, a 27-year-old male, were inmates and D had threatened V over some stamps that V owed to him.
The next day, D and Co-P, his cell mate, removed knives they had
hidden in the light fixture of their cell, put on coats and gloves, and
went to V's cell. V was then stabbed to death while he lay on his bed.
D was previously convicted of M1. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressures/influences-presented/not found);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presentednot found); (2)(f)(victim
participation/consent-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impairedpresented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
2. Bazer, Christopher - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
02/18/88. D and Co-P1 planned to rob or burglarize V's candy shop.
D, age 19, and 2 Co-P's drove to the shop when they were intoxicated.
Armed with a .22 caliber pistol D and Co-P1 entered the shop demand427. Aggravated refers to the presence of an additional statutory aggravating
circumstance.
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ing cash from 78-year-old V, a female. V insisted she had no cash; and
during a skirmish, D grabbed V by the hair and shot her in the back of
the head. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(convictions and substantial history-both presented/both not
found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Williams, Jimmie L. - Hamilton County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/22/89. D, 48 years old, and V, a 41-year-old male, were truck
drivers who got into an argument over their CB radios. They both
pulled their trucks over to the side of the road and got out. D had a
rifle and shot V once, in the chest, killing him. D and his wife, the CoP, then drove away. Several witnesses identified D as the killer of V.
In 1972, D was charged and convicted in Texas of murder with malice.
Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
4. Cyrus, Andrew - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 10 years
06/12/76. V, a 35-year-old, was at a bar and decided to go outside
and fight another patron. As the two were fighting, D, a 54-year-old
male, walked by and became embroiled in the fight. V beat D and left
him lying on the ground while V went back into the bar. D retrieved a
handgun and then went into the bar where he shot V once in the
chest. D had a prior conviction for manslaughter. Charge: M1. Plea:
Mit. Cir.:
M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions).
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10
years.
5. Fletcher, Stacey L. (II) - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial 25-35 years
10/13/97. Co-P and V, a 27-year-old male, were inmates and Co-P
had threatened V over some stamps that V owed to him. The next
day, Co-P and D, his 23-year-old cell mate, removed knives they had
hidden in the light fixture of their cell, put on coats and gloves, and
went to V's cell. V was then stabbed to death while he lay on his bed.
D was previously convicted of M1. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. 25-35 years.
6. Sheppard, Eugene Jr. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 3-9
years
04/27/75. D, a 50-year-old, and V, an adult male, got into an argument at a friend's house over a craps game. D shot at V twice while
they were in the house, and when V ran outside, D followed, firing
three more shots. D went back inside to reload his pistol, and V collapsed on the front lawn from his injuries and subsequently died. D
had a prior conviction for M2. Charge: MS. Plea: MS. No P. Trial.
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Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. 3-9 years.
D. Multiple Victims - Multiple-victim murder
1-(e):
D. 1 - Aggravated428 With Low Mitigation
1. Harper, Steven Ray - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
09/10/78. D, a 25-year-old, had difficulty in dealing emotionally
with the breakup of his relationship with his ex-girlfriend, especially
after she married V1. On one occasion D went so far as to shoot at and
injure members of his ex-girlfriend's family. After his release from
jail, D plotted to poison his ex-girlfriend and her family. D experimented by poisoning animals and told friends of his plans. D broke
into his ex-girlfriend's house and poisoned the milk and lemonade in
the refrigerator. During the next day V1 (a 24-year-old male), V2 (an
11-month-old boy), NDV1, NDV2 and NDV3 all drank either lemonade or milk and became gravely ill. V2 died two days later and V1
died eight days later. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions); (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not
found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death
risk to several). Mit Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history-presented/not
found); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination-presented/not
found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found);
(2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
2. Jones, Isaiah (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
12/07/79. The 36-year-old D murdered 12-year-old VI and her
mother, 44-year-old V2. The cause of Vi's death was attributed to asphyxiation and the cause of V2's death was determined to be multiple
wounds to the head with a blunt instrument. Their partially clothed
bodies were found buried in shallow graves. V2's body was found dismembered, V2's head and limbs had been sawed off. Evidence suggested that the murders may have been motived by a debt that V2
owed D. D was previously convicted of mutilating a dead body and
theft. He also was granted immunity for a murder he assisted in
Iowa. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not
found); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent Proceeding at D.3 (#1).
3. Lotter, John L. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial - Death
12/31/93. D, a 22-year-old , and Co-P, a 22-year-old, sexually assaulted V1, a 21-year-old female, and in order to silence Vi's testi428. An aggravated multiple-victim case involves either a contemporaneous felony
(e.g., robbery, kidnapping) other than a drug crime, or an additional statutory
aggravating circumstance.
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mony to the crime, D and Co-P planned to murder V1 by cutting her
head and hands off. D and Co-P set out to murder Vlon separate occasions, but they failed to locate her in their attempts. Finally, several
days later, they found out that Vlwas staying at V3's residence. On
their way to the murder scene, D and Co-P agreed that they would kill
anyone else who was with V1. They found V1 hiding under a blanket
in V3's bedroom. D shot V1 in the chin and then Co-P stabbed V1 to
assure her death. Next, Co-P handed V3's baby to her, and then D
shot V3, a 24-year-old female, in the abdomen before Co-P took her
child back out of her arms. D then located V2, a 22-year-old male, and
before shooting V2 in the head and chest, D shot V3 one more time in
the eye. D then went around and shot 2 or 3 more times at the V's to
assure of their death. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't
function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or
domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
4. Reeves, Randolph - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death
03/29/80. D, a 24-year-old, climbed through the window of V1 during the early morning hours. D sexually assaulted V1 and stabbed her
7 times in the chest. V2 walked in on the sexual assault of V1, and D
fatally wounded V2 by stabbing her twice. V1 died hours later after
being taken to the hospital. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
5. Simants, Erwin C.- Lincoln County - Penalty Trial - Death
10/18/75. After drinking at a bar, D, age 29, returned home and
loaded a .22 caliber rifle. D went to a neighbor's house where he sexually assaulted V1, a 10-year-old female, shot her once in the head, and
continued to sexually assault her. Five of Vi's relatives, V2, V3, V4,
V5, and V6, came home one by one. D shot them all and molested the
two females, a 57-year-old, and a 7-year-old. D returned home, unloaded the rifle, and confessed to his parents. Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(d)
(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Death.
6. Williams, Robert - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death
08/10/77. D, a 41-year-old, entered the home of his 25-year-old, female friend, V2, with a revolver, intoxicated and contemplating suicide. V1, a 25-year-old female neighbor of V2's, arrived at V2's home.
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In an attempt to calm D, the revolver exchanged hands between the
V's and D. D then fatally shot V2 once in the head and twice in the
neck. D ordered V1 to undress. He then sexually assaulted V1 before
shooting her twice behind her left ear and once in the back. D had
prior convictions of third degree robbery and assault with a deadly
weapon. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)
(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)
(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
7. Boppre, Jeff - Scotts Bluff County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/19/88 D and Co-P habitually bought cocaine and marijuana
from V1. D suggested robbing and killing V1 to get drugs and money.
Co-P agreed to ride along, but he refused to kill. D bought cocaine
from V1; and D and Co-P used the cocaine, then went to D's house to
get his .32 semiautomatic pistol. D and Co-P returned to Vi's house,
and D entered and shot V1 3 times in the trunk and once in the arm.
D exited the house to reload and Co-P heard him mumble "eliminate
witnesses." D re-entered the house and shot V2 3 times in the head
and 4 times in the torso and arms. D took cocaine and cash and several other items. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal
crime and perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not
found);
(1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
8. Hankins, Patrick H. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/04/87. 22-year-old D and 3 V's were sleeping at V2's apartment.
The previous day D and V1 got into a minor dispute over a small
amount of money. D awoke at about 6:30 a.m. and beat V1 over the
head several times with a metal bar while V was asleep. D then went
into the living room and beat V2 in the head with the bar while she
was asleep on the couch. D then proceeded to beat V3 in a similar
fashion as he slept on the floor in the living room. D then wiped the
blood off the bar, covered the Vs' faces with pillows, dressed, packed,
stole money from V1 and V2 and then left in Vi's car. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or
perp-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life.
9. Kirksey, Eric T. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
01/01/94. D, a 21-year-old, shot V1, a 19-year-old female, twice in
the head with two separate guns; one of the two shots only hit her ear,
and the other was fatal. D shot 22-year-old V2 several times, resulting in his death. There was evidence showing that the murders were
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committed during a robbery and that D did not expect V1 to be there.
Both V's were shot from behind while they were sitting in the front
seat of V2's car. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no
sig. criminal history-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
10. Nissen, Thomas M. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/31/93. D, a 22-year-old and Co-P, a 22-year-old sexually assaulted V1, and in order to silence Vi's testimony to the crime, D and
Co-P planned to murder V1 by cutting her head and hands off. D and
Co-P set out to murder V1 on separate occasions, but they failed to
locate her in their attempts. Finally, several days later, they found
out that V1 was staying at V3's residence. On their way, D and Co-P
agreed that they would kill anyone else who was with V1. After
breaking down the front door, they found V1 hiding under a blanket in
V3's bedroom. Co-P shot V1 in the chin, and then D stabbed V1 to
assure her death. Next, D handed V3's baby to her, and then Co-P
shot V3 in the abdomen before D took the child back out of her arms.
Co-P then located V2, and before shooting V2 in the head and chest,
Co-P shot V3 one more time in the eye. Co-P then went around and
shot 2 or 3 more times at the V's. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No
Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't
function/law enforcement). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
11. Belmarez, Dustin L. - Red Willow County - No Penalty Trial Life
05/18/90. D, a 19-year-old male, and Co-P were camping in a park,
as were the two V's, 59-year-old twin brothers. The four became acquainted and began to drink together. V2 went to bed and the remaining three continued to drink. D claimed that Co-P became angry over
something V1 said and began to hit him with a sign post. D hit V1
with the sign post 4 or 5 times as well. D and Co-P woke V2 and
began to beat him with their fists and empty liquor bottles. D then
began to hit V2 with a pickaxe blade. They hid his body in the bushes,
leaving the pickaxe imbedded in his head, and took the Vs' truck and
other belongings. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
12. Schommer, Richard P. - Fillmore County - No Penalty Trial 20 years
09/23/80. After a quarrel with family members, D, age 42, poured
gas throughout his own home. The gas was ignited by an unknown
cause, and two relatives, a 15-year-old female and a 39-year-old male,
died in the resulting fire. In addition to the two V's, two NDV's were
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injured. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(e)(multiple
victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 20 years.
13. Wagner, Clyde W. - Red Willow County - No Penalty Trial Life
5/18/90. D, a 32-year-old male, and Co-P were camping in a park
when they met V1 and V2, who were 59-year-old twin brothers. The
four began drinking together and eventually V2 went to bed. Both D
and Co-P claimed that the other began to argue with V1 and then beat
him with a signpost. Both D and Co-P then hid the body. They then
woke V2 and hit him with a large liquor bottle, their fists and a pickaxe without the handle. They hid the body under some leaves, leaving
the pickaxe still imbedded in V2's head. D and Co-P then stole V1 and
V2's truck and belongings. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
D. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation
1. Curtright, James D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/23/85. D, a 20-year-old, was angry with the lifestyle that V1,
D's 22-year-old sister, and V2, D's 42-year-old mother, led. D claimed
that God told him to kill V1 and V2. D set his alarm so that he could
awake early and kill them. D, who lived with V1, went into her bedroom after his alarm went off and stabbed her repeatedly. D then
drove to V2's house. After she let him in, he approached her from behind and stabbed her repeatedly until she fell to the ground. D then
took Vi's child, who had been staying with V2, and went to the police
station where he confessed. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Nokes, Harold - Red Willow County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/23/73. 44-year-old D, Co-P, V1 and V2 were in the basement of
D and Co-P, D's wife. D and V2 got into an argument where V2 drew
his fist back and came towards D. D pulled out a gun and fatally shot
him. Screaming, V1 started up the stairs, and D fatally shot her in
the back. D stated that he couldn't let her get away. D and his wife,
Co-P, cut up the bodies and disposed of them in a lake. Charge: M1.
Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or
perp); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
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3. Jacob, David H. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - Life
01/19/86. After drinking at a bar, D, a 25-year-old male, Co-P and
a friend went to a party at the home of V1, an 18-year-old female, and
V3, a 22-year-old male, even though they were not invited. After approximately 30 minutes, they were asked to leave. An altercation
broke out and V2, a 21-year-old male, struck D once in the face. D and
Co-P made comments about "getting even" and then left the party.
While leaving in their car, they tried but failed to run over a party
goer. D and Co-P then dropped their friend off and drove approximately 45 miles to D's house where they obtained shotguns. D and
Co-P then returned to the scene of the party. D first shot and killed
V2 and then D and Co-P went into the bedroom where V1 and V3 were
sleeping and shot and killed them. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P.
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
D. 3 -

One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation
1. Jones, Isaiah (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/07/79. 36-year-old D murdered a 12-year-old, V1, and her 44year-old mother, V2. The cause of Vi's death was attributed to asphyxiation and the cause of V2's death was determined to be multiple
wounds to the head with a blunt instrument. Their partially clothed
bodies were found buried in shallow graves. V2's body was found dismembered, with her head and limbs sawed off. Evidence suggested
that the murders may have been motivated by a debt that V2 owed D.
Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding at D.1 (#2).
2. Nielsen, Wilfred W. - Washington County - Penalty Trial - Life
11/19/77. After drinking most of the day, D went home and became involved in an argument with his wife. D stormed out and returned later to find that his wife and child were gone. The two V's
were the parents of D's wife. D went to the Vs' farm looking for his
wife and while arguing with V1, asked him to step outside. V's son,
who was hiding upstairs, heard a shot and then a second shot and
found the two V's dead on the front sidewalk. Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
3. Jacob, Steven M. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/02/89. D, a 33-year-old, broke into the home of V1, D's ex-girlfriend, and V2, her 54-year-old new lover, during the early morning.
D shot V2 3 or 4 times, killing V2. D then shot V1 in the side and
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head. Before dying in the hospital several days later, V1 identified D
as the killer. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
4. Rodriguez, Joseph D. - Hall County - No Penalty Trial - Life
01/10/88. D and his family were threatened at a bar by two V's. D
stated that he had once testified against one of the V's, which resulted
in the V's being incarcerated. D went home and got a gun saying: "It's
me or them." D returned to the bar with his two sons who stayed in
the back of the bar. D walked up to where the two V's sat and shot
them both twice. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
D. 4 -

One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation

1. Arnold, Lamont E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/24/95. D, a 22-year-old male, was involved in a fight with V1, a
34-year-old male, and V2, a 37-year-old male, and as a result D sustained a minor cut to his face. Later that day, D went to a party at CoP1's home where he complained about the earlier fight. D and another
then left the party to search for V1 and V2. After finding V1, D threw
a brick into his head causing serious, perhaps even fatal, injuries. After they returned to the party, Co-P1 suggested they "go finish [V1]
off." D, Co-Pi, and Co-P2 returned to where VI was lying on the
ground. V1 tried to talk but Co-P2 kicked him and then Co-P1 took
out a knife and stabbed VI multiple times. D and his Co-P's hid when
a car drove by, but afterwards returned to V1 and Co-P1 continued
stabbing him while D rummaged through Vi's pockets. V1 suffered 20
stab wounds. D and Co-P's returned to the party and decided to kill
V2 because, they believed, he would be able to identify them as Vi's
killers. They proceeded to V2's apartment where, just before entering,
D and Co-P1 decided D would kill V2. They then broke into the apartment. D first sprayed mace at V2 and then stabbed him 17 times. CoP2 and Co-P3 beat NDV, a friend staying with V2. They then left the
apartment, but Co-P1 returned and struck someone, though it is unclear who, in the head with a 2" x 4" board. The next day, D, laughing
and giggling, related to two other Co-P's (later charged with accessory
after the fact) how he and the others had handled the situation.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal
perp-presented/not found); (1)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and
participation-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
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2. Smith, Scott L. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Life
11/10/90. D, 19 years old, had been thinking about murdering his
family for about a week. When he got into an argument with V1, his
14-year-old sister, over a newspaper, D got his father's gun and emptied it into V1. When V2, D's 42-year-old mother, came home, D emptied the gun into her as well. D then reloaded and waited for his
father to come home, but his father managed to escape. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or
perp-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not
found); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/
influences and/or domination); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance);
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. West, Ben - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
11/26/84. D had suspicions that V1, his live-in girlfriend, was having an affair with V2. D returned home to find Vi's and V2's cars
parked side-by-side outside the apartment he shared with V1. D left
to purchase hollow-point bullets for his gun. D returned to the apartment but parked at a distance. D entered the apartment with the gun
loaded and concealed and walked in on V1 and V2 having sexual intercourse. V2 requested more time with V1. D shot V2 twice and V1 four
times. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
4. Waldner, Donald A. - Colfax County - Penalty Trial - Life
11/13/89. V1, a 25-year-old female, had served divorce papers on
25-year-old D two days before the incident. V1 and V2 were romantically involved and worked together at a factory from which D had recently been fired. D hid outside of the factory and surprised the 2 V's
as they were about to enter. He shot both V's twice, killing them both.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
5. Baker, John - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 40-80 years
07/17/81. D, a 21-year-old, entered his parents' bedroom and fatally wounded them both with a rifle. D first shot V1, his father, in
the left eye. D then shot V2, his mother, once in the shoulder and once
in the head. D then went down the hallway where he encountered his
brother. D's brother wrestled D down, and then D left with his
brother's car. D's record consisted of traffic violations. Charge: M1.
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. 40-80 years.
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E. Violent Record (other than a prior murder or manslaughter
conviction) 42 9 - Murder by a defendant with a substantial history
of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity or with a prior
conviction of a crime involving the use of a threat of violence to the
person - 1(a):
E. 1 - Aggravated1 With Low Mitigation
1. Bird Head, Hudson (A) - Sheridan County - Penalty Trial Death
03/02/85. D, 46 years old, was pulled over by a police officer for
driving V's car in an intoxicated manner. D had worked for V, an 85year-old female, in the past doing odd jobs for her. In addition to the
car, D was found with other belongings of V. Forensic evidence indicated that D came into V's home, knocked her down and tied her
hands behind her back. D then raped, beat and strangled V, crushing
her larynx. V eventually asphyxiated on her own blood. Charge: MI.
Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir: (1)(a)(convictions);
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Death. Subsequent Proceeding at G.1 (#8).
2. Bjorklund, Roger D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death
09/23/92. 30-year-old D and 24-year-old Co-P drove around looking
for a woman to rape. After a few hours of looking, they spotted V, an
18-year-old female, and they followed her car. D abducted V in her car
at her parents' residence and drove her to another location. After
abandoning V's car at a separate location, D and Co-P took turns sexually assaulting V. V's hands were bound and her eyes were partially
covered with duct tape. D and Co-P then decided to kill V because she
would otherwise be able to identify them. D walked her out into a
field in a choke hold and fell on top of her. Co-P then shot V twice in
the head. D later fired 5 rounds at V after realizing that she was still
gasping for air. D and Co-P returned to the scene 2 days later and
buried V's body. When her body was found, there was evidence of sexual torture. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or
domination-presented/not found); (2(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Death.
3. Holtan, Richard D. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial Death
11/01/74. D, a 39-year-old male, robbed at gunpoint a bar at which
V, the 34-year-old male bartender, NDV1, V's girlfriend, and NDV2, a
429. Defendants with a prior murder or manslaughter conviction are classified under
salient factor category A.
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bar patron, were present. After emptying the cash register and taking
the bar pistol, D herded his captives into the restroom where he forced
V to tie up NDV1 and NDV2. D then fired 4 shots. Two bullets struck
and killed V, a third struck and wounded NDV1 and the fourth missed
everyone. D fled to Hawaii where he later surrendered himself to police. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)
(convictions and substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent Proceeding at E.1 (#9).
4. Moore, Carey D. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. On the night prior to the first murder, D, a
22-year-old male, called several taxi companies from a phone booth
and asked that they send a cab. When the cab arrived, he hid in the
vicinity and tried to determine if the driver would make a suitable
victim for the robbery/murder he was planning. D believed it would be
easier for him to shoot an older man. On the night of the first killing,
D called the taxi company for which V1, a 47-year-old-male worked.
When V1 arrived, D determined V1 was a suitably-aged victim, and,
along with Co-P, D got into the cab. D directed V1 to drive them to a
certain rural location. When they arrived, D and Co-P robbed V1, and
D then shot him 3 times. Four days later, D saw a lone cab with an
older driver. D got into the cab and directed the driver, V2, a 47-yearold-male, on where to take D. Shortly thereafter, D shot V2 4 times
and attempted to rob the cab, but found no money. Charge: M1.
Bench: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)
(pressures/influence and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)
(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(agepresented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#5).
5. Moore, Carey D. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. On the night prior to the first murder, D, a
22-year-old male, called several taxi companies from a phone booth
and asked that they send a cab. When the cab arrived, he hid in the
vicinity and tried to determine if the driver would make a suitable
victim for the robbery/murder he was planning. D believed it would be
easier for him to shoot an older man. On the night of the first killing,
D called the taxi company for which V1, a 47-year-old-male worked.
When V1 arrived, D determined V1 was a suitably-aged victim, and,
along with Co-P, D got into the cab. D directed V1 to drive them to a
certain rural location. When they arrived, D and Co-P robbed V1, and
D then shot him 3 times. Four days later, D saw a lone cab with an
older driver. D got into the cab and directed the driver, V2, a 47-yearold-male, on where to take D. Shortly thereafter, D shot V2 4 times
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and attempted to rob the cab, but found no money. Charge: M1.
Bench: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial hisMit. Cir.:
tory); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity).
(2)(b)(pressures/influence and/or domination-presented/not found);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found);
(2)(d)(age-presentednot found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Death. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#4).
6. Peery, Wesley H. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death
06/06/75. While robbing Vs coin shop, 51-year-old D bound V's
wrists and ankles and shot her 3 times. He shot her once between the
eyes, once in the temple, and once through the roof of her mouth. V
was helpless and posed no threat to D. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(c)(pecuniary gain); (1)(d)
(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
7. Rust, John E. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
02/21/75. D, 23-year-old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 exchanged
gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated residential area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between houses
and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing on foot.
They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were bystanders
present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male, was a
resident of the area who came out to assist the police in apprehending
D and Co-P1. He ordered D to stop, and when D did not, he fired at D.
D fired back, hitting V, and when V fell, D shot him 2 more times,
killing him. D had a prior conviction for assault with intent to inflict
great bodily injury. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presentednot found); (1)(f)(death risk to several); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(c)(mentallemotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
Subsequent Proceeding at E.1 (#10).
8. Ryan, Michael W. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial - Death
04/29/85. D, a 36-year-old male, was the leader of a religious cult
and V, an adult male, was a member of the cult who had fallen into
disfavor with D. As punishment, D forced V to perform homosexual
acts with another member of the group. Later, D and 4 Co-P's, who
were also cult members, secured V to a crate and sodomized V repeatedly with a greased shovel handle, causing internal injuries. When V
screamed because of this abuse, D kicked him in the head and put
tape over his mouth. D and Co-P's then whipped V repeatedly over
the course of 2 days. Afterwards, D and Co-P's shot off V's fingertips
and D kicked and broke his arm. D then used a pair of pliers to pull
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strips of skin off of V's leg and had 2 Co-P's break both of his legs.
Finally, D stomped on V's chest, crushing it and causing his death. V
was castrated either before or after his death. D had tortured V, NDV,
and NDV's son prior to this homicide. NDV was a cult member and for
a period of time the owner of the farm where the cult resided who also
fell into disfavor with D. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not
found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Death.
9. Holtan, Richard D. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
11/01/74. D, a 39-year-old male, robbed at gunpoint a bar at which
V, the 34-year-old male bartender, NDV1, V's girlfriend, and NDV2, a
bar patron, were present. After emptying the cash register and taking the bar pistol, D herded his captives into the restroom where he
forced V to tie up NDV1 and NDV2. D then fired 4 shots. Two bullets
struck and killed V, a third struck and wounded NDV1 and the fourth
missed everyone. D fled to Hawaii where he later surrendered himself
to police. D had an extensive criminal history. Charge: M1. Plea: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions); (1)(a)(substantial
history-presented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp-both
presented/both not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presentedlnot
found); (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional
disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impairedpresented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding
at E.1 (#3).
10. Rust, John E. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
02/21/75. D, 23-year-old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 exchanged
gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated residential area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between houses
and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing on foot.
They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were bystanders
present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male, was a
resident of the area who came out to assist the police in apprehending
D and Co-Pi. He ordered D to stop, and when D did not, he fired at D.
D fired back, hitting V, and when V fell, D shot him 2 more times,
killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(convictions); (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found);
(1)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found); (1)(f)(death risk to severalpresented/not found); (1)(g)(officer/public servant victim during custody-presented/not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or dominationpresented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(d)(age-
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presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#7).
11. Bradford, Walter L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/02/82. D, a 25-year-old, and Co-P attempted to rob V, a 48-yearold male, who was Co-P's landlord. V struggled with D and Co-P, and
was stabbed once and drug into his auto while still alive. D and Co-P
drove V into the country, drug him into a ditch, and stabbed him multiple times. D had previous convictions for robbery and attempted
sexual assault. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir.
Presented. Agg Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or
prep). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)
(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)
(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
12. Barney, Scott A. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - Life
09/23/92. 24-year-old D and 30-year-old Co-P drove around looking
for a woman to rape. After a few hours of looking, they spotted V, an
18-year-old female, and they followed her car. Co-P abducted V in her
car at her parents' residence and drove her to another location. After
abandoning V's car at a separate location, D and Co-P took turns sexually assaulting V. V's hands were bound and her eyes were partially
covered with duct tape. D and Co-P then decided to kill V because she
would otherwise be able to identify them. Co-P walked her out into a
field in a choke hold and fell on top of her. D then shot V twice in the
head. Co-P later fired 5 rounds at V after realizing that she was still
gasping for air. D and Co-P returned to the scene 2 days later and
buried V's body. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
13. Denman, David W. - Keith County - No Penalty Trial - 25
years
01/29/77. D, a 17-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's had been "working"
their way across the country by robbing businesses and individuals.
While at a highway rest stop, they sneaked up on V who was sitting in
the cab if his truck, possibly asleep. When Co-P1 shot V through the
truck's windshield, D pointed his gun and also fired at V. Co-P2
waited in the car and did not take an active part in the crime. Then
Co-P1 and D robbed V of his wallet and CB. Charge: M1. Plea: M2.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25 years.
14. Herren, John - Scotts Bluff County - No Penalty Trial - 35
years
05/26/80. V, a 55-year-old male, was D's boss, and had made homosexual advances toward D. V had fired D the day before the offense
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for drinking on the job. On the day of the offense, D went to the apartment of NDV, an acquaintance, twice and made advances toward her.
NDV rejected D both times, and he got angry and left. D returned a
third time; and during a discussion about his being fired, D remarked,
"There's going to be one bloody killing." D then stabbed NDV in the
chest, probed the wound with his fingers, kissed her, and left. D went
to V's apartment and stabbed V in the neck, chest, shoulder, back, and
hand-a total of 18 times, then slit V's throat. Police apprehended D in
the parking lot. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Circ.:
(1)(a)(convictions); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 35 years.
15. Honeycutt, Nicodemus - Otoe County - No Penalty Trial - Life
09/10/83. V, and D became acquainted while they were staying in
the same boarding house. D hit V, a 63-year-old man, in the head
with a brick causing multiple skull fractures, and then robbed him
and stole his car. D, a 40-year-old man, later told a friend that he hit
an old man with a brick because he needed money. D had been convicted previously of aggravated robbery. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions); (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
16. Warford, Sherman - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 6-12
years
04/13/80. 38-year-old D abducted V from her workplace during the
early morning hours. D was seen driving off in his car with a passenger flailing arms and a commotion going on inside the car. V's body
was found later in a field. Her hands and feet were tied behind her
back with cloth and bailing wire, and she had been stabbed several
times with a sharp instrument. She bled to death. D had previously
been convicted of armed robbery. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). 6-12 years.
17. Womack, Arvie W. - Keith County - No Penalty Trial - Life
01/29/77. D, a 23-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's had been "working"
their way across the country by robbing businesses and individuals.
While at a highway rest area, they sneaked up on V, who was sitting
in the cab of his truck, possibly asleep. D fired a shotgun at V through
the truck's windshield, and Co-P1 fired his handgun at V. Co-P2
waited in the car and did not take an active part in the crime. After
shooting V, D and Co-P1 robbed him of his money and CB radio.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
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E. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation
1. Joubert, John J. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Death
09/18/83. V1, a 13-yr-old boy, was kidnapped by D, a 20-year-old
male, as V1 was delivering newspapers. D bound Vl's hands and feet,
put V1 in the trunk of D's car and drove to a remote area. D untied V1
long enough for him to undress down to his underwear and tied V1 up
again. V1 began to beg for his life and struggle so D stabbed him, and
eventually stabbed him a total of 11 times, 9 of which were inflicted
before death. V1 died as a result of blood loss. About 3 months later,
D kidnapped V2, a 12-year-old boy, as he was walking to school, and
repeated the same basic scenario, stabbing V2 a total of 7 times and
allowing him to die from loss of blood. Charge: M1 (2 cts.). Plea: M1
(2 cts.). P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Note: the plea was in exchange for dropping the other non-Mi counts and the prosecutors not arguing in favor
of a death penalty but nonetheless presenting aggravation. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity);
(1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no
sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance);
(2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/
not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
2. Sell, Dennis L. (I) - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial - Life
02/07/77. D, a 32-year-old male, developed urges to hurt and kill
women when he felt he was under stress. On the day of the incident,
he admitted that pressures were bothering him. He went to the home
of the V, an adult female, whom he knew from a home decorating
party she had given at the D's home. When she opened the door, the D
grabbed her and beat her. He then took her into the country and shot
her with a shotgun. The D had prior convictions for robbery and
assault with intent to rape, both of which stemmed from the same incident. Charge: M2. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional
disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Sell, Dennis L. (II) - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial - Life
09/23/77. D, a 32-year-old male, developed urges to hurt and kill
women when he felt he was under stress. On the day of the incident,
he admitted that pressures were bothering him. He went to the home
of V, an adult female and when she came to the door he beat her. He
then took her into the country. He then stabbed her twice with a pair
of pliers. At some point, he also raped V. D had convictions for robbery and assault with intent to rape, both of which stemmed from the
same incident. D also later plead guilty to a murder that he had committed six months prior to the killing of V. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(d)
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(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)
(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation
1. Benzel, Jeffrey - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/12/83. D, his girlfriend and another friend went to V's house to
buy drugs. D's girlfriend had told D, untruthfully, that she had already paid for drugs. At V's house, D and his girlfriend began to argue
and V told them to leave. D grabbed V's girlfriend and held a gun to
her head. V, a 28-year-old male, then ran to a bedroom where he kept
a shotgun, and D stated that he was going to kill V if V did what D
thought he was going to do. V came out of the bedroom with a shotgun
and D shot him in the mouth, killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination-presentednot found). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
2. Carter, George - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/09/85. D, a 28-year-old and Co-P, a 27-year-old, stopped in front
of the residence of a neighborhood rival. V and his companion were in
the yard of the residence, and the companion threw a baseball bat at D
and Co-P's car. D and Co-P got out of their car and started shooting at
V and V's companion. V was fatally wounded by a bullet that entered
his chest. There was some indication that the shooting was related to
the rival being in D and Co-P's neighborhood and with their friends.
D was previously convicted of the crime of robbery. Charge: M1. Jury:
M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
E. 3 -

3. Carter, Victor - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/09/85. D, a 27-year-old, and Co-P, a 28-year-old, stopped in
front of the residence of a neighborhood rival. V, and 18-year-old
male, and his companion were in the yard of the residence, and the
companion threw a baseball bat at D and Co-P's car. D and Co-P got
out of their car and started shooting at V and V's companion. V was
fatally wounded by a bullet that entered his chest. There was some
indication that the shooting was related to the rival being in D and CoP's neighborhood and interfering with their friends. D was previously
convicted of the crime of robbery. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
4. Clausen, Timothy L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/10/92. D met V and another outside a bar. D had been drinking. D, V, and the other went to the other's house. D believed V to be
of the opposite sex of that which V really was. D and V engaged in
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anal intercourse. Then, D realized V's true sex. D claimed V then
wanted to engage in intercourse again. D refused. A struggle ensued.
D was cut by V. D shot V twice killing V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction-presented/not found).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
5. Jones, Elijah -

Douglas County - Penalty Trial -

Life

11/19/92. Several days after V fired shots into D's apartment, narrowly missing occupants, D went looking for V. D checked at a card
club twice. The second time V was there. D shot V several times in
the chest and neck and several more times in the back as V crawled
around on the floor. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/
both not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Life.
6. Lopez, James -

Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

03/18/83. D killed V during the perpetration of a robbery by hitting
V with a stick. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
7. Massey, Wesley L. - Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

05/23/77 45-year-old D and Co-P lured V into a hotel room to rob
him. As Co-P walked into the room with V, D, who was lying in wait,
hit V over the head with a glass bottle. After V denied having more
than $5 on him, D started beating V with a gun. V escaped down the
hallway into the elevator, as D chased him. A scuffle continued between D and V until the elevator stopped in the hotel lobby. V cried
out to his friend for help, but D's gun scared the friend away. D then
fatally shot V in the chest. D testified that he shot his weapon because he feared that he was going to get caught for robbery. Charge:
M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and
substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp-presented/not
found); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not found). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
8. McLemore, Michael E. - Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

09/02/97 D, age 40, and V, age 39, had been boyfriend and girlfriend for about a month. D had become increasingly obsessive about
the relationship and got angry when V stood him up on the night of
the offense. D went to V's house and slashed her furniture with a
knife. Neighbors observed D assaulting V outside her home then driving away with V in her car. D later stabbed and cut V a total of 54 to
56 times in the face, neck, chest, abdomen and arms, then abandoned
her car with her body in the trunk. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction). Life.
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9. Sims, Ernest J. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/15/75. D and V were driving separate vehicles on the same
street. D, age 27, passed V on the right and stopped abruptly in front
of him. D exited his vehicle and accused V of nearly causing an accident. V pointed a revolver at D, and D left the area. D then returned
with a sawed-off shotgun and confronted V, whose weapon was in his
waistband. D shot V once in the abdomen while standing about 10
feet away from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history). Mit. Cir.: (2)(f)(victim participation/
consent). Life.
10. Domingus, Alex P. - Lincoln County - Penalty Trial- Life
05/02/86. 32-year-old D bludgeoned V, a 25-year-old female, to
death with a l"x4" piece of wood. Evidence revealed defense wounds
on V. D dragged V for a short distance after she had been beaten. D
was previously convicted of first degree sexual assault and robbery.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
11. Lee, Edward E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/07/82. D was a passenger in a car. V was in another car. V was
"flirting" with the driver of the car D was in. D got out of the car and
shot V once. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented.
Agg. Cir.: None. Life.
12. Barfield, Terry A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 10
years
02/08/93. The exact relationship between D, a 26-year-old, and CoP and V, a 24-year-old male, is unclear. On the night in question, D
and Co-P broke into the apartment at which V was staying, sought V
out, and shot him several times. They then fled the apartment. D had
a prior conviction for attempted robbery with a weapon. Charge: M1.
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years.
13. Beagle, George - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 10 years
07/07/75. D, 40-year-old, got into an argument while in a cafe. He
was intoxicated at the time. D left the cafe and returned five minutes
later with a sawed-off shotgun. Another argument started and D shot
V, an adult male. Charge: M2. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Mit Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years.
14. Brown, James A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
12/05/73. D, a 27-year-old, gave a ride to V, an 83-year-old female.
D drove the car to a lake, and they both got out. D started discussing
his financial problems, and V touched his elbow. D suddenly became
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violent and struck V on the side of the head. She fell to the ground
and started having convulsions. He shoved her into the lake water
and took money from her purse. V had massive contusions to the neck
and five cracked ribs. Her death was caused by shock from the injuries and asphyxia due to swelling of her larynx and immersion in
water. Charge: M1. Plea: MI. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction). Life.
15. Buckman, Herman D.- Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial Life
02/19/88. V, 25 years old, was shot twice in head at close range
while in her vehicle. V was a drug dealer and was going to meet with
D, 35 years old, and Co-P. D had a gun that night and Co-P was seen
in the area were V was killed. D and Co-P were arrested later that
day and had or had spent an amount of money comparable to what V
had been carrying before her murder. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. No P.
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
16. Escamilla, Mario - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - Life
07/03/86. D, a 20-year-old man, was walking down the street when
V, a 71-year-old man, spoke to him. D asked if he could use V's phone.
While doing so, D claimed V made sexual advances towards him. D
grabbed a knife and stabbed V 12 times. D admitted that he then took
money out of V's wallet. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
17. Holloway, Keith D. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 6-10
years
10/02/85. 23-year-old D aggressively approached V, a 27-year-old
male, and shot him once in the chest with a .22 caliber pistol. Witnesses said D threatened V as he approached and shot him with no
apparent provocation. D claimed that V "tried to cut him," but evidence showed V was unarmed. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6-10 years.
18. McClellen, William J. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial 6 2/3-20 years
10/28/83 D, age 51, had been frequenting a rest stop daily during
the two months prior to the offense. V, a 22-year-old male, was found
at the rest stop, shot to death in his car. V was reportedly sleeping at
the time of the shooting. A rifle cartridge found on the scene came
from D's rifle. D had 2 prior convictions for robbery and 2 for escape.
Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and
substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20 years.
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One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation
1. Bussard, Jerry R. - Red Willow County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/27/79. D, a 24-year-old, shot V, a 22-year-old male, 10 times in
the head, face and neck. There was evidence that indicated this shooting was committed in a robbery attempt. D had 3 prior convictions for
misdemeanor assault, one of which was 'aggravated,' and one conviction for child abuse. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/
influences and/or domination); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation); (2)(f)(victim participation/consent); (2)(g)(capacity
impaired-presented/not found). Life.
2. Ditter, David D. - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Life
01/23/79. D broke into residence of V, D's estranged spouse. D ordered friend of V to remove D and V's children form residence. D
stripped V of her clothing. Police arrived and were threatened by D
with a pistol. Police exited residence and D shot V 4 times in the
chest. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(b)(pressures/influences); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance);
(2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Booth, Stephan M. - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial - 6 1/220 years
10/13/88. D, 35 years old, and V, a 40-year-old female, were in an
abusive relationship and D had told a mutual friend that he would
someday kill V. On the night in question, D and V were traveling by
car and drinking. They got into an argument and V pulled the car
over and got out. D drove off and shortly thereafter turned the car
around and drove back. D saw V on the side of road, sped the car up
and drove towards V. When V fled into a ditch, D drove the car into
the ditch and struck V, killing her. There is evidence that as V's body
lay on the road, it was hit by other vehicles. Charge: M2. Plea: MS.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 1/2-20 years.
4. Rodriguez, Rafael - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - 40
years
05/12/98. D, a 36-year-old male, was the boyfriend of NDV. On the
night in question, they went to the hotel room of the V, a 55-year-old
male, and drank with him. At some point, D wanted to leave, but
NDV wanted to stay and D became argumentative. D left for a time
E. 4 -
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and returned with a knife. He stabbed V once and NDV twice. Either
before or after the stabbings, the phone lines to V's room had been cut
with a knife. V died from his stab wound. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 40 years.
F. Contract Killing - Murder (a) for hire by a principal or agent
(shooter) or (b) for pecuniary gain - 1(c):
F. 1 -Aggravated'

Low Mitigation

1. Anderson, C. Michael (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial Death
10/29/75. 23-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, D's
employer, for one week. D disliked V and his unfair business dealings,
and D wanted him dead. D agreed to pay Co-P1 $1500 to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, Co-P1 set up an appointment with V to
look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of killing V.
The plan was frustrated when two others came along with V. Co-P1
set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, but
this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. Co-P1 then
called Co-P2 to pick him up. D then cashed a forged check he had
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime-presented/not found); (1)(c)(D hired another); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent proceeding at F.3
(#1).
2. Hochstein, Peter (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
10/29/75. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, CoPl's employer, for one week. Co-P1 disliked V and his unfair business
dealings, and Co-P1 wanted him dead. Co-P1 agreed to pay D $1500
to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, D set up an appointment
with V to look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of
killing V. The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V.
D set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate,
but this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. D then
called Co-P2 to pick him up. Co-P1 then cashed a forged check he had
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime-presented/not found); (1)(c)(D was hired);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent proceeding at F.3 (#2).
3. Pope, Gary W. - Saunders County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/12/79. D, 32-year-old, and V, a 46-year-old male, were friends
who had known each other for 3 years. On the day in question, D and
V met in the country, possibly because V wanted to hire D to kill his

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

721

spouse. D shot V once in the head and took his money. D then dragged V's body up next to a barbed wire fence and covered it with weeds
and brush. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(c)(pecuniary gain); (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation-presented/not found). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
F. 2 - Aggravated1 With High Mitigation
1. Wredt, Jerry - Otoe County - No Penalty Trial - Life
40-year-old V, D's father, had been threatening and
12/04/79
abusing D's stepmother, Co-P. 16-year-old D was afraid of his father,
not only because of possible harm to himself but because he was particularly worried about possible injury to Co-P. D and Co-P discussed
how they should kill V on the day before the murder. The discussions
about the murder revolved around the potential that D would inherit
V's truck along with insurance money. D test-fired his gun to make
sure it worked properly, and when V got home and was walking towards the house, D stepped out from the corner of the house, aimed,
cocked, and fired on fatal shot into V's chest. Charge: M1. Plea: M2.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(pecuniary gain); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
F. 3 -

One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation

1. Anderson, C. Michael (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial Death
10/29/75. 23-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, D's
employer, for one week. D disliked V and his unfair business dealings,
and D wanted him dead. D agreed to pay Co-P1 $1500 to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, Co-P1 set up an appointment with V to
look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of killing V.
The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V. Co-P1 set
up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, but
this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. Co-P1 then
called Co-P2 to pick him up. D then cashed a forged check he had
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(c)(D hired another). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Prior proceeding at F.1 (#1).
2. Hochstein, Peter (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
10/29/75. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, CoPl's employer, for one week. Co-P1 disliked V and his unfair business
dealings, and Co-P1 wanted him dead. Co-P1 agreed to pay D $1500
to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, D set up an appointment
with V to look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of
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killing V. The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V.
D set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate,
but this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. D then
called Co-P2 to pick him up. Co-P1 then cashed a forged check he had
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(c)(D was hired). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Prior proceeding at F.1 (#2).
3. Burchett, Robin - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband,
Co-P1. On several occasions, Co-P1 asked D if he would dispose of a
body for $5,000. D claimed not to take this offer seriously, though he
was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else. A few
days before the offense, Co-P1 invited D to meet him at a truck stop
because he had some "farm work" for D to do. D asked Co-P2 to accompany him to the truck stop and offered him $200 without telling
Co-P2 what he had to do to earn the money. The night before the
offense, D drank heavily and used drugs. At the appointed time, D
and Co-P2 met Co-P1 and V. They entered Co-P's vehicle, and Co-P2
sat behind V. While Co-P1 drove on a country road, Co-P2 strangled
V. Co-P2 testified that D instructed him to use D's belt, to sit behind
V in the car, and to strangle her. D and Co-P2 disposed of the body in
a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(D was hired). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
4. Record, Robert - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/12/75. D, a 19-year-old, and Co-P were driving around town and
decided to shoot and rob someone. They picked up a friend and told
her of their intentions. She asked to be dropped off and they complied.
They then drove to a location on the edge of Omaha and waited for
someone to drive by so they could shoot and rob him. V, an adult
male, drove by and D and Co-P pursued him. D, the passenger hung
out the window and fired a single shot into V's car. The shot struck V
in the head, killing him instantaneously. D and Co-P returned to rob
V but were frightened off by oncoming traffic. Later D and Co-P
boasted about the killing to at least 5 people. Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(pecuniary gain). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
5. Haselhuhn, Wayne - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial Life
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband,
Co-P1. On several occasions, Co-P1 asked Co-P2 if he would dispose of
a body for $5,000. Co-P2 claimed not to take this offer seriously,
though he was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else.
A few days before the offense, Co-P1 invited Co-P2 to meet him at a
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truck stop because he had some "farm work" for Co-P2 to do. Co-P2
asked D to accompany him to the truck stop and offered him $200
without telling D what he had to do to earn the money. The night
before the offense, D drank heavily and did drugs. At the appointed
time, Co-P2 and D met Co-P1 and V. They entered Co-Pl's vehicle,
and D sat behind V. While Co-P1 drove on a country road, D strangled
V. D testified that Co-P2 instructed him to use Co-P2's belt, to sit
behind V in the car, and to strangle her. D and Co-P2 disposed of the
body in a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(D was hired).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life.
6. Rolenc, Clement - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - Life
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband,
D. On several occasions, D asked Co-P1 if he would dispose of a body
for $5,000. Co-P1 claimed not to take this offer seriously, though he
was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else. A few
days before the offense, D invited Co-P2 to meet him at a truck stop
because he had some "farm work" for Co-P2 to do. Co-P2 asked Co-P1
to accompany him to the truck stop and offered him $200 without telling Co-P1 what he had to do to earn the money. The night before the
offense, Co-P1 drank heavily and did drugs. At the appointed time,
Co-P2 and Co-P1 met D and V. They entered Co-Pl's vehicle, and CoP2 sat behind V. While D drove on a country road, Co-P2 strangled V.
Co-P2 testified that Co-P1 instructed him to use Co-Pl's belt, to sit
behind V in the car, and to strangle her. Co-P1 and Co-P2 disposed of
the body in a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Circ.: (1)(c)(D hired another). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Life.
G. Escape Detection - A murder committed in which the defendant's motive was an apparent effort to conceal either the commission
of a crime or the identity of the perpetratorof a crime - 1(b):
G. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation
1. Drinkwalter, Randy W. (A) - Cherry County - Penalty Trial Death
11/01/89. D, a 27-year-old male, went to the home of V, his 87year-old grandmother. The two had a brief conversation. D, who
weighed 450 pounds, then cut the telephone wires, ripped off V's
clothes, and raped her. He then went to the kitchen and retrieved a
ball preen hammer. He returned to V, sat on her chest (his weight
fractured several of her ribs) and struck her in the head and face with
the hammer 10-20 times. D then jammed an ordinary table knife into
V's face just below the eye, though by this time she was probably dead.
D then took a different hammer and shattered several family pictures
causing glass to fall on to V. D then left the scene. Charge: M1. Jury:
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M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/
influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Death. Subsequent Proceeding at H.1
(#11).
2. Hunt, Robert E. - Madison County - Penalty Trial - Death
05/12/84. D had fantasized about having sex with a dead woman
for many years and picked V as a likely subject. D watched V's trailer
home and made other plans for carrying out the crime. D forced his
way into V's home, tied her up and strangled her with nylon stockings.
D than masturbated onto V and, though she was probably already
dead, put her face down in a bathtub full of water. Charge: M1. Jury:
M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Death.
3. Otey, Harold L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
06/11/77. D, 25-year-old, broke into V's home and stole her stereo.
D re-entered the house and V, the female occupant of the home, woke
up. D told V that he would rob and rape her. When V resisted, D cut
her across her forehead with a knife. D then vaginally and anally
raped V, and afterwards took her upstairs to get her money. D then
stabbed V multiple times, struck her on the head multiple times with
a hammer, and finally strangled her. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no
sig. criminal history-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impairedpresented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death.
4. Palmer, Charles J. (A) - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Death
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating
strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homicide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had
stolen. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Death. Subsequent Proceedings at G.1 (#5 & #6).
5. Palmer, Charles J. (B) - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Death
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating,
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strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homicide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had
stolen. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Death. Prior Proceeding at G.1 (#4). Subsequent Proceeding at G.1 (#6).
6. Palmer, Charles J. (C) - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Death
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating
strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homicide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had
stolen. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Death. Prior Proceedings at G.1 (#4 & #5).
7. Stewart, Rodney L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
01/25/75. V, an 18-year-old male, and NDV had given drugs to D, a
16-year-old. D then sold the drugs and gave part of the money from
the sales to V and NDV. D had also stolen drugs from V and NDV,
and prior to the killing, V and NDV confronted D about his stealing. D
formed a plan to steal more drugs from V and NDV. As part of the
plan, D called V and NDV with information about a fictional buyer. D
had gotten a gun and a can of gasoline in preparation for the theft. V
and NDV picked D up in their van and drove with D to meet the
buyer. Upon arrival at the meeting sight, D shot V once in the back of
the head, killing him. D then shot NDV, who was seriously wounded,
and spread gasoline in the van and lit it on fire. NDV escaped from
the van and later identified D to the police. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and/or substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(c)(pecuniary gain);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presented/
not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Death.
8. Bird Head, Hudson (B) - Sheridan County - Penalty Trial - Life
03/02/85. D, a 46-year-old male, was pulled over by a police officer
for driving V's car in an intoxicated manner. D had worked for V, an
85-year-old female, in the past doing odd jobs for her. In addition to
the car, D was found with other belongings of V. Forensic evidence
indicated that D came into V's home, knocked her down and tied her
hands behind her back. D then raped, beat and strangled V, crushing
her larynx. V eventually asphyxiated on her own blood. Charge: M1.
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Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir: (1)(b)(conceal perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#1).
9. Brewer, Wayne K. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
03/21/90. Co-P talked 18-year-old D into robbing a house with CoP. Upon entering the house, Co-P went upstairs and raped V, Co-P's
17-year-old ex-girlfriend. Then D raped V who was bound and gagged.
While D was in another room, Co-P began to stab V with a butcher
knife until she eventually died. D and Co-P then left with stolen items
from the house and a stolen car. V had been babysitting, and the child
she was watching was left unharmed. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or domination- presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age-presented/not
found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
10. Joy, Carolyn A. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/11/83. D, a 29-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car drinking brandy. Earlier that day, D had used heroine and Valium. D and
Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing by and decided to rob
her. D and Co-P's invited V into the car and then forced her to disrobe. D and Co-P's searched V's clothing and found $25.00. They also
took V's necklace. D gave a straight edged razor to one of the Co-P's
who cut the V's hair. Another Co-P gave V a minor cut with the razor
and forced her to perform oral sex on D. A Co-P then "popped" the V
with the razor. At a wooded park D and Co-P got V out of the car and
beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball bat. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:(1)(b)(conceal perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life.
11. McDonald, Joseph - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
07/04/74. D, a 16-year-old, and Co-P spent the evening drinking
beer with their friends. After returning home to their trailer park, D
and Co-P approached the 38-year-old V, who was drunk and sitting in
his car. D and Co-P attempted to get money from V on the pretext
that V had backed into D's brother's car. After their unsuccessful attempts at getting money from V, D and Co-P retrieved a shotgun barrel from Co-P's trailer and walked over to V, who was leaning over his
trunk. There was conflicting testimony as to whether D or Co-P then
hit V over the head with the gun barrel. The two stuffed V into the
trunk of his car and shut the lid. Then either D or Co-P lit the car on
fire after one of them had stolen V's wallet. V was still alive when the
fire was lit, and he died of asphyxiation. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life.
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12. Privat, Clifford A. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/04/93. D, a 19-year-old male, and Co-P needed money, so they
decided to commit a robbery. D and Co-P had a history of "rolling
gays" believing them to be "easy" targets. They went to a bar that
catered to homosexuals and there they met V a 51-year-old male.
Feigning friendship, they invited him back to their motel room. Upon
arriving at the motel, they went to D's and Co-P's room and drank
alcohol. After about 20 minutes, D noticed V had left so D and Co-P
went to look for him. When they found V, they offered to give him a
ride to his car. V accepted and got into D's and Co-P's car. Instead of
taking V to his car, D and Co-P drove V to a secluded area. D took off
his belt and gave it to Co-P who put it around V's neck. The two demanded V's wallet, but he refused. D then began beating V. He then
dragged V from the car and kicked him and stomped on his throat.
Co-P asked D what they were going to do and D replied that they were
going to kill V. D then took out a pocket knife and cut V's throat. D
handed the knife to Co-P who stabbed V in the stomach. V died from
the stab wounds and injuries sustained during the beating. D and CoP hid the body in nearby woods. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life.
13. Silvers, Thomas J. - Buffalo County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/03/86. V was D's 16-year-old stepdaughter, living in the same
house as D, age 30. D thought V was somewhat rebellious, and there
was tension between them. On the evening of the offense, D drank 6
beers and found the bathroom door locked. D became very angry and
confronted V. He then beat her with a bar. D thought he had killed V;
so he poured gas on V and set her on fire to "cover things up." V suffered second and third degree burns to 90% of her body, as well as
severe blows and lacerations to the head and liver. V died of the burns
several days later. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(f)
(death risk to several). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
14. Williams, Jo Helen - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/11/1983. D, a 24-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car
drinking brandy. D and Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing
by and decided to rob her. A Co-P invited V into the car and then D
forced her to disrobe. A Co-P took V's necklace, searched V's clothing
and found $25.00. D got a straight edged razor from a Co-P and used
it to cut V's hair. Another Co-P gave V a minor cut with the razor. D
and Co-P's drove to a park and D forced V to perform oral sex on a CoP. D then "popped" V in the mouth with the razor. D and Co-P got V
out of the car and beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball
bat. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)
(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life.
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15. Brunzo, Gary L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/06/93. D, 21-year-old, and Co-P1 went looking for a vehicle to
steal to use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van
that V, a 20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van
behind his home when 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van
between the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. These
Co-P's then drove the van to pick up 3 other Co-P's. They all started
taunting and hitting V, and either D shot V once in the back of the
head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then thrown out of the
van. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
16. Eona, Daniel - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/06/93. D, 21-year-old, and Co-P1 went looking for a vehicle to
steal to use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van
that V, a 20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van
behind his home when 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van
between the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. These
Co-P's then drove the van to pick up 3 other Co-P's. They all started
taunting and hitting V, and either Co-P1 shot V once in the back of the
head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then thrown out of the
van. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
17. Bishop, Allan L. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial 6 2/3-20 years
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, and Co-P1 had been dating but
V planned on breaking off the relationship when they next met. V and
Co-P1 met at a restaurant and were joined by Co-P2 and later D.
They all went to D's house and when V rejected their sexual advances,
the 3 men beat her into submission with their hands, feet, a large
wooden dowel, and possibly another blunt instrument. V was anally
and vaginally raped and then beaten some more. D then called Co-P3,
his wife, who borrowed a pickup for transporting V. V was put in a
sleeping bag, placed in the back of the truck, taken out to the country
and dumped by the side of the road. Charge: MI. Plea: MS. No P.
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20
years.
18. Carrera, Juan - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 20-30
years
12/06/93. Co-P1 and Co-P2 went looking for a vehicle to steal to
use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van that V, a
20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van behind his

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

729

home when the 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van between
the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. The Co-P's then
drove the van to pick up D, a 21-year-old male, and 2 other Co-P's.
They all started taunting and hitting V, and either Co-P2 shot V once
in the back of the head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then
thrown out of the van. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 20-30 years.
19. Ellen, Richard E. - Madison County - No Penalty Trial - Life
07/19/89. D, 37 years old, Co-P, and V, an adult male, worked for
the same carnival, and on the night in question, all 3 became intoxicated in a bar. D and V had a confrontation in the bar, and after returning to the carnival, D hit V repeatedly with a mallet handle,
breaking his arm. When V complained to others in the carnival about
this, D and Co-P placed him in D's truck on the pretense of taking him
to the hospital. However, they drove V to a nearby area and pulled
him out of the truck. V could not stand on his own. D and Co-P dragged him down a hill and beat him with a metal bar, penetrating his
brain and killing him. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg Cir:
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
20. Garhart, Terry D. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - 120 years
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, had been romantically involved
with Co-P1 but wanted to end the relationship. Co-P1 was aware of
her plans. V met with Co-P1 and Co-P2 at a restaurant. At some
point they were joined by D, and they all went to Co-P2's residence.
When V refused their sexual advances, the 2 Co-P's and D beat V unconscious with a large wooden dowel and then took turns raping her
both anally and vaginally, then beat her some more. There is some
evidence that V may have still been alive when she was placed in a
sleeping bag. Co-P3 was called and told to come with a pickup. They
put V in the back of the truck, drove out into the country and dumped
V off on the side of the road. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 1-20 years.
21. Harlan, Lance J. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 12
years
07/12/86. Co-P's stole $11 from V, an adult male, along with his
house keys. Later, D, 19 years old, and Co-P's went back to V's home
and let themselves in with the keys. V woke up and, at first, attacked
D. V was hit with a baseball bat, however, and ran upstairs. He was
followed upstairs, beaten again with the bat, and chased downstairs.
V was then beaten to death and a can of black paint was poured on
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him. V's televison was stolen. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 12 years.
22. Lanzendorf, George - Hall County - No Penalty Trial - 25
years
05/18/77. D, a 16-year-old, and Co-P, decided to rob a hardware
store. They parked behind the back of the store and waited until the
employees left. When V, a 28-year-old male who was a manager of the
store, came out with a money bag, Co-P hit him on the head, attempting to knock him out. V did not fall, however, and D and Co-P got V
into their car instead. Co-P then drove them to a sandpit. When they
arrived, D handed a gun to Co-P and Co-P fired all of the bullets in the
clip into V. Co-P then went to the car, got another clip, and emptied
that clip into V as well. V was shot 17 times. Charge: M1. Plea: M2.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25 years.
23. LeGer, Eldon T. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - 40
years
08/04/93. D, a 19-year-old and Co-P needed money and decided to
commit a robbery. D and Co-P had a history of "rolling gays" believing
them to be "easy" targets. They went to a bar that catered to homosexuals and there they met V, a 51-year-old male. Feigning friendship,
they invited him back to their motel room. Upon arriving at the
motel, they went to D's and Co-P's room and drank alcohol. After
about 20 minutes, D noticed V had left so D and Co-P went to look for
him. When they found V, they offered to give him a ride to his car. V
accepted and got into D's and Co-P's car. Instead of taking V to his
car, D and Co-P drove V to a secluded area. Co-P took off his belt and
gave it to D who put it around V's neck. The two demanded V's wallet,
but he refused. Co-P then began beating V. Co-P then dragged V
from the car and kicked him and stomped on his throat. D asked Co-P
what they were going to do and Co-P replied that they were going to
kill V. Co-P then took out a pocket knife and cut V's throat. Co-P
handed the knife to D who stabbed V in the stomach. V died from the
stab wounds and injuries sustained during the beating. D and Co-P
hid the body in nearby woods. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found);
(1)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10-40 years.
G. 2 - Aggravated1 With High Mitigation
1. Sheets, Jeremy C. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death
09/24/92. D, age 18, and Co-P planned to rape a woman. Earlier
that day they had also discussed their mutual hatred for a certain
race. D and Co-P abducted V, a 17-year-old female of the race they
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hated, from a parking lot. They took V to a park where D raped and
beat her while uttering racial slurs. After V lost consciousness, D
deeply cut her throat. D and Co-P threw the knife into a river and
moved V's body to a remote wooded area. D and Co-P removed blood
from D's car and disposed of his bloody clothing. Charge: M1. Jury:
M1. P. TrialID.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Death. Released after appeal. See supra note
264.
2. Roewert, Ricky E. - Platte County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/29/77. D and Co-P's were drinking at a bar when the V, who
was very intoxicated, entered. D and one of the Co-P's noted that V
had a large amount of money, and they decided to rob and kill him.
They discussed the robbery with the other Co-P and 2 others. The CoP agreed but the others wanted no part in it. As a ruse, D and Co-P's
asked the V if he wanted to go to a party to which he agreed. After
stopping on the way to get 2 knives, D and the Co-P's drove V to the
city dump. The V "passed-out" and D and a Co-P pulled V out of the
car and D slashed V's throat. D then cut off V's head and made multiple cuts in the back and front of V's body. They then hid the body.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Moore, Donald F. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. Co-P suggested to D, a 15-year-old, that
they rob a cab driver and D agreed. D was aware that Co-P had a gun
and that there was a possibility that they might shoot the V. The two
went to a restaurant and Co-P called the taxi company for which V, a
47-year-old, worked. They planned to rob a tax driver who was older.
When V arrived, D told Co-P that V was the cab driver they would rob.
They got into the cab and directed V to drive them to a certain rural
location. When they arrived there D and Co-P robbed V and Co-P then
shot him 3 times. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influence and/or domination);
(2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
G. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation
1. Kennedy, Paul L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
07/03/73. D, a 23-year-old, was experiencing financial difficulties
and had recently written some insufficient funds checks on a friend's
account. D decided to burglarize a home to get money. He went to a
house with the intent of burglarizing it, but was scared away by dogs.
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D then went to a lake where he planned to rob a fisherman. D decided
that since many of the people who regularly fished at the lake knew
him, he would have to kill whomever he robbed. After contemplating
robbing some fishermen in one location along the lake, D decided
there were too many people present and went to a different location
where he found V, a 67-year-old male, fishing alone. D shot V 4 times
and took V's money. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Myers, James E. -

Douglas County - Penalty Trial -

Life

09/18/95. V was an ex-girlfriend of 22-year-old D's who had witnessed a friend/crime associate of D's commit a prior murder. A witness testified that he and D pulled up in front of V's apartment, D got
out of the van and witness heard a gun being cocked. When D returned he gave the gun to witness, telling him to get rid of it. V had
been shot twice in the head at close range while she slept. Charge:
M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and
substantial history-both presented/both not found); (1)(b)(conceal
perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't
function/law enforcement-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no
sig. criminal history-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
3. Schaeffer, Bernard -

Hall County - Penalty Trial -

Life

05/22/77. D, who was 16 at the time, and Co-P planned to rob a
hardware store by hiding in the back lot and waiting for V, the manager, to come out with the money bag. The plan was to knock V out,
but when D hit him, V did not fall down, so D forced V into D's car at
gunpoint. D and Co-P drove V to a sandpit where D emptied the gun
into him, went back to the car for another clip and emptied that into V
as well. D shot V 17 times. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravitypresented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(d)(age). Life.
4. Simpson, Jerry (I) -

Kimball County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

11/12/76. D and Co-P, D's sister, were hitchhiking when they were
picked up by V. D and Co-P planned to rob V, but when Co-P pulled a
gun, V tried to grab it and Co-P shot him. V turned back towards the
front of the car and Co-P shot V again. D and Co-P decided they had
better finish the job because V could identify them, so D, as V pleaded
for his life, aimed at V's head and fired twice. Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Circ.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.

2002]

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

733

5. Smith, Loray S. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/11/83. D, a 25-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car drinking brandy. D and Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing by
and decided to rob her. D invited V into the car and then forced her to
disrobe. D and Co-P's searched V's clothing and found $25.00. They
also took V's necklace. With a straight edged razor, one Co-P cut V's
hair. Another Co-P gave V a minor cut with the razor. One Co-P
forced V to perform oral sex on another Co-P. A Co-P then "popped" V
in the mouth with the razor. At a wooded area, two Co-P's removed V
from the car and beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball
bat. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found); l(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
6. Ware, David E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/20/83. D, an 18-year-old male, shot and killed V in V's store and
then took V's wallet, keys and automobile. D later admitted that he
shot V because he was going to call the police and would be able to
identify D. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
Life.
7. Perkins, Brian K. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/02/82. D, a 21-year-old male, and Co-P attempted to rob V, a 48year-old male, who was D's landlord. V struggled with D and Co-P,
and was stabbed once and drug into his auto while still alive. D and
Co-P drove V into the country, drug him into a ditch, and stabbed him
multiple times. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir.
Presented. Agg Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
8. Price, James E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
07/23/95. V, a 19-year-old male, was thought by D, a 20-year-old
male, and 7 Co-P's to have stolen speakers belonging to one of the CoP's. D and Co-P's pulled up in front of a house where V was visiting,
blocking in V's car. They forced V into the van at gunpoint, took him
to a remote area and robbed him. V agreed to take D and Co-P's to
where the speakers could be reclaimed. V was forced into the trunk of
a car stolen by a Co-P at the same time as V's kidnapping. D shot into
the trunk of the car with an assault rifle, killing V. D then took the
car, with V still in the trunk, to another location and set it on fire.
Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp and/or crime). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
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9. Armour, Kenneth - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 4-7
years
10/01/80. D, 27 years old, and 2 Co-P's were driving and saw V, an
adult male, at a gas station and he appeared to be intoxicated. Co-P1
jumped out of their vehicle and into V's truck and drove it to a secluded place with D and Co-P2 following. Once there, Co-P1 stopped
the truck and beat and kicked V to death. D stole gas from V's truck
and set it on fire to destroy any fingerprints. Charge: M1. Plea: MS.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice
and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 4-7 years.
10. Black Bonnette, Cornelius - Lancaster County - No Penalty
Trial - Life
05/21/81. D, 36 years old, knocked on V's door and presented himself as a police officer. V, an 87-year-old female, let D inside and was
told by D to go into her bedroom for her protection. D looked around
V's home for something to steal, took a knife from the kitchen and
went into V's bedroom and demanded money from her. When V said
that she did not have any money, D stabbed her twice in the stomach.
Then, because she was still alive and D was worried that she could
identify him, D cut off a length of cord from a set of window blinds and
strangled V. D stole V's radio, which he later sold, and a few days
later he fled to South Dakota, where he was apprehended. Charge:
M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
11. Brick, Jacqueline S. - Cheyenne County - No Penalty Trial 40 years
11/12/76. D, a 24-year-old female, was hitchhiking with Co-P, her
sibling. They were picked up by V, an adult male, and they formed a
plan to rob him. D, who was in the back seat, pulled out a gun and
told V to stop the car. V reached into the backseat in an attempt to get
the gun, and it discharged. V then turned around to face the front of
the car and D shot him once more in the back, paralyzing him and
inflicting a fatal wound. D and the Co-P then dragged V from the car,
tied him to a fence by the roadside, robbed him, and agreed that they
should finish him because he could identify them. Co-P took the gun
and shot at V twice, aiming at his head but hitting him in the arm and
leg. D and Co-P drove away in V's car and made their way to California, where they were arrested. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg Cir: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 40 years.
12. Brown, Samuel P. - Stanton County - No Penalty Trial - Term
of Years
04/30/77. D, a 27-year-old, was drinking at a bar with Co-P1, CoP2 and 2 other acquaintances. V, a 23-year-old male, was also at the
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bar and D and Co-P1 noticed he had a large sum of money. D suggested they rob V and then kill V so he could not identify them and CoP1 and Co-P2 agreed. V, who was extremely intoxicated, agreed to go
with D and Co-P's to a party and they all left the bar. After stopping
to get knives, D and Co-P's drove V into the country. Co-P1 slashed
V's throat and cut off V's head after Co-P1 and D dragged V from the
car after V passed out. D dragged V's torso to some bushes where he
and Co-P's hid it. D kicked the torso and poured beer into V's body.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp and/
or crime). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat Mit.: Present.
Term of Years.
13. Clark, Harry A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
03/12/83. D, 34 years old, attempted to steal V's truck, but accidentally ran it into another vehicle. D fled the scene, and V, a 40-year-old
male, found out from Co-P where D lived. V and Co-P went to D's
home and V and D amicably talked about the situation. When V went
to shake D's hand, D hit him. D and Co-P then beat and kicked V
until he was unconscious, and later put him in a trash bin. V died in
the dumpster from his injuries. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
14. Clark, Lee L. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
03/12/83. Co-P attempted to steal V's truck, but accidentally ran it
into another vehicle. Co-P fled the scene, and V, a 40-year-old male,
found out from D, a 25-year-old male, where Co-P lived. V and D went
to Co-P's home and V and Co-P amicably talked about the situation.
When V went to shake Co-P's hand, Co-P hit him. D and Co-P then
beat and kicked V until he was unconscious, and later put him in a
trash bin. V died in the dumpster from his injuries. Charge: M1.
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
15. Cook, Todd L. - Madison County - No Penalty Trial - Life
01/29/95. D and Co-Perp had discussed robbing a particular convenience store for about a week. On the way home from a party they
decided this was the night. At the party, they had been drinking,
smoking marijuana, and snorting methamphetamine. D went into the
store first and took V, who was the clerk, into the back to try to remove the surveillance tape from the video camera. D could not remove the tape so he shot at it. D then shot V in the neck. Charge: M1.
Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(d)(age). Life.
16. Davis, John R. - Sanders County - No Penalty Trial - Life
11/22/79. D, 21-year-old, and 2 Co-P's planned to rob someone so
that they could have a party. They hitchhiked and were picked up by
V, a 22-year-old male. V, D and the Co-P's spent some time drinking
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together. When V was driving them home, D asked him pull the car
over. D then dragged V out of the car, and V was beaten and put in
the trunk. D and Co-P1 dropped off Co-P2, and then drove V into the
country. They beat V with their fists and a steel bar, then stripped V
and threw him in a water-filled ditch, where he drowned. D and CoP1 kept V's car. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). NonStat. Mit.: Present. 30 years - Life.
17. Epp, William A. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - Life
11/24/77. 18-year-old D, in an apparent attempt to burglarize V's
liquor store, shot out the front window. V, who lived next door, went
to investigate with a shotgun. V confronted D and D shot V, who was
able to describe D and give D's license plate number before he died.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
18. Fletcher, Stacey L. (I) - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial Life
02/19/92. D, 23 years old, and Co-P entered a convenience store to
rob it. V, a 49-year-old female who worked in the store, started
screaming and ran to or was dragged by D and Co-P to the back of the
store. D and Co-P then beat V with tire irons until she stopped
screaming, breaking V's wrist, fingers, teeth, jaw and skull. V died
from her head wounds, and D and Co-P robbed the store and fled.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
19. Lara, Albino - Cherry County - No Penalty Trial - 30-50 years
11/04/93. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's befriended 55-year-old V at a
bar with the intention of robbing him. D, the 2 Co-P's, and V left the
bar together and went to a motel where some or all of them participated in homosexual activities. Intoxicated from a night of drinking,
the 4 individuals drove V's car out to a secluded area to fulfill the perpetrators' plan of robbing V. The perpetrators forced V to the ground
and kicked him in the head and face and upper body for an extended
period of time. V suffered a broken jaw, multiple abrasions and bruising over his chest, head and neck area, serious lacerations, a near removal of his ear, and a severed artery in his brain. The perpetrators
stripped V of his clothing and left him near a creek. As the perpetrators were walking away, D stepped down on V's throat and said, "I've
got to kill this guy." The perpetrators then attempted to hide the car
and their bloody clothing. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. 30-50 years.
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20. Leon, Ira R. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - Life
02/19/92. D, 20 years old, and Co-P entered a convenience store to
rob it. V, a 49-year-old female who worked in the store, started
screaming and ran to or was forcibly taken by D and Co-P to the back
of the store. D and Co-P then beat V with tire irons until she stopped
screaming, breaking V's wrist, fingers, teeth, jaw and skull. V died
from her head wounds, and D and Co-P robbed the store and fled.
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
21. Liebers, Anna M - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - Life
11/25/91. V a 32-year-old-female, D, Co-P and a fourth person all
belonged to a burglary ring. V and a fourth person were caught and
arrested. V stated that he was going to turn State's evidence against
the fourth person in order to save himself. Co-P and D lured V out into
the country and then beat him to death with crowbars because they
feared the whole group would be caught. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
22. Reichwaldt, Ricky L. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial Life
11/25/91. V, 30-year-old D, Co-P and a fourth person all belonged
to a burglary ring. V and the fourth person were caught and arrested.
V stated that he was going to turn State's evidence against the fourth
person in order to save himself. Co-P and D lured V out into the country and then beat him to death with crowbars because they feared the
whole group would be caught. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Life.
23. Shelley, Tyrus T. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 25-30
years
01/20/95. 19-year-old D, and Co-P were holding up a fast food restaurant when D shot the 71-year-old V who was an employee. D
stated that he thought V was going for a gun. When another employee
came out and saw V on the floor, D tried to shoot the second employee,
but the gun jammed. The second employee escaped and called police.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25-30 Years.
24. Taylor, Brian L. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
03/24/75. D had been drinking and taking drugs when he picked
up V, a hitchhiker. As V was exiting the car, D shot him in the left
temple. D then went through V's pockets and took everything. D
pushed V out of the car, got out, and shot V in the back of the head.
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp).
Life.
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One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation

1. Larsen, Richard A. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/24/95. Co-P1 was involved in a fight with V1, a 34-year-old
male, and V2 a 37-year-old male, and as a result Co-P1 sustained a
minor cut to his face. Later that day, Co-P1 went to a party at D's
home where he complained about the earlier fight. Co-P1 and another
then left the party to search for V1 and V2. After finding V1, Co-P1
threw a brick into his head causing serious, perhaps even fatal, injuries. After they returned to the party, D suggested they "go finish [V1]
off." D, Co-Pi, and Co-P2 returned to where V1 was lying on the
ground. V1 tried to talk but Co-P2 kicked him and then D took out a
knife and stabbed V1 multiple times. D and his Co-P's hid when a car
drove by, but afterwards returned to V1 and D continued stabbing him
while D rummaged through Vi's pockets. V1 suffered 20 stab wounds.
D and Co-P's returned to the party and decided to kill V2 because,
they believed, he would be able to identify them as Vi's killers. They
proceeded to V2's apartment where, just before entering, D and Co-P1
decided Co-P1 would kill V2. They then broke into the apartment.
Co-P1 first sprayed mace at V2 and then stabbed him 17 times while
the other Co-P's beat NDV unconscious. They then left the apartment,
but D returned and struck someone, though it is unclear who, in the
head with a 2" x 4" board. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance);
(2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and participationpresented/not found); (2)(f)(victim participation/consent-presented/
not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life.
2. Osborn, Jeremy P. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/13/93. D, a 19-year-old male, and V, a 19-year-old female, lived
in the same apartment complex. D pried open the door to V's apartment and raped her. Worried about the consequences of sexual assault, D got a knife from the kitchen. D stabbed V in the neck and
head, and V died of asphyxiation. Autopsy findings also produced evidence of strangulation and beating prior to death. D put the knife in
the dishwasher before leaving. D claimed to have been drinking heavily that day. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found);
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Rehbein, Cary N. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/06/81. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(conviction-presented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)
(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/
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law enforcement-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences-presentedlnot found); (2)(c)
(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/
not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
4. Thornton, Owen R. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/08/79. D, a 23-year-old, broke into an apartment to burglarize
it, thinking no one was home. V, a female occupant of the apartment,
awoke and began screaming. D attempted to gag V to stop her
from screaming, and then he strangled V, killing her. Charge: M1.
Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial historypresented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influences-presented/not found); (2)
(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(agepresented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation); (2)(f)(victim
participation/consent); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
6. Soukharith, Anousone - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/23/95. D, a 20-year-old male, planned with friends to "hijack"
V's car. D approached V's vehicle with a loaded gun. He ordered her
to exit the car, then changed his mind and told her to get back in and
drive. She complied and they traveled from Des Moines, Iowa, to the
Omaha area of Nebraska. After exiting Omaha, D said he planned to
tie V to a tree near the river and take her car to California. The two
exited the vehicle in the area he chose, and as V was walking in front
of D, she asked him several times not to shoot her. It was this, D
claimed, that gave him the idea to shoot V. D fired once, striking V. D
left V's body where it lay. He was apprehended the same day in Wyoming. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
7. Laravie, Antonio A. - Knox County - No Penalty Trial - Life
08/18/73. D, a 15-year-old male, had been drinking with his
friends for several hours into the early morning. D left his friends to
make a phone call. He broke into a house to use the phone, and once
in the house, he decided to rob it. D grabbed a knife from the kitchen
in case someone woke up. V, a 2-year-old boy, woke up and made a
noise. D put his hand over V's mouth and stabbed him twice in the
chest, killing him. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit Cir.: (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
8. Lawson, Douglas E. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 25
years
01/16/75. D, a 16-year-old, went into V's home to ransack it. V, a
7-year-old female, came home and asked D what he was doing. D said
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that he had come in after V, and she seemed to accept this. V got a
snack and started to watch television. D became frightened because of
V's presence, however, and got a knife from the kitchen and stabbed
her repeatedly. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25
years.
9. Randall, Kevin D. -

Saunders County - No Penalty Trial - Life

11/22/79 D, a 16-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's were hitchhiking
when they were picked up by V. They all went to a bar where D and
Co-P's, who had just taken L.S.D., decided that V had made a pass at
one of them and they were going to "roll" him. After leaving the bar, a
Co-P asked V to stop the car. Co-P jumped out, pulled V out of the car
and beat and robbed him. They put V in the trunk and drove out into
the country where they continued the beating with a steel bar. V was
still alive when they dumped him off a bridge into a creek. Charge:
M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
H. HAC or Depravity - Murder was especially heinous, atrocious,
and cruel (HAC) or defendant manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standardsof morality and intelligence - 1(d):
H. 1 -

One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation

1. Bronson, Clyde W. - Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

06/28/91. The 39-year-old D's neighbor, V, was found dead in her
home with 16 stab wounds to her chest and stomach and 6 blunt injuries to her face and head. D's fingerprints were found in the blood. D
had been asking several neighbors for money on the night of the murder, and V's purse was left out in the kitchen where she was found
dead. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Crisp, Harold W. -

Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

04/05/84. D was convicted of homicide when he struck V, knocking
her out, and sexually assaulted and mutilated the body. Evidence existed to suggest the D was under significant influence of drugs and/or
alcohol at the time of the crime. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired).
Life.
3. Hargett, James F. -

Sarpy County - Penalty Trial -

Life

09/29/98. D, a 19-year-old and 5 Co-P's planned the murder of a
19-year-old male V, for about 2 weeks. Their plan was in response to
allegations that V raped a Co-P during a sexual foursome involving V
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and 3 of the other perpetrators. Five of the perpetrators, including D,
drove to a park with V. One of the Co-P's remained in the car while D,
V and 3 Co-P's walked down to an area under a bridge, and the 4 perpetrators all began stabbing V. The pathologist stopped counting the
number of wounds at 69, 57 of them being stab lacerations. A Co-P
also stated that they hit V over the head with bricks. During the murder, a Co-P said to D, "We have to finish this. [V's] not dead. [V's]
going to know who we are." After the murder the perpetrators made
comments about how V "screamed like a fucking girl" and how they
were happy V was dead. Charge: MI. Plea: M1. P. TrialD.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. Life.
4. Lynch, Patrick B. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/01/82. D killed V by multiple stab wounds in what originally
appeared to be a consensual homosexual encounter after V picked D
up when he was hitchhiking. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
5. Scott, Maurice L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
04/23/80. D, age 24, was living with V, a 22-year-old female. D
became angry with V for leaving their young children with a neighbor
one evening. For a prolonged period of time, D beat V with a belt with
a metal buckle and a coffee table leg, and kicked her with metal-toed
boots. V suffered multiple bruises, abrasions, broken ribs, and lacerations which were mostly confined to her scalp. V died of blood loss and
shock. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity
impaired-presented/not found). Life.
6. Searles, Marvin D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/19/80. D, a 51-year-old, and the V, had been arguing over the
use of a television set in the group apartment in which both were living. While V was on the balcony of the building, D stabbed V several
times. Witnesses indicated that V was screaming during the attack.
After the homicide, the D said to a few witnesses: "I stabbed her good;
I hope I killed her." V later died in the hospital. Charge: M1. Jury:
M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
7. Wetherell, Niccole A. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Life
09/29/98. D, an 18-year-old female, and 5 Co-P's planned the murder of V, a 19-year-old male, for about 2 weeks. Their plan was in
response to allegations that V raped D during a sexual foursome involving D, V and 2 of the other Co-P's. Five of the Co-P's, including D,
drove to a park with V. One of the Co-P's remained in the car while D,
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V, and 3 Co-P's walked down to an area under a bridge, and the 4
perpetrators all began stabbing V. The pathologist stopped counting
the number of wounds at 69, 57 of them being stab lacerations. D also
stated that they hit V over the head with bricks. During the murder,
D said, "We have to finish this. [V's] not dead. [V's] going to know
who we are". After the murder, the Co-P's made comments about how
V "screamed like a fucking girl" and how they were happy V was dead.
Charge M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal
perp-presented/not found); (1)(c)(D was hired, pecuniary gain,
and/or D hired another-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
8. White, Joseph E. - Jefferson County - Penalty Trial - Life
02/05/85. The 26-year-old D, and group of 4 Co-P's had discussed
robbing V, a 68-year-old woman on several occasions. D and 4 Co-P's
forced their way into V's apartment. V refused to tell where she kept
her money and was severely beaten and then raped by D and Co-P1.
Co-P1 also sodomized V. During the sexual assaults, Co-P2 held a pillow over V's face to keep her quiet, causing V to suffocate. Charge:
M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp
and/or crime-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
9. Barnes, Richard C. - Pierce County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/20/93. V, a 10-year-old male, and his friend were fishing at a
park. They went into a bathroom, and when they exited, D was standing by the door. V and his friend went back to the pond, but D, 23
years old, yelled to V and told him that he had left a fish in the bathroom. V went to retrieve the fish and D followed him into the bathroom. D then stabbed V 22 times. After D left the bathroom, he told
V's friend to help clean up the mess in the bathroom, but the friend
refused. V's friend later identified D as the assailant. Charge: MI.
Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
10. McHenry, Darrin J. - Lincoln County - Penalty Trial - Life
07/27/92. D, 27 years old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing
severe injuries to his head and body. D and Co-P1 then orally and
anally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge:
M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
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11. Davis, Stanley 0. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - 1-20
years
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, was D's girlfriend, but she
planned on ending the relationship. D and V met at a restaurant,
joined by Co-P's 1 and 2. They all went to Co-Pl's house. When V
rejected the sexual advances of D and the 2 Co-P's, they beat her into
submission with their fists and a large wooden dowel. V was then
raped, both anally and vaginally, and then beaten some more. V was
placed in a sleeping bag, and with help from Co-P3, was driven out to
the country in the back of a pickup and dumped by the side of the
road. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. 1-20 years.
12. Dean, James L. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 10 years
02/05/85 D, who was 21, was one of a group of 6 who planned the
robbery of the 68-year-old V. In an effort to force her into telling
where her money was kept, V was beaten, anally and vaginally raped,
and finally suffocated with a pillow while D watched. D did not actually take an active part in the beating, sexual assaults, or suffocation.
Charge: M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice and participation).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years.
13. Drinkwalter, Randy W. (B) - Cherry County - No Penalty Trial
- 6 2/3-20 years
11/01/89. D, a 27-year-old, went to the home of V, his 87-year-old
grandmother. The two had a brief conversation. D, who weighed 450
pounds, then cut the telephone wires, ripped off V's clothes, and raped
her. He then went to the kitchen and retrieved a ball preen hammer.
He returned to V, sat on her chest (his weight fractured several of her
ribs) and struck her in the head and face with the hammer 10-20
times. D then jammed an ordinary table knife into V's face just below
the eye, though by this time she was probably dead. D then took a
different hammer and shattered several family pictures, causing glass
to fall on to the V. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). NonStat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20 years. Prior Proceeding at 41842A.
14. Estrada, Antonio - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - 6 2/320 years
07/27/92. D, 22 years old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing
severe injuries to his head and body. Co-P's 1 and 2 then orally and
anally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge:

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:486

M2. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20.
15. Freeman, Thomas E. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial Life
01/01/77. 23-year-old D was visiting V, his girlfriend, in her bedroom. V's children heard her cry out, telling D to "stop." D went to the
kitchen and returned to the bedroom with a knife. D stabbed V a total
of 14 times in the face, neck, and body. Charge: M2. Jury: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir. (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
16. Krimmel, Vern S. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life
11/04/82. D, a 20-year-old male, did odd jobs for V, an 84-year-old
man. D believed V owed him money for some work he had done and
went to V's home to demand the money. Before leaving, D took a paring knife from the Co-P's apartment. V allowed D to enter his home
and D asked for the money. V offered D less than D believed he was
owed. D became angry and stabbed V 25 times, placed V's body into
the bathtub, and stole several small items including V's wallet. Later
D and Co-P's hid the knife and the items stolen by D. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
17. Ladig, Frank E. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - Life
07/27/92. D, 20-year-old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing
severe injuries to his head and body. D and Co-P1 then orally and
anally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge:
M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
18. Sapp, Michael J. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - 6 1/220 years
04/27/84. D, age 22, often obtained drugs from Co-P, and the two
did drugs together. Co-P wanted to kill his grandmother, the 83-yearold V, to receive his inheritance. Accordingly, Co-P offered D a large
supply of drugs in exchange for killing her. After several weeks of
discussing the murder and method, Co-P told D it was time to kill V.
While on drugs, D went to V's house and deliberated for several minutes before smothering her with a pillow. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 1/2-20 years.
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19. Strohl, Daniel J. - York County - Penalty Trial - Life
12/21/95. V, a 51-year-old female, met D, 22 years old, in a bar and
agreed to give him a ride home. At a nearby park, D sexually assaulted V and beat her with a blunt object. Then, while she was still
alive, D ran over V with her own automobile, killing her. D drove V's
car out of state, but was found by police in a motel room paid for with
V's credit card. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir.
Presented. Agg Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
20. Taylor, Ada Joann - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 40
years
02/05/85. D, a 21-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's planned to rob V,
a 68-year-old female. Co-P1 and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V.
D and 5 Co-P's forced their way into V's apartment; and D and 2 CoP's beat her, demanding money. Co-P's 1 and 3 took turns holding the
blindfolded and bound V down while they raped and anally and orally
sodomized her. D participated in the sexual assault and held a pillow
over V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered several broken
bones. After the assault, D and Co-P's took money from the apartment. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.:
Present. 40 years.
21. Winslow, Thomas W. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 50
years
02/05/85. D and group of 4 Co-P's planned to rob a 68-year-old female V. D and Co-P's forced their way into V's apartment. V refused
to tell where she kept her money and was severely beaten for a prolonged period. V was then forced to lay on the floor while D and Co-P1
took turns raping her. Co-P1 then held V down while D sodomized
her. During the sexual assault, Co-P2 held a pillow over V's face to
keep her quiet, which resulted in V's suffocation. Charge: M1. Plea:
M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). NonStat. Mit.: Present. 50 years.
H. 2 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation
1. Carter, Asa T. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
10/20/90. V, a 9-year-old female was staying at the apartment of
D, a 35-year-old male and D's wife. D told his wife that he wanted to
have sexual relations with V. His wife became frightened and left the
apartment. While his wife was gone, D violently sexually assaulted V,
subjecting her to both vaginal and anal penetration. V died from asphyxiation due to compression of the chest which prevented V from
breathing. D then moved V's body to behind his apartment building
and threatened to harm his wife if she told anyone about his involvement. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg Cir:
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Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);

(2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or domination-presented/not found);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Peverill, Douglas G.

-

Sarpy County

-

Penalty Trial -

Life

01/04/85. D, who was 55, had purchased a shotgun and shells less
than 8 hours before he confronted V1, a 27-year-old male, about not
having a job. They argued violently and D went upstairs to get the
shells, then came back downstairs and shot V1 twice. V1 was D's
stepson. When V2, who was D's wife, came downstairs, D shot her
also. D had been convicted previously of assault with intent to commit
great bodily injury. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/
both not found); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp-presented/not
found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history-presented/not found);
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Seberger, Francis L. -

Sarpy County -

Penalty Trial -

Life

05/31/97. D, 40 years old, and V, an adult female, were married
but separated. Prior to the night in question, D had threatened V
with violence on numerous occasions. On the night in question, D was
drinking and went to a gas station where he purchased some gasoline
that he placed in a plastic container. D then went to V's home and
forced his way inside. While V was trying to contact the police, D
poured gasoline over her body and lit her on fire. During and after his
arrest, D commented several times that V had gotten what she deserved. V suffered severe burns, her leg had to be amputated, and she
died from complications of her injuries. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not
found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
4. Lamb, David J. - Lancaster County -

Penalty Trial - Life

07/14/80. D, 60-year-old, was the spouse of V, a 60-year-old female,
and D had thought of killing V in the past. On the day in question, D
went to a hardware store and purchased a rifle and ammunition. At
home, D test fired the rifle to see if it worked. Later that day, while V
slept, D shot her between the eyes, killing her. D then shot their 2
dogs, drank some whiskey and then called the police. Charge: M1.
Jury: M1. P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/in-
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fluences); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity
impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
5. Norfolk, Robert C. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
05/12/84. D, age 19, boarded with V, his 54-year-old aunt. After a
night of drinking, D returned to V's home. He obtained a butcher
knife and inflicted 1 to 3 superficial stab wounds on V before strangling her. Thinking V was dead, D had sex with her body. The phone
lines in V's house had been cut. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. Trial/No
Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presentednot found);
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
6. Baker, Mark E. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - Life
09/16/91. D, age 31, entered the store where V, a 71-year-old female, was a bookkeeper and asked for directions. Upon seeing V had a
cash box, D grabbed her by the throat and stabbed her 16 times in the
face, neck, and chest, cutting through her ribs. D took the cash and
left the store. He cleaned the blood from his vehicle and buried the
knife. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/
Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance);
depravity).
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life.
7. Gondringer, Daniel G. - Platte County - No Penalty Trial - 10
years - Life
05/17/90 (approx.). V, a 13-year-old-female, asked D, an 18-yearold male, if she could stay at his house during the day because she did
not want her parents to know that she had been suspended from
school. D agreed, and V spent the day at his house. During the day, D
stabbed V in the stomach. He claimed the injury was accidentally inflicted while the two were playfully fencing. V lost consciousness and
D then put her into the trunk of his car and drove her into the country.
When he stopped, he found her awake and moved her into the field. D
then cut her throat, but when this did not kill her, he struck her twice
in the head with a pick ax. D claimed that V asked to die before he
killed her. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(d)(age);
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years - Life.
8. Gonzalez, Kathleen A. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 10
years
02/05/85. 4 Co-P's planned to rob V a 68-year-old female. Co-P1
and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V. After D, the 24-year-old
female neighbor of V, gave a signal, D and 5 Co-P's forced their way
into V's apartment and 3 Co-P's beat her, demanding money. Co-P's 1
and 3 took turns holding the blindfolded and bound V down while they
raped and anally and orally sodomized her. Co-P4 held a pillow over
V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered several broken bones.
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After the assault, which D observed, D and Co-P's took money from
the apartment. Charge: M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P.
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years.
9. Haverkamp, Timothy - Richardson County - No Penalty Trial Life
04/29/85. Co-P1 was the leader of a religious cult and V, an adult
male, was a member of the cult who had fallen into disfavor. As punishment, Co-P1 forced V to perform homosexual acts with another
member of the group. Later, D, 24 years old, Co-P1 and three other
Co-P's, who were also cult members, secured V to a crate and
sodomized V repeatedly with a greased shovel handle, causing internal injuries. When V screamed because of this abuse, Co-P1 kicked
him in the head and put tape over his mouth. D and Co-P's then
whipped V repeatedly over the course of 2 days. Afterwards, D and
Co-P's shot off V's fingertips and Co-P1 kicked and broke his arm. CoP1 then used a pair of pliers to pull strips of skin off of V's leg and had
D and Co-P2 break both of his legs. Finally, Co-P1 stomped on V's
chest, crushing it and causing his death. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination). NonStat. Mit.: Present. Life.
10. Kerr, Walter T. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 20 years
- Life
03/19/98. V, a male, was an acquaintance of D and Co-P. D and
Co-P were at Co-P's residence doing drugs and drinking alcohol and V
was also there. Co-P thought V was trying to steal from him, so D and
Co-P planned to beat V. Co-P sprayed V with mace, the D and another
assailant beat V with a bat. V was also subjected to electric shock
with a "zapper" and pins and needles were stuck in his hands. A
plastic bag was taped over V's head for an unknown length of time,
and his hands and ankles were bound with tape and wire. V was shot
with a pellet gun in the arm, leg and mouth and later died of blunt
trauma to the head. Assaults on V lasted 5 hours before he was left to
die. D and Co-P put V's body in a dumpster. Charge: M1. Plea: M2.
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present.
20 years - Life.
11. Patz, Donald - Dawes County - No Penalty Trial - Life
07/15/84. D, 20-year-old male, and V, a 25-year-old male, were at a
bar drinking together. They had not previously known each other. After the bar closed, V suggested to D that they continue to drink so they
went to the court house lawn. While there, V passed out, and then D
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returned home. D got a knife and returned to the court house. He
stabbed V 17 times, and then, believing V had marijuana, searched V's
body, finding and taking $10. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial.
Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life.
12. Shelden, Debra K. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 10 years
02/05/85. 4 Co-P's planned to rob V, D's 68-year-old great aunt.
Co-P1 and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V. After Co-P5, a
neighbor of V, gave a signal, 26-year-old D, a female, and 5 Co-P's
forced their way into V's apartment; and 3 Co-P's beat her, demanding
money. Co-P's 1 and 3 took turns holding the blindfolded and bound V
down while they raped and anally and orally sodomized her. Co-P4
held a pillow over V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered several broken bones. After the assault, which D observed, D and Co-P's
took money from the apartment. Charge: M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/
Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. . Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years.
13. Taylor, Terry H. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - Term
of Years
12/21/84. D, a 21-year-old, and V, an 18-year-old male, had been in
a relationship that had ended, but they were still living together. On
the night in question, D and V argued over some money that D had
loaned to V and also V's infidelity. D stabbed V 51 times in the torso,
head, and neck with a steak knife while V lay in bed, awake. D had
previously intimated to a friend a desire to shoot V. Charge: M1.
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit Cir.:
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance).
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Term of Years.
14. Valerio, Michael A. - Banner County - No Penalty Trial - 1035 years
10/14/84. D, age 18, and 3 Co-P's kidnapped V, a male. V was
beaten severely. After the beating, D set V's hair on fire and stabbed
him twice. At the time of the offense, D was intoxicated and on amphetamines. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.:
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history);
(2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10-35
years.
I. Grave Risk - A murder in which the defendant knowingly createda
grave risk of death to at least two or more persons - 1(f):
L 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation
1. Ell, Ronald R. -

Douglas County -

Penalty Trial -

Life
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02/21/75. D, 29 years old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 exchanged gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated
residential area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between
houses and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing
on foot. They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were bystanders present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male,
was a resident of the area who came out to assist the police in apprehending D and Co-P1. He ordered Co-P1 to stop, and when Co-P1 did
not, he fired at Co-P1. Co-P1 fired back, hitting V, and when V fell,
Co-P1 shot him two more times, killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1.
P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(f)(death risk to several);
(1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/
emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
L 2 - One Statutory Mitigator With High Mitigation
1. Ruyle, Stanley - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/05/88. D, a 25-year-old male, had been romantically involved
with a person who lived in the same apartment building as V. D had
difficulty dealing with the breakup of the relationship and was arrested several times for harassing his ex-lover. After making bail for
one such arrest, D returned to his ex-lover's apartment and started a
fire with the intention of killing his ex-lover. The V was overcome by
smoke inhalation and died. Charge: M1. Jury: MI. P. Trial/D.P.
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig.
criminal history); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat.
Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Sims, Michael J. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
03/25/97. D, age 20, and Co-P were driving around looking for an
individual who had stolen marijuana from Co-P and a dealer that day.
D and Co-P stopped in front of V's house where the thief was hiding.
V, NDV, and a third person approached D's vehicle, side by side. V
and NDV lifted their shirts, an ambiguous gesture indicating they
were either armed or unarmed. D and Co-P opened fire, shooting V
and NDV multiple times. During the shooting, several individuals,
including V's children, were nearby in V's yard. Charge: M1. Jury:
M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
3. Owens, Daniel L. - Sarpy County - No Penalty Trial - 40 years
06/18/97. D, an 18-year-old male, and his girlfriend were driving
down the road. D, the passenger, was shooting bottle rocket fireworks
at passing cars, including the vehicle that V, a teenage male, was driving. There were 3 other passengers in V's vehicle and one of them
called the police to report D's conduct. They believed they were in-
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structed by the police to follow D's car and did so. Shortly thereafter,
V pulled up next to D's car at a stoplight. D fired a gun once toward
the back end of V's car. He then fired twice into the passenger, area
hitting V once in the head. Charge: M2. Jury: M2. No P. Trial. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 40 years.
4. Winefeldt, Harry R. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 9-10
years
03/25/97. D, age 18, and Co-P were driving around looking for an
individual who had stolen marijuana from D and a dealer that day. D
and Co-P stopped in front of V's house where the thief was hiding. V,
NDV, and a third person approached D's vehicle, side by side. V and
NDV lifted their shirts an ambiguous gesture indicating they were either armed or unarmed. D and Co-P opened fire, shooting V and NDV
multiple times. V's children, were nearby in V's yard. Charge: M1.
Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(f)(death risk to several). Mit.
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 9-10 years.
J. Hinder Government Function - The defendant committed the
crime to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental
function or the enforcement of the laws - 1(h):
One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation
1. Allen, Kevin L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life
08/20/95. D, an 18-year-old, and 3 Co-P's were driving around in a
van. They were stopped by V, a 24-year-old male police officer who
had noticed an abnormality on the van's license plate. D was wanted
for first degree assault and feared V was going to arrest him. While V
was notifying the police dispatcher from the radio in his police cruiser
that he had stopped the van, D got out of the van and fired eleven
shots at V's cruiser with an assault rifle. Four shots penetrated the
windshield and struck V killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: MI. P. Trial/
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a) (substantial history-presented/not
found); (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp-presented/not found);
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (1)(g)(officer/public servant victim during custody-presented/not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't
function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history-presented/not found); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and
participation-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
2. Beers, Robert L. - Otoe County - Penalty Trial - Life
07/09/77. D, a 39-year-old male, was intoxicated and was driving
around with a shotgun, looking for his wife and her boyfriend. A
neighbor informed NDV and V (a 24-year-old male), who were police
J. 1 -
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officers, of D's actions. When the officers saw D driving by, they yelled
at him to pull over. D did so and got out of truck with the shotgun in
hand. When D was told to drop gun, he shot NDV and V. D then
reloaded and fired again, missing both V and NDV. V died from the
gunshot wound. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg.
Cir.: (1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/law enforcement). Life.
J. 2 -

One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation

1. Reynolds, Terry, L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life
03/14/87. D, a 26-year-old male was drinking with his wife and 3
friends. D's wife accused him of flirting with one of the friends. This
accusation angered D and he began beating his wife. The friends intervened and temporarily stopped the abuse. However, after the
friends left, D became angry and beat his wife again. After beating
her, D left his home, went to the residence of the friend with whom he
had been flirting, and attempted to have sexual relations with her.
When she refused, D hit her and then returned home. When arrived,
he attacked several people who were trying to help his wife. D then
pointed a gun at his wife and told her that if a law enforcement officer
arrived he would kill his wife, his child, the law enforcement officer
and himself. V, a 42-year-old sheriff, arrived and, after talking briefly
with D and his wife, attempted to gain entry to the house. D shot V
once in the chin, fatally wounding him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P.
Trial/D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history-both presented/both not found); (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or
perp-presented/not found); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not
found); (1)(g)(officer/public servant victim during custody-presented/
not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't function/law enforcement). Mit. Cir.:
(2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination); 2(c)(mental/extreme
disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life.
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APPENDIX E
DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEATHSENTENCING RATES IN SUBPOPULATIONS OF CASES TO ACCOUNT FOR
DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENDANT
CULPABILITY LEVELS

A number of times in this Article we estimated death-sentencing
rates for different subgroups of cases and compared the results of the
different estimates. For example, as a basis for inferring the impact of
the defendant's race on penalty trial sentencing decisions, we compared the death-sentencing rate in white-defendant cases with the
rate for the minority-defendant cases. A possible problem with these
comparisons is that the difference in death-sentencing rates that we
documented may have reflected differences in the culpability levels of
the defendants in the two subgroups rather than the impact of the
defendant's race. An extreme form of the problem would exist if the
defendants in one group of cases were the most aggravated in the sample while the defendants in the other group of cases were the least
aggravated. In practice, disparities in the distributions of defendant
culpability levels are never this extreme, but they are often sufficiently different to present a risk of an erroneous inference. To avoid
the risks, we needed a procedure to control for the culpability of the
defendant in each case.
One method to control for defendant culpability in these situations
is to subject the cases to a logistic multiple regression analysis that
takes into account, and controls for, the culpability level of each defendant. An alternative method, which we have found more accessible for
this research, is a process of adjustment for case culpability known as
"direct standardization."4 30 It enabled us to estimate an overall
430.

Joseph L. Fleiss, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS 162-64
(1973) and Prithwis Das Gupta, STANDARDIZATION AND DECOMPOSITION OF RATES:

A USER'S MANUAL, 23-186, (1993) present a more technical discussion of the issues and procedures involved with the use of the standardization procedure. We
prefer the directly standardized results as the principal mode for the presentation of our findings because they are easier to depict and explain than are regression coefficients and odds multipliers estimated for race of defendant and victim
variables. For this reason, they are widely used. See, e.g., Alexa Beiser et al.,
Computing Estimates of Incidence, Including Lifetime Risk: Alzheimer's Disease
in the Framingham Study; The PracticalIncidence Estimators (PIE) Macro, 19
STATISTICS. IN MED. 1495 (2000) (direct standardization for age); Richard M.
Bray, Ph.D., & Mary Ellen, Ph.D., Marsden, Trends in Substance Use among U.S.
Military Personnel: The Impact of ChangingDemographic Composition, 35 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 949 (2000) (direct standardization for differences in
demographics of military personnel); LESTER R. CURTIN & RICHARD J. KLEIN, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DIRECT STANDARDIZATION (AGE-ADJUSTED
DEATH RATES) (1995) (direct standardization for age); Seiji Nakata et al., Trends

and Characteristicsin Prostate Cancer Mortality in Japan, 7 INT'L J. UROLOGY
254 (2000) (direct standardization for age differences); Arlene C. Sena et al.,
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death-sentencing rate for two or more groups of actual cases, on the
assumption that the cases in each group have the same levels or distribution of defendant criminal culpability. For this purpose, our measures of defendant culpability are (a) counts of the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases, (b) counts of the
number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
cases, (c) a multi-level salient-factors scale, and (d) multi-level scales
multiple-regression analyses of chargbuilt upon the results of logistic
43 1
ing and sentencing decisions.
The direct method of adjusting for differences among populations
of defendants 4 32 focuses on computing the overall death-sentencing
rate that would result for a subpopulation of defendants if, instead of
having a different distribution of criminal culpability, both the whole
population of defendants and the subpopulation of defendants being
compared to the whole population had the same distribution of culpability. 4 33 Appendix E Table 1 illustrates the adjustment procedure.
Our purpose there is to adjust the .42 (25/60) death-sentencing rate
for the hypothetical subpopulation of 60 penalty trial cases shown in
Column C, Row 3a. This rate is adjusted to the death-sentencing rate
we would expect to see if the distribution of defendant culpability
levels for the young defendants in Column C were the same as the
distribution for the whole population of defendants shown in Column
B. The adjusted rate of .37 is shown in Column C, Row 3b.
The first step in applying this technique is to identify the standard
distribution of culpability levels for the whole population of defendants. 43 4 Column A of Appendix E Table 1 shows three levels of culpability43 5 and Column B indicates the distribution of the whole
population of defendants on that scale. We then calculate the number
of death sentences that would have occurred in the subpopulation of

431.

432.

433.

434.
435.

Trends of Gonorrhea and Chlamydial Infection During 1985-1996 Among ActiveDuty Soldiers at a United States Army Installation, 30 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DisEASES 742 (2000) (direct standardization for age, sex, race/ethnicity).
The count of statutory aggravating circumstances is shown in Figure 3, p. 552.
The count of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is shown in Figure 4, p.
555. The salient-factors scale is shown in Figure 5, pp. 557-58, while the regression-based measures of defendant culpability are shown in Figure 6, pp. 559-60.
To illustrate the process of direct adjustment, we draw on a presentation in a
leading textbook by Professors Pagno and Gauvreau of the Harvard University
Schools of Public Health and Medicine, respectively, which we have modified to
fit the subject matter of this Article. MARCELLO PAGNO & KIMBERLEE GAUVREAU,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOSTATISTIcs 72-73 (2000).
Id. at 72. The same principles apply when the death-sentencing rates among
multiple subgroups are being compared, as occurs in several Figures in this
Article.
Id.
We use a three-level culpability scale here to simplify the explanation. As noted
above, in the actual research, we used multi-level culpability scales.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

2002]

APPENDIX

E

755

TABLE 1

DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEATHSENTENCING RATES FOR A HYPOTHETICAL SUBPOPULATION OF YOUNG

PENALTY-TRIAL DEFENDANTS, CONTROLLING FOR
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY

A

B

1. Culpability Level

Whole
Defendant
Population

a. (Low)
b. (Med)
c. (High)

250
160
100

C

D

Subpopulations of
Young Defendants
Actual DeathSentencing Rate

Expected Number of
Death Sentences if the
Whole Defendant
Population (Col. B) Were
Sentenced at the Same
Rate as the
Subpopulations of Young
Defendants (Col. C)

.10 (3/30)
.50 (5/10)
.85 (17/20)

190

510

2. Total
3. Subpopulation DeathSentencing Rates:
a. Unadjusted Rate
b. Adjusted Rate

25
80
85

.42 (25/60)
.37 (190/510)

young defendants, assuming that the defendants in it had the same
culpability distribution as the whole population of defendants, while
retaining its own individual death-sentencing rates specific to each
4 36
culpability level.
The expected numbers of death sentences for the subpopulation of
defendants are calculated by multiplying Column B by Column C,
which produces a total expected pool of 190 death sentences. This result is shown in Column D, Row 2. The culpability-adjusted deathsentencing rate for the subpopulation of young defendants is then calculated by dividing its total expected number of 190 death sentences
by the whole defendant population of 510, which is shown in Column
B, Row 2. 43 7 This produces the culpability adjusted death-sentencing
rate of .37 (190/510) for the subpopulation of young defendants in Column C.
This culpability-adjusted death-sentencing rate is the rate that
would apply if both the young defendant subpopulation in Column C
and the whole defendant population in Column B had the same culpability distribution. 4 38 The .37 adjusted rate is 5-percentage points
lower than the .42 unadjusted rate because, as a comparison of the
436. PAGNO &
437. Id.
438. Id.

GAUVREAU,

supra note 432, at 73.
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distribution of cases in Columns B and C reveals, the young defendant
(Column D) subpopulaion is more heavily weighted toward the upper
end of the culpability scale than are the cases in the whole population
in Column B.
In the Figures presented in this Article, the adjusted death-sentencing rates that we report for each subpopulation of cases are based
on a comparison of its distribution of culpability scores to the distribution of culpability scores for the whole population of death-eligible defendants in our universe.
One limitation of the direct standardization adjustment procedure
illustrated in Appendix E Table 1 is a requirement that each subgroup
of cases for which an adjustment is made contains one or more cases
at each of the culpability levels involved in the analysis. This requirement becomes problematic when the subgroups being estimated are
4 39
comparatively small.

439. This problem is also more likely to occur in this research than in the hypothetical
situation presented in Appendix E Table 1, because our adjustments are based on
multi-level culpability scales, which tend to thin the data out more than does a
three-level culpability scale. We report such data in the belief that doing so is
more informative than no data, so long as the risks of unreliability are taken into
account in their interpretation.

